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Glossary
Allemgana - Walamo Road Construction Association (AWRCA)
Multi-ethnic, although mainly Kistane Gurage, road construction orgarüsation founded in
1961 to link the eastern Gurage areas with Addis.
Arafa (Eid El Adha)
Islamic celebration for which all Moslem Gurages are expected to return to their home
village.
Awraja
Defunct administrative unit used in imperial and Derg times covering several Worredas.
Roughly approximate to the current zone.
Balebbat
Rural landowner, usually a clan head, appointed by the imperial government to collect
taxes and maintain rural order.
Beta Gurage Lemat Deregit (BGLD) Gurage Houses Development Association
Development Association formed by the Gurage Diaspora in the USA. Currently involved
with a compensatory education scheme and has previously supplied educational material
to Gurage schools distributed by GPSDO.
Buda
Gurage leather working caste.
Debo
Rotating single sex agricultural labour group consisting of six to fifteen members.
XII
EC: Ethiopian Calendar
Julian calendar. Approximately seven years and nine months behind the Gregorian
calendar.
Enamor Development Committee / Association (EDC I EDA)
One of the seven GPSDO affiliates formed in 1961.
Enset (Ensete Adulis)
The 'false banana tree'. The main crop of Gurageland and much of southern Ethiopia.
This drought resistant plant produces an edible root and stem which are processed into
'kotcho' or 'wusa' the Gurage staple food.
EPRDF: Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
Ruling party in Ethiopia consisting of a federation of several regionally and ethnically
based affiliates established by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in order to
broaden its legitimacy.
Fuga
The lowest caste of Gurage artisans. In the past they were carpenters and performed
ceremonial functions.
Gabbar system
A Feudal system imposing land appropriation by the Shoan Amhara elite and
incorporating a system of tithes payable by serfs.
GPDF: Gurage People's Democratic Front
Opposition party allegedly linked to prominent GPSDO officials.
XIII
GZDA: Gurage Zone Development Association
Formed in 1998 through the merger of the Gurage Development Association, the Kebena
Development Association and the Marako Development Association all founded in 1992.
GZNDM: Gurage Zone Nationalities Democratic Movement
The ruling political party in the Gurage Zone. Before 1998, each of the three nationalities
in the zone had separate parties: Gurage People's Revolutionary Democratic Movement,
Kebena National Democratic Organisation and Marako People's Democratic Organisation.
A member of the Southern Peoples' Democratic Front (SPDF) which is an affiliate of the
ruling Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
House (Bet)
Collection of affiliated clans that inhabited a given territory at a certain point in time. All
Sebat Bet Gurages are members of one of the seven houses.
Idir
Burial societies that provide social welfare and financial support in times of crisis such as
bereavement and major illness. Most Ethiopians belong to at least one Idir. Usually
affiliation to these institutions is based on residence or occupation. However, Gurages
have Idirs based on house, clan, sub-clan and family. Currently there is a great deal of
research by NGOs and academics into their potential to act as agents of development.
Ikube
Rotating credit associations. NGOs including GPSDO have attempted to harness them for
development purposes such as micro-finance projects.
Jafforo
Village or a common main street shared by a village of around 60 households.
xiv
Kayewa
see Yeka
Kebele
Urban dwellers association. The smallest urban administrative unit.
Listro
Shoe shiner, the archetypal first occupation for male Gurage migrants.
Mahber
Literally association. Usually used to refer to an association that celebrates saints' days.
Mercato
The main open air market in Addis Ababa, which is traditionally associated with the
Gurages.
Mescal
The finding of the true cross. The most important orthodox Christian festival for which all
Christian Gurages are expected to return to their home village.
Moher Development Committee I Association (MDC I MDA)
One of the seven GPSDO affiliates formed in 1961.
Nefura
Gurage blacksmith caste.
xv
Peasant Associations (PA)
The lowest rural administrative unit serving a population of around 5000. Originally
established by the Derg to facilitate rural participation in government and later becoming a
means of wealth extraction and social control. They are elected committees, which in
theory are a form of grassroots government.
Sebat Bet
A confederation of the seven houses (bets) inhabiting western Gurageland: Cheha, Enor
& Aner, Eza, Geta, Gomare, Indegagn and Moher & Akilil.
Senbete
Informal social gathering after church at which the community share food and tella (beer).
Communal issues are discussed. Used as an access point by Development Associations.
Shango
A customary dispute settlement forum. There are several tiers of this institution, which
relate to the layers of Sebat Bet Gurage identity. They include: Family, Jafforo/ village,
Sub clan, Clan, House and Sebat Bet - Ya Joka
Wolleba
Farming caste. Approximately 95% of the Gurage population.
Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE)
Political party created by the Derg in order to broaden its base of support.
Worreda
Administrative unit containing around 60 peasant associations and a population of
approximately % million.
xvi
Ya Joka (place name)
The supreme Shango for Sebat Bet Gurages.
Ya Kitcha
Gurage customary law. Recently 'modernised' and transcribed in a controversial process
facilitated by GPSDO.
Yeka (Moher and Kistane Gurage dialects) or Kayewa (other Sebat Bet dialects)
A group that enforces social obligations under the Gurage traditional law. In rural
Moher all members of the relevant Shango become Yeka. In Enamor and other
Sebat Bet areas, only relatives and clansmen participate in Yeka.
Zowa
The practice of removing an item from a person's house to remind them to meet their
financial obligations such as Idir contributions and fines.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I	 Statement of issues
This thesis aims to contribute towards an understanding of the relationship between
ethnicity and development in Africa. The thesis focuses critically on the notion of
development as practice, which has been defined as intentional efforts to "ameliorate the
disordered faults of progress" (Cowan and Shenton 1996 p 7). The thesis examines how,
in a particular Ethiopian case study, ethnic identities have been harnessed for, or have
directed, communal action that seeks to improve the material or social conditions of
existence. In order to understand this process, I examine the relationships constructed by
The Gurage People's Self Help and Development Organisation (GPSDO), a federation of
Sebat Bet Gurage (the seven western houses of the Gurage, see pp 7-9) ethnically-based
development associations, and the communities they seek to serve. I investigate the
extent to which the concepts such as participation and accountability, used by dominant
development discourses to analyse the relationship between development agencies and
their beneficiaries, are applicable to ethnically-based indigenous development
associations. These discourses are juxtaposed with the ways that the development
associations, their stakeholders and beneficiaries conceptualise their relationships, and
the processes and purposes of development.
There has been much academic interest in ethnicity in Africa, which has focussed
particularly on the following issues: histories of ethnic identities; the relationships between
ethnicity and the state; and the causes and effects of ethnic conflict. However, there is
little published research on the relationship between ethnicity and development as
practice. Current development discourses stress the importance of engaging with
indigenous agencies of development. However, there has been little attempt to
understand the role of ethnic identities within them or to understand the ways in which
they and their beneficiaries conceptualise their relationships.
In much of Africa, official discourses regard ethnicity as a threat to the viability of the state
and national integration, which are viewed as preconditions for development. Hence,
governments and development agencies generally regard ethnicity and ethnic identities,
as hampering development. In many African countries, community development
organisations openly or covertly based on ethnic identity play a significant role in
development and have been integrated into their countries' political systems. However, in
Ethiopia the state actively promotes ethnicity as a legitimate basis of association.
Currently the activities of ethnically-based development associations, and the nature and
implications of their ethnic basis, have been overlooked by the dominant development
discourses.
In this thesis, I argue that the relationship constructed between indigenous ethnically-
based development associations and their beneficiary communities is best understood as
a form of trusteeship (Thomas 2000c), which is underpinned by indigenous perceptions of
civic virtue, the rights and obligations inherent in notions of citizenship (Lonsdale 1992).
This perspective is different from mainstream approaches, which tend to conceptualise
trusteeship in terms of formal relationships and practices such as mechanisms of
accountability and community participation in development. Although concepts such as
participation and accountability are used in Gurage models of development, their
meanings are related to the rights and obligations embedded in Gurage notions of
citizenship. Thus to understand the relationship between indigenous ethnically-based
development associations and their beneficiaries, one must first understand the complex
web of rights and obligations that are embedded in their notions of what it means to be a
good citizen. These notions relate directly to ethnic identities as the construction of civic
virtue is an integral aspect of the construction of ethnic identities (Lonsdale 1992). As
such, the role of ethnicity within these organisations is complex. While ethnicity can act as
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a resource to be harnessed and a determinant of collective action, for Gurages, the
processes of development are part of their construction of civic virtue and thus, central to
their ethnic identities.
2	 Background
2.1	 Ethiopian ethno-federalism
In many African countries, ethnic identities are regarded as a political threat, which must
be suppressed. In the past, Ethiopia was synonymous with ethnic conflict, however, since
the assumption of power by the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) in 1991, Ethiopia has taken an innovative approach to managing ethnic
diversity. In Chapter 2, I argue that the current Ethiopian constitution uses an essentialist
conception of ethnicity, and uses ethnic identities as the basis for political empowerment.
Under a federal structure largely based on ethnic identity, the country is divided into 14
administrative regions, which officially exercise a degree of autonomy from central
government. Furthermore, the state promotes ethnicity as the primary legitimate basis of
political organisation and, by implication social organisation. Officially, the languages and
cultures of all Ethiopian ethnic groups are promoted by the state, and all ethnic groups
have the right to determine their own destinies up to and including the right to
independence.
This use of ethnicity as a central organising principle has also been reflected in the state's
development strategy, which promotes rural self-sufficiency within ethnically defined
political units. In order to achieve this aim, the state promotes ethnically-based
development associations across Ethiopia. However, as I discuss in Chapter 3, the
organisations supported by the state at present have little autonomy from it, and, as
discussed, in Chapter 7, the state has been less than supportive of independent
3
development associations. Although an evaluation of the nature of ethno-federalism is not
the main focus of this thesis, analysis of the relationship between GPSDO and the state
has wider political implications, as it contributes to an understanding of nature and
motivations of ethno-federalism. In Chapter 7, I outline the current relationship between
GPSDO and the state.
At a superficial level, the approach the Ethiopian State has adopted seems to reflect a
conception of ethnicity that enables its positive aspects to be harnessed for development
purposes. Furthermore, the early I 990s witnessed an opening of political space, which
has facilitated the expansion of associational life. Whilst in other African countries,
ethnicity is a politically sensitive subject which would make researching the relationship
between ethnically-based organisations and development difficult, I expected that there
would be a relatively open debate in Ethiopia. Thus, I assumed that, in the current political
climate, Ethiopia would provide both examples of ethnically-based development and an
open environment for their study.
Ethiopia is the second poorest country in Africa, and, for several decades, it has been
synonymous with war, cyclical famine and dependence on foreign aid. The thesis focuses
on a long-term, indigenous, Ethiopian success story, which could have lessons for other
countries. The Gurage Road Construction Organisation (GRCO) renamed The Gurage
People's Self-help and Development Organisation (GPSDO) in 1988 is the oldest and
most successful indigenous development association in Ethiopia. As such, it makes an
ideal case study to examine the relationship between indigenous development
associations and their beneficiaries.
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2.2 The Gurage
Gurageland is located in the southernmost part of the central Ethiopian plateau
approximately 150 - 250 km south of Addis Ababa. Most of Gurageland is contained within
the Gurage administrative Zone of the Southern Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples Administrative Region. The estimated population of Gurageland is three to five
million with around 2 million being Sebat Bet Gurages (Gabre 1997). In addition, it is
estimated that around 60% of Gurages now reside outside Gurageland 1
 with Gurages
making up around 20% of the population of Addis Ababa (Alemayehu 1999).
According to oral traditions, published by the Gurage Zone Culture Department (Alemu
1999), the Gurages are composed of three distinct groups of people, from Eritrea, eastern
Ethiopia and southern Ethiopia, who migrated to Gurageland around the I 3th century.
These migrants assimilated the indigenous population (Shack 1966 and 1964), a process
that appears to have continued, as Gedamu (1972) suggested that the Kistane Gurages
11 was unable to verify the accuracy of this statistic, particularly whether or not it accounts for
cyclical migration and if it includes women and children.
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assimilated other groups such as Oromos. However, at present Gurages believe that their
ethnic boundary is fixed.
The first major ethnographic work on the Sebat Bet Gurages (Shack 1966) suggested that
Gurages had a uniform culture and social organisation. However, this view was contested
by many Gurage intellectuals, notably Gedamu (1972), and was subsequently revised
(Shack 1974) to take account of significant differences in culture and social organisation
between the Sebat Bet, the focus of Shack's original research, and other Gurage
groupings. The Gurages are dMded into seventeen houses, often referred to as tribes by
informants. The Gurage houses are linguistically linked groups of clans, who inhabit a
given territory, with which they are closely associated. According to most authorities, the
Gurages have never had centralised political leadership, instead they had a segmentary
political system with authority vested in clan heads and elders (Shack 1966; Alemu 1999).
Sebat Bet Gurages are patrilineally organised with exogamous clans, hence there is
intermarriage between clans and houses with the wife adopting the clan and house of her
husband. There has been much migration within Gurageland, and currently men maintain
their original house and clan affiliations. For example if an Eza household relocates to
Cheha, they and their male children will remain Eza. This is discussed further in Chapter
8.
The rural economy is based on subsistence agriculture, with the main crop being Enset
(Ensete Adulis), the 'false banana tree' which produces an edible root and stem; this is
supplemented, in some areas, by cash crops such as chat. However, the population
densities are such that it is necessary for almost all male Gurages to migrate to other
areas of Ethiopia to generate income (Gabre 1995). The process of male urban migration
is examined in detail in Chapter 4.
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According to urban and rural Sebat Bet intellectuals, the Sebat Bet confederation took its
current form around the time of Amhara expansion at the end of the nineteenth century,
and is made up of the seven houses inhabiting the western part of Gurageland, with a
population estimated at around 2 million.
According to Shack, before 1875, the Amist Bet (five houses) formed a federation of
Cheha, Moher, Geta, Enamor and Eza (Shack 1966). The Sebat Bet came into existence
some time after 1889, when Akilil and Wollane joined the existing five (Shack 1966).
However Shack's definition of the Sebat Bet is currently contested by many Sebat Bet
intellectuals who suggest that at present the Woflane are not considered as Sebat Bet.
Shack also excludes the Gomare and lndegagn houses, which are currently regarded as
Sebat Bet. Furthermore the Moher and Akilil elders suggest that they have always been
one house.
According to GPSDO, Gurage intellectuals and the Gurage Zone government (Alemu
1999) the following houses currently make up the Sebat Bet Gurage:
Cheha	 • Enor & Aner (Enamor)
	 • Eza
Geta	 • Gomare	 • Indegagn
Moher & Akilil
At the time of writing, these houses were located in the following Worredas (administrative
districts with a population of around 250 000):
• Cheha - Cheha Worreda
• Enor & Aner and Indegagn - Enamor Worreda
• Geta and Gomare - Geta and Gomare Worreda
• Eza and Moher & Akilil - Eza and Wollane Worreda
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2.3 The Gurage People's Self-help and Development Organisation
The Gurage Road Construction Organisation (GRCO) was established in 1961 in Addis
Ababa. The organisation was founded by the urban elite, at the request of rural elders, in
order to activate urban-rural linkages within the Sebat Bet Gurage communities to
mobilise communal resources for the purpose of constructing roads to connect
Gurageland to the national highway system. The organisation has expanded its activities
from these original aims to encompass a wide range of rural development activities and, in
1988, the organisation changed its name to the Gurage People's Self-help and
Development Organisation (GPSDO).
Currently it acts as an intermediary co-ordinating the activities of seven autonomous
development committees or associations based on house affiliations 2 In the thesis, I refer
to these institutions as both sub-committees and development associations because both
terms were used by informants; for example, the Enamor Development Association is the
same entity as the Enamor development sub-committee. Although their purpose is rural
development, the organisations are based in Addis Ababa, and committee members are
all Addis residents. An elected executive committee of 14 members, with two members
representing each house, undertakes day to day management of GPSDO3. The executive
committee is responsible for implementing the overall strategy of GPSDO, decided by the
general assembly, to which it reports. The general assembly consists of 55
representatives appointed from each house by the sub-committees.
The seven autonomous sub-committees, each representing a Sebat Bet house, have a
similar organisational structure. Day to day management by the sub-committees is also by
an elected executive committee of 14 members, who report to a house-based general
assembly of 55 members selected by the committee. All work undertaken by the elected
2 Moher and Akilil have separate development associations but share representation on GPSDO
bodies.
organisational structure of GPSDO changed after the fieldwork. The organisation has
appointed a full time, paid Executive Director, who has responsibility for the day to day operations.
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representatives in the sub-committees and GPSDO is unpaid and voluntary, and in
Chapter 6, I examine notions of voluntarism within GPSDO. In theory, officials must seek
re-election every two years, however, as discussed later this has not always been the
case.
Since the completion of the road network, the main function of GPSDO has been to co-
ordinate, build the capacity of, and provide technical assistance to the sub-committees. To
facilitate this process it, has employed project officers to assist in producing proposals and
designing projects. As the registered legal entity, GPSDO initiates partnerships with
international NGOs on behalf of the sub-committees. In theory, each house committee
meets on a weekly basis, sharing the facilities of GPSDO on alternate days, to discuss
ongoing development issues.
In the past, each house sub-committee had a rural sub-committee consisting of elders,
representatives of the government and other concerned people, which acted as a point of
liaison with the rural community. However, whilst some of these committees continue to
function, others have lapsed or are only engaged on an ad hoc basis for specific
purposes.
After the construction of the first road, GRCO invested surplus money into a public
transport operation to ensure a sustainable supply of funds for future operations. These
contributions were supplemented by charging tolls on the road they had constructed, and
the organisation was well financed. However, as discussed in Chapter 7, in 1998, the
government prohibited the practice of charging tolls, and the activities of the transport
operation were constrained. As its main sources of income have been removed, GPSDO
is now in financial difficulties. The financial position of the sub-committees and their
sources of income vary. Most sub-committees receive ad hoc contributions from urban
clan and house based Idirs (burial societies) and the urban and rural communities for
specific projects. Some sub-committees also have long-established links with Idirs, which
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charge their members a one Birr (nine pence) monthly development levy on behalf of the
sub-committee.
The achievements of GRCO/GPSDO and the sub-committees have included:
• The construction and maintenance of over 500 km of all weather roads
• The construction and maintenance of six high schools
• The construction and maintenance of many primary schools
• The electrification of several towns
• Providing several towns with access to water
• Installing telephone services in several towns
• Constructing adult literacy centres
• The construction of seven women's literacy centres and seven kindergartens in
conjunction with international NGOs.
• Lobbying all levels of government for services for Sebat Bet Gurageland.
The profile of GPSDO was such that it was invited to participate in the United Nations
World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995.
3	 Structure of the thesis
In Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature on the meaning of development and the role
of development agencies in development as practice. I then explore issues relating to the
construction of trusteeship between NGOs and beneficiaries, with particular reference to
indigenous development associations. In section 3, I examine theoretical approaches to
ethnicity in Africa, and outline the lack of research into the relationship between
development as practice and ethnicity. I then look at the uses and limitations of ethnicity
as an analytical concept. I conclude the Chapter by drawing together the previous
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discussions and presenting an approach to analysing the role of ethnicity in indigenous
ethnically-based development associations.
In Chapter 3, I detail my methodological approach. I emphasise the importance of
applying analytical concepts in the terms used by informants, and discuss the possible
impact of my research on Gurage identities and relationships within the group. The
chapter outlines the process of data gathering, and explains the reasoning behind the
selection of the case study organisations, informants, and the implications of these
decisions.
In Chapter 4, I outline the causes of Gurage migration and discuss the social world
constructed by Sebat Bet Gurage migrants. I emphasise the centrality of social networks,
and the rights and obligations embedded within them to Sebat Bet Gurage migratory
survival strategies. I argue that these relationships, based on an institutionalisation of
urban reciprocity and urban rural inter-dependence, are an essential element of Gurage
citizenship.
In Chapter 5, I discuss Sebat Bet Gurage perceptions of the purpose of development. I
relate these perceptions to their survival strategies and notions of civic virtue. The central
argument is that, according to the dominant Sebat Bet Gurage perception, development
must facilitate their survival strategies and take the forms of a tangible public good, which
is in turn interpreted by their notions of civic virtue.
In Chapter 6, I examine Gurage perceptions of the process of development, and explain
the forms of trusteeship constructed between GPSDO and Sebat Bet Gurages. I explain
indigenous perceptions of terms such as participation, voluntarism and accountability. I
argue that these terms are made meaningful to Gurages by reference to the rights and
obligations embedded in Gurage notions of civic virtue.
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In Chapter 7, I trace the evolution of the relationships between GRCO / GPSDO and the
Ethiopian state. I argue that the survival of the organisation is due to accommodations
constructed between the Gurage elite and the imperial and Derg regimes. However, this
accommodation has broken down under EPRDF rule, due to a range of factors including,
competing models of development and political pressures.
In Chapter 8, I conclude the thesis by drawing together the previous chapters to explain
the role of identities in the indigenous Sebat Bet Gurage model of development. I outline
the contemporary constructions of Gurage identity, and examine the various roles that
identities have played in GPSDO, including the role of ethnicity as a resource to be
harnessed for development purposes. I outline how ethnic and other identities have been
constructed to make sense of conflicts within GPSDO and its relationships with external
forces. I also look at contemporary social and demographic changes, and how these have
affected Gurage identities and GPSDO. I conclude by explaining how communal
participation in development has become an integral aspect in the dominant constructions
of Gurage civic virtue. As such, I argue that under the current constructions of Gurage
identities, to be a Gurage, one must participate in development.
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Chapter 2
Literature review:
Ethnically-based development associations, develo pment as practice and
trusteeship
I	 Introduction
This chapter is structured into three sections. Section 2 examines how development and
the relationship between agents of deve'opment and their beneficiaries have been
conceptualised. In section 3, I examine the theoretical approaches to ethnicity in Africa. I
investigate why there has been little examination of the relationship between ethnicity and
development as practice, and what notions of ethnicity are implicit in the dominant
development discourses. I conclude the section by reflecting on the uses and limitations of
ethnicity as an analytical tool. In section 4, I synthesise the previous two sections, and
examine ways in which the role of ethnicity within indigenous development organisations
can be conceptualised.
2	 Development
This section examines the literature on the relationship between indigenous development
associations and the communities they seek to serve. I begin by examining the meanings
of the term development particularly focusing on the notion of trusteeship between the
agents and objects of development. 1 then locate the role of indigenous development
associations as agents of development in the dominant development discourses. I then
discuss the various practices that the literature suggests are used to construct the
trusteeship between development agencies and the community. The section concludes
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with a discussion of the role of indigenous development associations in civil society.
2.1	 The meanings of development
Development has always been a contested concept. Recent debates have sought to
demystify the conceptualisations of development and place them in historical context. This
section draws heavily on three particular texts, which have sought to synthesise and take
forward the debate, (Cowan and Shenton 1996; Thomas 2000a; Thomas 2000c). Thomas
distinguishes three interrelated meanings of development, which are important for this
thesis:
1. Development as an evolutionary historical process, particularly the immanent
development of capitalism.
2. Development as practice, defined as, intentional efforts to "ameliorate the disordered
faults of progress" (Cowan and Shenton 1996 p 7).
3. Development as a vision of a desirable society.
These authors analyse the evolution of the concept of development in its historical
context. Thus, for Cowan and Shenton, the modem doctrine of development was
constructed to alleviate the social disruption that was caused by and threatened industrial
capitalism. Later the geopolitical environment shaped the nature of the debates about the
meaning of development. The cold war period was characterised by global competition
between capitalism and state socialism, which, as Thomas points out, was reflected in the
debates about the nature of development. In this period, the competing models of a
desirable society generated distinct forms of development. According to Thomas, in the
post cold war period the global dominance of liberal capitalism has led it to become the
only point of reference for debates about the nature of development (Thomas 2000c).
Critically, these authors suggest that currently the dominant meanings of development are
determined by the most powerful development actors, multilateral agencies and those
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linked to northern governments. This has led to the dominance of 'development as
practice', as development is defined as being whatever is done in the name of
development by powerful development agencies. For Thomas, this has led to visions of
development becoming little more than techniques and targets, with little understanding of
the relationship between evolutionary and purposive development (Thomas 2000c). As
debates about practice within powerful sectors in the context of liberal capitalism are what
define development, it is difficult for the marginalised to contest these meanings.
Debates about the meaning of the term development are now restricted to disputing the
nature of the relationship between capitalism and purposive development and who has
the right to perform development on behalf of the marginalised. According to Thomas, "the
suggestion that development in its dominant meaning is now somewhat restricted and
refers mainly to practice does not mean that debates and disagreements about
development have ceased. However, the main axes of debate have shifted from
opposition between major theoretical positions or models of social transformation to
differences about the form and extent of intervention or which agencies have the right to
intervene." (Thomas 2000c p779) Thus, the dominant development paradigms now share
a basic assumption about the nature of the relationship between liberal capitalism and
development. Debates now focus on the nature of intervention in the market, ranging from
those who regard the market as incapable of bringing about development and requiring
regulation, to those who regard the role of intervention as being to ameliorate the worst
aspects of the market.
The dominant forces that currently drive the development discourses should not be seen
as monolithic and all-powerful. Thomas argues that development agencies have adopted
concepts, such as sustainable participatory development, and can be influenced by civil
society. However, the logic of Thomas' argument would suggest that although
development agencies have adopted the language used by civil society this process has
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significantly changed the meanings of already contested concepts. This point is discussed
below in relation to participation and civil society.
Critiques of the dominant development discourses do not all question the relationship
between liberal capitalism and development. However, they generally reject the notion
that development agencies in the north should decide how other people should be
developed. Anti-development writers contest northern constructions of development goals
and processes (Escobar 1992). Whilst people-centred approaches such as that of Korten
(1995), are based on a normative vision of development, with guiding principles such as,
reducing poverty and increasing freedom. This approach involves redistribution of power
and transforming institutions and it is thus, for Thomas, an advance on development as
practice (Thomas 2000c). Although Thomas criticises people-centred approaches for
being theoretically incomplete and lacking suggestions of how to implement their visions,
the central thrust of people-centred development is that theorists do not implement their
visions. Rather, it is the 'objects' of development, the beneficiaries, who are the primary
agents of social change. As a critique of mainstream approaches, people-centred
development provides important reminders of the principles that should guide
development interventions. People-centred approaches also focus on the importance of
small-scale interventions, and thus provide the beginnings of a theoretical approach to
conceptualising localised development endeavour, something the mainstream approaches
have failed to do.
For the purposes of this thesis, the salient distinction between the dominant development
discourse and alternative approaches is the way in which they conceptualise the nature of
the relationship between development agencies and beneficiaries. Thomas suggests that,
"both mainstream interventionism and people-centred development concentrate on
development as practice. The debate is about whether development should be done on
behalf of others or whether people should somehow be empowered to develop
themselves" (Thomas 2000c p782).
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Although this issue has increasingly been seen as a central aspect of the development
process, attempts to theorise the relationship between agencies and beneficiaries are
relatively new. Cowan and Shenton apply the term of trusteeship to situations when one
agency is entrusted to act on behalf of others. Thomas suggests trusteeship is dependent
on the effectiveness and legitimacy of development interventions (Thomas and Allen
2000b). However, the conception of trusteeship outlined by Cowan and Shenton and
Thomas is in itself a form of legitimacy, and thus to suggest that trusteeship is based on
legitimacy seems somewhat tautological. Furthermore, the terms effectiveness and
legitimacy are in themselves complex and ambiguous and require further explanation,
particularly regarding, who defines them, who determines whether interventions are
legitimate and effective and on what basis, and the nature of the contradictions between
these terms.
Thomas suggests that people can only become their own agents of development if they
are empowered through promotion by an agency such as an indigenous development
association (Thomas and Allen 2000b). In this case, the leadership becomes the trustees.
The nature of this trusteeship raises a number of questions, which will be addressed by
the thesis, such as: Are indigenous leaders any more accountable than other
development agencies? Do they have to be accountable? Who are they accountable to?
Does this accountability take different forms related to the local conditions? This leads to a
more fundamental question of whether the concepts used by the dominant development
discourses are appropriate to analyse the relationships between the various types of
indigenous development associations and their beneficiaries. Thomas suggests that the
term trusteeship should not be given a universal meaning and should not be applied
indiscriminately to all development agencies, as cultural differences must be taken into
account (Thomas and Allen 2000b). However, the terms community and culture must be
critically evaluated (see sections 2.2.2 and 3) and related to an understanding of how local
people construct their own meanings of the term development. The thesis will investigate
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how meanings of development and trusteeship are related o indigenous cultures,
people's survival strategies and the relationships embedded within them. More
fundamentally, the thesis critically examines the meaning of the idea of empowering
people to direct their own development through indigenous development associations.
1.2	 Purposive development and the role of NGO Interventions
This section focuses on NGOs, as the literature on NGOs and development can act as a
point of reference in examining the role of indigenous development associations and the
nature of their trusteeship. The section critically examines the issues that the dominant
development discourses treat as the basis of the trusteeship between NGOs and the
beneficiaries of their actMties. It focuses particularly on how and if these concepts can be
applied to indigenous development associations. The development discourses discussed
below were constructed as a means of analysing and to some extent legitimising the
activities of international NGOs. Research into indigenous NGOs has been less evident
and has tended to follow the debates related to international NGOs. The most accessible
literature on indigenous ethnically-based NGOs has focused on Hometown or Ethnic
Associations in West Africa with more limited research on the Harambee movements in
Kenya and Sudanese Migrant Workers' Associations. In many parts of Africa, these
organisations play a crucial role in the social, political, economic and cultural life of the
population. According to Mcnulty, Hometown Associations are the most important element
of civil society in Nigeria (Mcnulty and Lawrence 1996). Whilst in Kenya 90% of the rural
population participate in Harambee organisations which operate most schools and provide
significant health and other basic services (Barkan 1992). The bulk of research in this
area, to date, is by geographers and political scientists with little contribution from
development studies. Thus, the focus of research into indigenous, ethnically-based NGOs
reflects the orientation of these disciplines and is influenced by governmental policy
concerns. For example, Agbese outlines how research in this area has shifted from
18
emphasis on urbanisation in the 1960s to rural infrastructure in the 1970s with the current
focus on civil society and democratisation (Agbese 1996). However, before discussing the
nature of trusteeship and indigenous NGOs it is necessary to locate the role of NGOs as
agents of development in the dominant contemporary discourses of interventionism. I then
go on to examine some key concepts in the contemporary discourses around the
relationship between trustees and beneficiaries: participation, accountability and
effectiveness.
1.2.1 The role of NGOs in the interventionist approaches
Under both the modemisation and structuralist paradigms, a strong state was considered
the primary engine of development. However, the role of the state as the main engine of
development has been critiqued from both structuralist and neo-Iiberal perspectives.
Some strands of structuralism emphasise the negative effects of the elites' dependence
on their position in the state. For example, Ake (1993) regards the post colonial African
state as the primary source of economic advancement as it dominates economic
opportunities. In this context, the state becomes the focus of economic competition and
political activity becomes a scramble for access to resources distributed by the state.
The most significant critique of the role of the state in development, in terms of its impact
on policy, has come from the neo-liberal perspective that dominated the discourses of
major donors in the 1980s and continues to be highly influential. This perspective views
the state as inherently monopolistic and self-serving, as it is not subject to the rigours of
the market it becomes inefficient and lacks the expertise to judge the market. Its
domination of the economy and interference in the market leads it to inhibit the
development of free markets, which will facilitate the entrepreneurial instincts of the
population, which in turn are believed to drive development. This ideology has taken
concrete form in the policies of the IMF and other major international donors. These
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policies charactensed by Robinson (1993) as the New Policy Agenda (NPA) emphasise
rationalisation and contraction of the provision of state services and a reduction in state
intervention in the economy in order to increase efficiency. Tied to this is the spread of
democratisation to hold the state to account in the areas where it still performs a role. In
the context of this retrenchment of the role of the state, the private sector, operating within
the free market, is envisaged as performing many development functions.
As discussed above, both undiluted neo-liberalism and structuralism are currently out of
favour, and the NPA of the early I 990s has evolved into the dominant interventionist
paradigms, in which interventions may be carried out by many types of agency, including
the state. Thus, the debate over the advantages of the state and market as engines of
development has been supplanted by discussion over the nature of the relationship
between the development of capitalism and purposive development to benefit the poor
and marginalised. This approach accepts that the market can fail to provide essential
services, particularly for the marginalised, and thus some non-market intervention is
necessary. The state is considered as having the capacity to provide public services, such
as health and education, either directly or creating a regulatory framework and co-
ordinating development within civil society including the activities of international NGOs
and local NGOs. It has been suggested that NGOs have comparative advantages over
the state and private sectors in alleviating socio-economic problems, as they are seen as
being more flexible and responsive than the state and unlike the private sector, NGOs are
driven by values rather than profit However, the perception that NGOs have a
comparative advantage over the state is also highly contested. Edwards suggests that,
"there is increasing evidence that NGOs and indigenous NGOs do not perform as
effectively as had been assumed in terms of poverty reach, cost-effectiveness,
sustainability, popular participation (including gender), flexibility and innovation (and that]
there is no empirical study which demonstrates a general case that NGO provision is
cheaper than public provision" (Edwards and Hulme 1995 p6).
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1.2.2 Participation
The next two sections address the role of the interrelated concepts of participation and
accountability in constructing trusteeship between indigenous NGOs and their
beneficiaries. The discourses on accountability and participation address the issues of
who defines the goals and methods of development, who should benefit from
development and how they should benefit. These discourses have tended to gravitate
towards the contested concept of participatory development, which has become the
'hallmark' (Wood 1997) of NGOs. The participation discourses serve as a means of
legitimisation and differentiation for NGOs, as they reflect a belated acknowledgement
that many previous attempts at development failed. The dominant development
discourses perceive the participatory approaches as more effective as they aim to
harness local skills and knowledge. Furthermore, they are more likely to be sustainable
and perceived as legitimate as they mobilise communities. Ideologically they may be
related to indigenous responses to developmental needs such as Gandhian philosophy
and African self-help.
Participatory approaches are based on a conception of development similar to that
outlined by Rondinelli: an uncertain, complex process characterised by a lack of
knowledge and the need for constant social learning (Rondinelli 1993). This conception of
development coincides with the perceived advantages of NGOs outlined above. It is also
related to an acknowledgement of the potential contribution that the indigenous
knowledge systems and organisational forms, particularly of the marginalised, can make
to development interventions. There are, however, a multiplicity of meanings ascribed to
participatory development, which reflect both the processes of negotiation of competing
interests within development, and the influence of different ideas, such as
conscientisation, self-help philosophies and post-fordist business practice. These
differences become apparent when one investigates the differing forms that participatory
development takes. The various activities labelled as participatory development can be
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viewed as a continuum with participation as a process of community empowerment at one
end, and participation as an instrumental approach to the use of community resources at
the other. Community empowerment challenges socio-economic structures through
building the capacity of indigenous agents of development. In contrast, the instrumental
approaches involve the use of communal resources to implement externally pre-
determined blueprints of development. Between these extremes are a range of
participatory methods used by development practitioners to facilitate beneficiary
involvement in the process of identifying problems and developing sustainable solutions.
The central areas of debate within this literature focus on the power relationships between
development agencies and beneficiaries, particularly, in the context of the constraints
placed on NGOs by their relationship with donors. The power differentials relate to
differences between development practitioners and beneficiaries in terms of resources,
education, status, and knowledge, and are framed by a lack of beneficiary sanctions other
than withdrawal. The literature frequently focuses on the means used to reduce these
imbalances. Shah and Shah for example suggest that participatory rural appraisal (PRA)
functions successfully when both beneficiaries and fleldworkers have been trained in
appropriate methods, in order to facilitate shared knowledge and decision-making (Shah
and Shah 1995). From an NGO perspective, the focus is on the institutional obstacles to
these power reversals. Chambers sites this in the inherent contradictions between linear
planning, which implies predetermined outcomes and learning methods as, "preceded by
top down planning, however logical, participation becomes submissive: 'they' participate in
'our' project" (Chambers 1995). This methodological contradiction is compounded by the
hierarchical structure of development organisations, which inhibits fleldworkers' ability to
facilitate power reversals in their dealings with beneficiaries (Chambers 1995). However,
there are constraints on the ability of international NGOs to adopt these participatory
methods. For example, Dichter discusses how attachments to participatory methods tend
to compromise organisations' core management skills. He draws a distinction between the
need for survival and effectiveness, which require the same management skills as the
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commercial sector, and the value driven aims of NGOs and symbols of good development
practice (Dichter 1989).
The assumption that people want to participate is rarely questioned by the dominant
development discourses. There could well be contradictions between participatory
methods, developed in the west and indigenous knowledge systems and organisational
forms that they seek to harness. For example, Wanigaratne sees PRA as an 'alien
concept' imposed upon the historically evolved socio-cultural base of Sri Lanka.
(Wanigaratne 1997). This approach could be characterised as a selective articulation of
culture by interests threatened by the empowerment of the marginalised, however,
grassroots activists have suggested that the disruption to patterns of dispute settlement
caused by the introduction of participatory methods could also impact negatively on the
marginalised (Menike 1997). Whilst the power relations between NGOs and beneficiaries
are discussed at length, in the participation literature, there is a tendency to see
beneficiary communities as homogenous and interest free. It is implicit in these
approaches that social change is dependent on the perceptions and behaviour of the
beneficiaries, however, this is rarely related to wider social forces and many of the
implications of social change are neglected. This may be partially due to a positive sum
approach to the potentially limitless number of stakeholders in the success of
interventions. If the unequal distribution of power and property relations rather than
technological and capital deficits are seen as the causes of poverty and marginalisation,
the gains made by the marginalised will involve a zero sum conception of power as they
will be at the expense of the powerful. This is particularly the case in the developing world
where the limited size of the economy and the terms of its integration into world markets
limits the potential areas for economic gain. However, it is likely that if empowerment of
local communities is institutionalised, the authority of decision-makers and the property
and power relations that they represent will be questioned. It is also necessary to examine
who the primary beneficiaries of interventions are, as it is likely that the structures created
23
by participatory methods will reflect the differentials in the local power and status
hierarchies.
Thus, whilst there is some understanding of the probability that the interventions by
international NGOs will create patron client relationships between themselves and
beneficiaries, these interventions are rarely examined in the context of the systems of
domination and politico-economic culture operating within localised power structures.
The literature on indigenous ethnically-based development associations does not
investigate the nature of participation directly, instead treating it as an aspect of spatial
relationships embedded in the organisations. These organisations claim to be, and are
presented by researchers as, the main means of community participation in economic and
social development. However, participation is treated as an unproblematic self-
explanatory concept. The forms of participation described in this work tend to reflect local
and national power relations rather than challenging them, as the nature and extent of
participation vary between different sections of the community. Through self-help
schemes, the poorer and more marginalised sections contribute resources, particularly
labour, to projects determined by the elite. Barkan suggests that inputs to the associations
are defined by the relative skills of the membership, with the elite using their contacts,
financial resources and technical skills, whilst other groups, such as the peasantry,
contribute labour (Barkan 1992). Decision-making, planning and management tend to
remain in the hands of the leadership or state. The disproportionate wealth, status and
connections of the urban branches structure these relationships. In most cases external
urban chapters contribute the majority of financial resources and are more likely to have
access to the connections necessary to lobby the state (Mcnulty and Lawrence 1996;
Pratten and Baldo 1995). This is related to the nature of the specific activities of the
associations: the more complex and costly a project, the greater the need for material
support and accessing networks of decision-makers (Barkan 1992).
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There is a correlation between the social groups responsible for founding or reviving
indigenous development associations and those who control them. These organisations
are structured to facilitate the participation of educated returnees with bureaucratic links,
in terms of imposing their definitions of communal needs and cementing their status and
power. Although the local elites may wish to inculcate a self-help mentality within the
population, this is a process structured by and institutionalising their control of the key
decision-making roles arid, particularly for complex projects, is also dependent on the
elites' skills, contacts and wealth for success.
The form of participation illustrated above includes aspects from both ends of the
instrumental - empowerment continuum. The role of members of the community would
appear to be instrumental whilst the elite takes decisions. It cannot be assumed that
indigenous development associations incorporate the values of participation embedded in
the dominant development discourses, by virtue of being local and indigenous, or by
claiming to represent the community. This suggests that the concept of participation is not
adequate to understand the nature of the community and the power relations embedded
within it. The literature on indigenous ethnically-based organisations investigates the
effects of differential patterns of participation on urban rural relationships within the
organisations, highlighting differing needs of the urban and rural communities. The urban
sectors tend to require welfare and social networks (Lentz 1995; Pratten and Baldo 1995),
whereas the rural chapters emphasise the need for education and infrastructure.
However, this approach overlooks other impacts of the nature of participation in
indigenous development associations. Furthermore, this analysis is based on the
assumption of an urban-rural dualism or separation of interests, which could well be
artificial (see Chapter 4).
An assessment of this literature suggests that the extent of participation in the decision-
making processes within indigenous development associations should be analysed in
terms of local expectations rather than western definitions. For example, in the case of
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Kenyan indigenous development associations, Cosway outlines how the results of
decision-making by the high status groups are presented to the community through
meetings to generate consensual agreement. In this process there was a tendency to
accept 'traditional knowledge and authority' (Cosway and Anakum 1996). As decision-
making structures within these organisations are likely to reflect the hierarchies within the
communities, strengthening indigenous institutions may well reinforce the structural
conditions that cause poverty and powerlessness (Covey 1995). The impact of this form of
participation is seen to be mitigated to some extent by the obligations and rights inherent
in reciprocal arrangements expected of successful community members (Mahieu 1990
cited in (Woods 1994)). Whilst appreciating that Africans may have cultural preferences
for collective and consensual forms of decision-making (Verhelst 1987), concepts such as
traditional or consensual leadership must be problematised and examined in their socio-
political and historical context. One of the major gaps in this literature is that there has
been little critical investigation of the relationship between indigenous development
associations and other indigenous institutions or 'traditional' forms of leadership.
Furthermore, there is little investigation of the meanings, nature and implications of the
reciprocal arrangements embedded within the development associations. In section 3, I
examine constructions of tradition and culture to illustrate their relationship with both
interests within the community and the external socio-political context.
1.2.3 Accountability
The second way that trusteeship is seen to be constructed by the dominant development
discourses is embedded in the term accountability. Within the dominant development
discourses, analysis of the accountability of indigenous development associations tends to
be subsumed under a wider debate about the accountability of NGOs to their
stakeholders, particularly donors. The accountability of indigenous development
associations to the communities they represent is highly problematic, as it is necessary to
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understand both the sections of the community they are accountable to and what aspects
of their activities they are accountable. These difficulties are compounded by the way that
the dominant development discourses analyse indigenous development associations as
membership organisations and thus assume that their primary accountability is to their
members. This relates to Uphoff's characterisation of indigenous NGOs as the third sector
driven by the interests of their members and is a basis of their perceived comparative
advantages over state and international NGO based interventions. However, the term
membership is highly problematic and seems to have different meanings to researchers
and to the organisations they investigate. Organisations such as Hometown Associations
use a broader but less tangible notion of community membership, as they conceptualise
membership in an ascriptive sense, whereby the whole 'community' is assumed to be
members of the organisation. Thus, they claim to act on behalf of the whole community.
This causes problems in applying the development discourses to indigenous
organisations, as the development discourses have tended to use artificial analytical
constructs to distinguish between membership organisations and southern NGOs,
whereas many indigenous development associations have characteristics associated with
both forms of organisation.
Within the dominant development discourses, there is an assumption that indigenous
development associations by virtue of being indigenous are more accountable than other
development agencies. However, Uphoff suggests that indigenous NGOs also require
internal mechanisms of accountability, citing Michels' 'iron law' that organisations with
distinctions of status and education are likely to become oligarchic (Uphoff 1995). Thus,
their status as membership organisations does not automatically correlate with their being
accountable for their decision-making. However, I suggest that these processes of
accountability should be located within local political structures and the impact of local
culture should be examined rather than relating these oligarchic tendencies to the nature
of organisations. Marzouk suggests that, in Arab countries, the use of 'traditional' models
of authority, characterised as hierarchical, centralised and undemocratic, operate as a
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means of social and political advancement: "NGOs reproduce the same authoritarian
structures that govern ... political and social life in general" (Marzouk 1997). These
processes affect the suitability of applying northern terms such as accountability to
processes in the south. This view is backed by evidence from Bangladesh presented by
Wood, who suggests that indigenous organisational culture is a reflection of wider
authoritarian and hierarchical social relations involving the transference of patriarchal
multi-stranded ties to an organisational context (Wood 1997). The nature of membership
participation in decision-making is likely to take a different form from the format processes
of accountability highlighted in the dominant development discourses.
The literature on indigenous development associations uses a different terminology that
reflects the current preoccupation with the role of these associations in civil society. This
literature focuses on internal democracy in the associations, however there is a tendency
to accept the claims at face value rather than to analyse them. For example, Wahab
(1996) suggests that the appointment of officers and decision-making in Nigerian
Hometown Associations is democratic, but offers no evidence to support this. According to
Pratten and Baldo , a multitude of rival power bases coupled with institutional checks and
balances ensure equity within Sudanese migrant workers associations (Pratten and Baldo
1995). Conflicting evidence is provided by Mcnulty and Lawrence, who contrasts the
Nigerian Hometown Associations' self image, as a democratic grassroots local
government and the existence of a leadership dominated by an elite comprised of the
highly educated and businessmen (Mcnulty and Lawrence 1996). Similarly Woods
suggests that, in Hometown Associations in Cote D' lvoire, although there is some
consultation and downward dissemination of information there is little formal democracy.
Instead, the associations are dominated by local notables, whose position seems to be
based on wealth and political connections (Woods 1994). This view is reinforced by
Barkan, who suggests that Hometown Associations are controlled by local oligarchies,
whilst the leadership of Harambees is concentrated with relatively wealthy landowners
(Barkan 1992). The dominant view of this literature is that the local elites control the
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formal structures of these indigenous development associations, however, there is little
analysis of less tangible forms of accountability such as informal pressure and culturally-
based expectations. Lentz draws an important conceptual distinction between formal and
informal structures of accountability and practice by highlighting how activists can exercise
de-facto control of the association by flexibly interpreting the formally democratic
structures (Lentz 1995). However, she and others tend to accept uncritically northern
notions of democracy and accountability and apply them to southern contexts. There is no
attempt to investigate how communities perceive accountability and in which
circumstances they would regard it as important.
2.2.4 Effectiveness
The third aspect to the construction of trusteeship between indigenous NGOs and
beneficiaries is effectiveness. Analysis of effectiveness by the dominant development
discourses tends to be influenced by discussion of the accountability of international
NGOs to donors. To the extent that development is seen as a series of targets (Thomas
2000c), the dominant development discourses tend to focus on tangible and quantifiable
aspects of effectiveness.
The literature on indigenous NGOs provides surprisingly little analysis of the physical
results of their activities. Barkan has analysed the provision of education and health
services and concludes that, while they appear to provide universal benefits, there is an
increase in end-user charging that may well restrict these benefits to those who can afford
to pay (Barkan 1992). This is, however, popular with the poorer sectors of the community
as it increases their status and deflects accusations of free loading. Mcnulty and
Lawrence (1996) identify an emphasis on increasing the value of current investments
rather than creating new productive capacity within the locality. However, the distinction
they outline is blurred, as infrastructure such as communications is vital to the
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development of productive capacity. However, it is important to note that some of the
projects he describes, such as the installation of telecommunications and electricity, are
resourced by a wide section of the community but may benefit the wealthy
disproportionately. There is awareness, in this literature, that these associations do not
necessarily make the most cost-effective use of the resources at their disposal. Wahab
(1996) suggests that the Nigerian home town association he studied, tended to
concentrate on symbolic projects, such as spending 25 years building a palace for the
local 'traditional ruler', an activity which seems to bear little relation to providing for the
needs of the marginalised. Similarly, the tendency identified by Woods (1994) to increase
the rate of return on current investments rather than to increase overall productive
capacity may well run counter to values, in the dominant development discourses, of
helping the most marginalised sectors of communities.
Edwards suggests that there is little evidence of indigenous NGOs performing more
effectively than the state (Edwards and Hulme 1995). However, it is likely that if
development interventions using indigenous NGOs are seen as legitimate by the
beneficiaries, they are likely to be more sustainable than International NGO projects
imposed from above. Furthermore, there has been lithe analysis of beneficiary
perceptions of effectiveness, which researchers tend to define as the organisation's
history of providing concrete and symbolic benefits to the community. For example, Covey
suggests that the legitimacy of indigenous NGOs is dependent on their effectiveness
(Covey 1995). It would appear that the authority of the leadership is dependent on its
abilities to secure resources through lobbying, contacts and fundraising and whether it can
mobilise the community. Generally the effectiveness of the association is dependent on
the leadership's somewhat personalised relationships with the state which mirrors the
local elite's overlapping occupational and associational roles and networks of contacts.
Mobilising the community as part of the process of development could well be regarded as
a form of effectiveness. Alternative conceptions of effectiveness could include less
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tangible aspects such as the ability to generate stability and consensus within the
community and promoting the self-image of the group. The utility of this approach goes
beyond it being a precondition for successful community development as it places an
additional emphasis on the values of consensus and social harmony (Verhelst 1987; Ake
1993).
2.3	 The role of indigenous NGOs in civil society
The other main issue relating to the relationship between indigenous NGOs and the
communities is how these organisations give their beneficiaries a stake in society through
their role in civil society. In the dominant development discourses, discussion of the role of
NGOs in civil society is subsumed under a wider discourse of good governance. In
contrast to the anti-statism that characterised development discourses in the eighties,
there is currently a constructive engagement with the state by NGOs through
complementary arrangements with each sector focusing on their areas of comparative
advantage. This is based on a vision of empowered communities represented by a vibrant
grassroots sector with NGOs mediating between competing interests and acting as a
bridge between the state and citizens. However, as Covey suggests, there is no automatic
correlation between a strong grassroots sector within civil society and strong advocacy
role for NGOs (Covey 1995). Within the development literature there are only vague
references to the mechanisms that will institutionalise NGO participation in this process.
These approaches presuppose that the state has the capacity or interest to respond
constructively and evenly to the demands placed upon it by civil society. It is crucial to
investigate the definitions of the state and civil society inherent in these approaches.
Wood draws an analogy between contemporary notions of civil society and the central
flaws of modernisation theory, both founded on the application of western myths to
developing societies (Wood 1997). Universalistic ideas of progress which seem to
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underpin the neo-liberal elements of the NPA have been largely discredited in favour of
seeing social organisation as socio-historically specific. Pearce suggests that, "the
importance of civil society lies not in its use as a descriptive term for some observable
reality but precisely in the way it has been used historically to construct different
conceptions of the relationship between the state and the associations and groups of
society" (Pearce 1997 p270). Thus, civil society is regarded as an unproblematic concept
identical to European style corporatism or American pluralism. However, the operation of
civil society in Africa can only be understood by examining how the state is culturally and
institutionally rooted in society and the forms of domination it uses. For the purposes of
the thesis, the role of indigenous NGOs is examined in the context of the African forms of
corporatism discussed in section 2.3. This would suggest that the empowerment of the
marginalised would take place within the context of complex institutional and normative
frameworks that operate to serve the interests of the powerful and diffuse the demands of
the powerless. Hodson is aware of the impact of structures of domination and suggests
that international NGOs must ensure that the funding of indigenous NGOs is outside state
patronage systems (Hodson 1997). It also seems likely that the process of strengthening
the role of indigenous NGOs within civil society will disproportionately benefit local elites.
This approach also seriously questions the ability of a non-autonomised political elite to
act as a disinterested co-ordinator of civil society.
Allied to the emphasis on increasing accountability are moves to localise decision-making
to make it more responsive to the needs of communities. This may increase the
involvement of communities in decision-making on local issues, however, it is necessary
to distinguish between the decentralisation of responsibility and power in a wider context.
Schuurman argues that decentralisation is likely to lead to greater marginalisation, as
impoverished communities and the bureaucrats working with them are given greater
responsibilities for resoMng problems rooted in macro factors without the resources to
resolve them (Schuurman 1997). Furthermore, if the lack of state accountability to the
population is related to the use of the state by elites as a source of accumulation,
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localising this process will increase the autonomy of local elites from the central
government rather than acting as a means to hold the state to account. For Wood (1997),
the central contradiction in the civil society discourse is between strengthening the
capacity of civil society to make demands of the state whilst simultaneously reducing the
capacity of the state to meet these demands. In this context Nelson and Wright identify a
process of appropriation of the concepts of participation and self help by powerful
development agencies, such as the IMF, to shift responsibility for welfare onto individuals
and particularly women (Nelson and Wright 1995).
In the past, according to Barkan, civil society was overlooked by researchers and
governments as its constituent parts were perceived to reflect ethnic and regional
cleavages and were thus a barrier to political integration rather than potential agents of
democratisation (Barkan 1992). Barkan proposes a neo-modemisation model of
development where the institutionalisation of relationships between organised interests
and the state is central to the construction of a viable and accountable political system,
which is in turn key to securing improved economic performance. He sees a direct
correlation between the capacity of local institutions to organise and promote their
interests and governmental accountability, as these groups increasingly act as a bulwark
against the state. This model is underpinned by a positive sum conception of power as the
process of strengthening civil society through enabling local elites to hold the state to
account will simultaneously reinforce the state through strengthening its social base whilst
not exacerbating ethno-political cleavages. Barkan (1992) mentions the role of the Kenyan
government strategies that enmesh the Harambee movements and politicians in networks
of patronage in order to shift the emphasis of politicians to community service and thereby
reduce parliamentary dissent. However, the effects on the organisations are not integrated
into his theoretical approach. Woods (1994) investigates how state policies, particularly in
relation to the allocation of resources shape associational life. His analysis of the role of
Hometown Associations within civil society in Cote d' Ivoire identifies a central dynamic
related to regime control of intra-elite relations. He illustrates how these organisations
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were co-opted by the dominant political party at independence and played a central role in
providing access to administrative sites of accumulation, which facilitated elite class
formation whilst leaving it weak and dependent on its associational and ethnic links. The
co-option of this elite and their associationally rooted power bases plays a key role in
institutionalising communal activities, competition for resources, the integration of rural
areas and the suppression of ethnic based dissent. Local notables (the organisations'
leadership) play a pivotal role in both the vertical integration of their ethnically-based
communities and the state, and the horizontal integration of the elite through formal and
informal channels. Therefore success for the organisation, measured in terms of
resources secured, is dependent on the position of the leadership within the elite and the
ability of the association to produce a veneer of unity within their community (Woods
1994).
It seems difficult to reconcile the ends of good governance discourse, a pluralistic form of
democracy and strengthening indigenous NGOs as a means to achieve it. The linkages
between the Hometown association leaderships and the state are an integral aspect of the
current system of domination through distributing resources rather than a means to secure
greater accountability to a wider section of society. It is important to note that Barkan's
definition of empowerment is based on state accountability to local elites through these
organisations rather than developing mass movements with the capacity to press for
structural change. Little evidence has been provided of how these organisations can hold
the state to account over anything other than parochial issues through securing increased
resources for a particular locality. Pratten and Baldo suggest that even economically self
sufficient organisations with a degree of autonomy from the state are unable to hold it to
account, as they are geographically dispersed, uncoordinated and have differential access
to the state (Pratten and Baldo 1995). Rather than influencing policy formulation there is a
tendency for them to implement government policy by harnessing communal resources.
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The vertical integration of these organisations with the state constrains their ability to
become part of a cross-sectoral alliance with other forces in civil society. From a radical
perspective, such as Amin (1997) or Wignaraja (1993), these alliances are necessary to
broaden the political space in which civil society operates and are the origins of
movements with the capacity to make the state more accountable and become agents of
social change. However, the perspectives of the current leadership lead to an emphasis
on control of distribution relationships within the elite and facilitate patronage vertically
rather than challenging these relationships or those of production. This area of research
provides little information on relationships between associations, although by implication
competition rather than co-operation between groups is institutionalised. Other sources
such as Nnoli suggest that these associations play a leading role in provoking ethnic
violence in order to further the political and economic interests of the urban elite, to the
extent of arming rural populations (Nnoli 1995). Similarly, Lentz found that although they
can play a role in diffusing ethnic conflict, they can also engender it (Lentz 1995).
Most of this literature refers to one party rule or transitions to democracy and the models
may need to be revised to take account of the impact of multi-party democracy. In the one
party ethno-corporatist model outlined by Woods (1994) the interests of the elite and the
organisation's leadership are served by preventing the mobilisation of communities on an
ethnic basis. Although ethnic competition is diffused by these organisations it is also
institutionalised as the basis of association across class and often territorial cleavages.
This institutionalisation also plays a role in the ethnic demarcation of territory. However,
following the logic of Woods' model (1994), as multi-party democracy provides a more
competitive basis for both intra elite relationships and membership of the elite it is likely
that it will increase incentives to mobilise communities on an ethnic basis. Agbese
illustrates how the salience of ethnicity within Nigerian Hometown Associations varies
according to the leadership's perception of its value as a strategy for attaining material
ends (Agbese 1996). Lentz (1995) and Woods (1994) suggest that the introduction of
competitive elections has also caused divisions within organisations. As these
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associations are central to the mobilisation of collective action within communities, they
become sites for conflict as rival political factions vie for control and the benefits in
electoral terms. The impact of the politicisation (defined as competitive electoral politics
rather than in a broader sense) is generally seen to be a critical factor in the success of
these organisations. Those that can provide unity and stability are seen both by,
researchers such as Lentz (1995) and Woods (1994) and subjects as more likely to be
successful, whereas Wahab (1996) and others suggest that the dissipation of energies
due to politicisation and factionalism inhibits their effectiveness.
Analysis of this literature suggests that the potential contribution of these organisations to
strengthening civil society should be seen in the long term and indirectly through
increased education and possibly developing the confidence of the marginalised by
broadening participation in decisions affecting their fives. If these associations are to
become the root of a democratic civil society, they must develop new forms of
accountability. Warren suggests that, through the intervention of facilitators, the
communities represented by indigenous NGOs can negotiate the evolution of new
institutional forms (Warren, Adedokun et al. 1996). However, this could undermine the
class basis of the leadership. As the effectiveness of the organisation is based on the
strategic intersection of its occupational, associational and social networks, weakening
these social groups may undermine the ability of indigenous development associations to
harness resources. Thus, there seems to be a major contradiction between the aims of
strengthening civil society and harnessing these groups as development agents. It must
also be noted that indigenous development associations are not distributed evenly nor are
they equally effective. Barkan (1992) suggests that they are most active in more
economically developed areas. It is likely that democratisation based on associations with
uneven capacities and uneven access to the state will entrench political marginalisation.
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3	 Ethnicity and development
3.1	 The main currents in thinking on ethnicity
This section reviews the various social anthropological and sociological approaches taken
to ethnicity. Until recently, the theoretical approaches of social anthropologists and
sociologists to the study of ethnicity in Africa could be presented as a continuum between
the polar opposites of essentialism and instrumentalism. These theoretical approaches
constitute methodological assumptions about the nature of ethnicity which are basically
empiricist.
3.1.1 Essentialism
The core assumptions underpinning the essentialist or primordialist approaches are that
populations are linked by collective conscious and sub-conscious identities, which
emanate from primary traits and are an essential aspect of human existence. Thus,
individuals will naturally gravitate towards other group members due to this shared
psychological core. This approach shares similarities with soviet anthropological theory,
which uses Bromley's concept of ethnos, 'a historically formed community of people
characterised by common, relatively stable cultural features, certain distinctive cultural
traits, and the consciousness of their unity as distinguished from other similar forms'
(Bromley 1974). This approach presents social organisation and political activity as
reflecting the natural, culturally-based, ethnic divisions within a multi-ethnic society. From
this perspective, the primary objective of such research is to uncover the impact of
ethnicity on politics rather than appreciating that politics and other social phenomena also
impact on ethnicity. Although Bromley accepts that this cultural core can adapt to
changing circumstances, it is regarded as an objective aspect of social structure, which
influences social organisation and identity rather than reflecting social relations.
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The main strength of essentialism is that it describes how people feet about their own
ethnic identity. As Turton suggests, ethnic identities are meaningless unless experienced
as primordial (Turton 1998). Although essentialism currently has limited academic
credibility, variants of the essentiatist approaches continue to be influential. These
approaches underpin 'common sense' views of the role of ethnicity in Africa and are
crucial in legitimising the setf image of members of ethnic groups. Elements of
essentialism can be detected in the modemisation, neo-liberal and some Marxist accounts
of the relationship between ethnicity and development. The work of Anthony Smith, the
main proponent of essentialism, mirrors much of the modemisation discourse of the I 960s
and 70s as he presents ethnic communities as an explanation for the weakness of the
African state, suggesting that, "state making requires, among many other things, a secure
base in an ethnic core from which elites can be drawn" (Smith 1996). Ethnicity is
presented as a temporary atavistic phenomenon related to pre-capitalist forms of
association based on diffused, traditional and particularised ties, which would eventually
be replaced by specific, rationally-based interests as a consequence of development.
Ethnicity is conceptualised as a divisive problem to be overcome by a strong state as it
inhibits the formation of a core national identity.
Essentialism can be detected in the current Ethiopian constitution, which was created by
negotiation between mainly Leninist groups 'representing' ethnic constituencies. This
constitution divides the country into nine federated states delimited on the basis of
settlement by ethnic groups. Article 39 of the constitution defines ethnic groups as "groups
of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture, or similar customs,
mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities and who
predominantly inhabit an identifiable, contiguous territory".
The most striking limitation of the essentialist approach is that it describes rather than
explains ethnic differences and is thus of little analytical value. As it takes ethnic groups
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as ahistorical elements of the social structure, it cannot explain their origins or why certain
psychological needs develop into ethnicity rather than other forms of association. It is
necessary to see ethnic groups as based on more than cultural similarities. Brown along
with many other critics suggests this approach has difficulty explaining why some groups
with cultural similarities are antagonistic, whereas other culturally diverse groups have
developed strong shared consciousness (Brown 1989). Furthermore, it cannot account for
the differing levels of group attachment within or between groups or the multiple and
changing identities of individuals within the group.
3.1.2 Instrumentalism
The early work of Abner Cohen is associated with instrumentalism and occupied the
opposite pole of this continuum from essentialism. Cohen portrays ethnic groups as
created by their members for specific economic and political ends rather than being
culturally driven. Thus, for Cohen, ethnicity is characterised as a form of informal political
organisation, which invokes cultural values for material reasons. It provides a theoretical
shift characterising ethnic identity as a social construct rather than an innate and defining
feature of social structure. This approach regards identities as flexible and ethnicity as
rooted in adaptations to social change. Instrumentalism enables the investigation of
contextual factors and it has therefore influenced the development of the various
contextually oriented approaches such as inventionism and constructivism.
Instrumentalism also marked a shift away from regarding ethnicity as operating in isolation
from other ethnic groups. For Cohen, ethnic groups use customs and myths from their
cultural tradition to articulate political organisation, which they use in struggle against
others. Thus, ethnic groups are formed by an increase in interactions between groups in
the context of political and economic competition related to urbanisation and
marketisation.
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Although this approach marked a series of theoretical shifts in the study of ethnicity, it also
has a range of limitations. It regards internal processes as unproblematic and interests
within the group as homogenous. Thus, Cohen presents the values and interests of the
dominant elements within the ethnic group as those of the group as a whole. This
approach suggests that traditions are harnessed to articulate material interests, a line of
reasoning developed further by the inventionist school associated with Hobsbawm and
Ranger (1983). However, although instrumentalism appreciates that ethnic traditions are
manipulated, it treats them as historical facts, in contrast to the inventionists who view
these traditions as constructs created for specific purposes. For instrumentalists ethnicity
can have only one function as the approach only explains one dimension of ethnicity,
characterised by Murphree as ethnic sentiment politically mobilised (Murphree 1988).
Thus, it neglects non-material motivations and cannot account for the possibility of
ethnicity developing autonomy from its material roots leading to situations where ethnic
mobilisation is inconsistent with the material interests of the group. It also fails to explain
why ethnicity rather than other forms of identity became the medium of expressing
interests.
3.1.3 Constructivism
The term constructivism has been applied to a diverse range of approaches to
understanding ethnicity, which share an intellectual tradition including Hobsbawm and
Ranger (1983), Barth (1969), and Anderson (1991). They have applied ontological
insights from wider social science to investigate the ways that ethnic difference is
constructed. This increasingly sophisticated approach appreciates the strengths and
limitations of both sides of the primordialist / instrumentalist dichotomy. As such it has
attempted to resolve the seeming paradox of how people are able to use ethnic identity as
a means to an end in competition with others, whilst simultaneously considering it as an
end in itself. This section will review some of the influences on the constructivist approach
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and discuss its contribution to understanding the relationship between ethnicity and
development.
The first major influence on constructivism was the approach attributed to Barth (1969),
who conceptualised ethnicity as an aspect of social interaction linked to the maintenance
of boundaries between groups. In common with instrumentalist approaches, Barth
focused on the social functions of the group rather than cultural functions. He drew a
distinction between ethnic groups and cultural units, and analysed culture in terms of its
role in the process of boundary maintenance. The internal characteristics of an ethnic
group are seen as diacritic markers of difference, whose importance flows from their use
by members in contrasting their identities with their neighbours rather than as the drivers.
Thus, ethnic groups are defined by their boundaries rather than the culture within them.
This approach facilitates understanding that the content and personnel of the ethnic group
can be fluid as it is part of a long-term social process, which is being constantly remade as
groups interact. In these terms, the flexible yet persistent nature of ethnicity can be
explained by the varying significance attached to the boundaries, which can also persist
latently to be activated later rather than disappearing once the instrumental motivations
have receded.
The impact of Barth's work is such that Cornell suggests that it has led much subsequent
work to focus purely on the ethnic boundary and, therefore, to neglect the role of
processes within these boundaries in shaping the nature and intensity of group
attachments and thus the character of the boundary itself and indeed the nature of the
social context (Cornell 1996). As Barth privileges processes related to external group
boundaries over processes within the group, there is a tendency to regard ethnic groups
as homogenous and consensual. According to Yeros "while Barth rejects 'shared culture'
as a starting point of inquiry, he returns to relocate the shared aspects of the ethnic group
not in its culture but in its moral boundaries" (Yeros 1999 p112). In common with
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instrumentalism, there is a tendency to regard internal processes as uncontested and
homogenous leaving little appreciation of the negotiations within the group.
In common with instrumentalism, Barth's approach provides little analysis of the
constraints on individuals' choice of identities. Whilst there is evidence of individuals and
groups changing their ethnic assignment due to circumstantial factors, Allen and Eade
(1997) suggest that this process is constrained by the indMdual's ability to fulfil the criteria
of key cultural attributes, related to the social environment and changing over time, which
are perceived as a necessary pre-condition for group membership. Banton (1997) adds
that this process is also dependent on the perception that it is to the advantage of the
dominant group to assimilate new members.
The second major influence on constructivism was the inventionist approach closely
associated with Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). The first variant of inventionism rooted
the creation of ethnic groups in the political context of early colonialism with an emphasis
on the use of traditions to facilitate a social order based on indirect rule. Ranger (1983)
suggested that the colonial administration invented traditions for social control through
indirect rule. In this process, some African entrepreneurs manipulated these ethnic
identities as the dominant groups used them to exercise control over the subordinate
groups (Ranger 1983). This approach marked a positive advance in giving attention to
internal competition within the group. However, it was subject to much criticism, as the
fluidity and dynamism of African ethnic identities were seen to end in this period and
thereafter viewed as static. It also gives primacy to colonialists, who decided which
elements of African social structures were traditional and therefore legitimate. Thus, it has
been criticised by a range of researchers for presenting dominant Africans as reactionary
and manipulative and the subordinate groups as passive. In the light of these criticisms,
Ranger subsequently refined his position to give greater weight to progressive and
contestable forms of African agency, and he has become closely associated with current
approaches to constructivism.
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Constructivism's strength is that it has taken onboard previous critiques, has harnessed
the insights of Anderson (1991) and applied Gramscian conceptions of the roles of
organic intellectuals (Hoare 1971) in the process of identity construction. Constructivism
focuses on the processes whereby groups respond to circumstantial factors, acting as
agents in their own construction through the use of raw materials such as history, culture
and pre-existing ethnic constructions. For Cornell, constructivism provides a conception of
ethnicity that is a "contingent, volitional, negotiated phenomenon in which both societal
circumstances and creative assertions...play variable and interactive roles" (Cornell 1996).
Constructivism has applied an historical approach to uncovering understandings of
ethnicity as a response to social change. Vail's (1993) work was crucial in refining
Rangers early work into a constructivist form, which gave more weight to African agency.
He identifies a range of social actors who played a role in the process of cementing, giving
new meaning to, or inventing, ethnic authority structures, such as colonial officials and
intellectuals, native officials and intellectuals and the mass of the population. This
expands on the earlier approaches, which privileged the colonial administrators and
intellectuals as the only historical actors. Adaptation was constrained by the interests of
the colonial officials, for whom revenue collection and the maintenance of order, (in
anglophone colonies), were achieved by using indirect rule through the tribal institutions
that served to reinforce tribal distinctions. Markakis (1998) applies this approach to the
creation of a Gurage identity, which for him was largely a product of the imposition of
administrative structures by Menelik (see Chapter 8). These interests were systematised
by the colonial intellectual strata such as missionaries and anthropologists using pseudo-
scientific methods of characterising communities. Jacobs (1995) suggests that colonial
administrators only recognised hierarchical, territorially linked and patriarchal groupings as
appropriate organisational units. This led to the creation of new institutions by the colonial
authorities through the selection of leaders, often with no pre-existing legitimacy. These
groups and 'traditional' authorities developed into a new elite with increased power and
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access to resources and an interest in increasing tribal particularism becoming what Vail
(1993) characterises as stakeholders in tribalism.
A crucial role in the process of regenerating ethnic identities was played by the native
intellectual strata. Three approaches to the role of the local intellectual strata can be
identified: an instrumental characterisation such as Young's conception of ethnic
entrepreneurs, intellectuals who consciously attempt to increase group solidarity for
specific purposes; the dominant modemisation approach, which characterises the role of
this newly educated group as modemising their localities in cultural and economic terms;
a third constructivist approach can be developed through applying the work of Lonsdale
(1992) and is of particular interest to this research.
The Moral Economy approach outlined by Lonsdale (1992) does not differ significantly
from constructivist thought on the role of contextual factors and the fluidity of the
composition of ethnic groups. However, he refines the constructivist approach by
producing a detailed analysis of processes occurring within the ethnic boundary. The
'internal architecture of ethnicity' is characterised as the moral aspects of culture that are
negotiated to serve different interests within the group in order to define their position in
the world in relation to an imagined past Central to this process are debates within the
group about the nature of 'civic virtue', defined as an idealised form of citizenship
consisting of a moral framework of rights and obligations and conceptions of justice and
equality. In changing circumstances, "tribe was the imagined community against which the
morality of new inequality was bound to be tested" (Lonsdale 1992 p316). Thus, from the
moral economy perspective, "debates about civic virtue in changing times", were central to
the construction of ethnic identities (Lonsdale 1992 p331). To make sense of new
relationships within and outside the group and to legitimise their positions, the intellectual
strata voiced their contestations in the language of tradition and ethnicity. Lonsdale
outlines how the various groups interpreted tradition to articulate their competing claims,
"what ancestors had taught or were said to have taugh , on the relationship between
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labour and civilisation were the only measure of achievement or failure" (Lonsdale 1992
p316). This roots the constructions of ethnic identity in debates about economic and social
survival in changing times. For the purposes of this thesis, it roots the constructions of
Gurage identities firmly in their adaptations and migratory survival strategies, discussed in
Chapter 4.
The central thrust of this perspective is that "to debate civic virtue was to define ethnic
identity" (Lonsdale 1992 p268). Thus, sectors of the group use comparisons with the
morality of other ethnic groups through appeals to past identities to understand 'what is
done by us and not done by them'. In this process, the group defines who it is, who it is
not and the proper way of doing things and ordering a community. Framing ethnicity in this
way is not simply to include or exclude others, as differentiation is not to exclude others,
but a process of making sense of new opportunities by relating them back to real or
imagined traditions. Thus, "ethnicity was a question of honour within what have become
tribes before it was a weapon of conflict between them"(Lonsdale 1992 p317). This form
of constructivism has the capacity to see a range of competing ethnicities, as competing
groups vie for political prominence by reconstructing the past in order to redefine the
moral nature of group membership such as the nature of civic virtue within the group.
From this perspective, there is more than one version of ethnic identity and one shou'd
beware of privileging the dominant or most accessible view over dissident views, and
strive to place these views in the context of the contemporary external socio-political
environment as well as in the context of the previous constructions from which the
contemporary constructions are interpreted.
Lonsdale notes that conceptions of civic virtue can have their own logic and may therefore
operate autonomously from sectional and material interests (Lonsdale 1992 p317). These
values although constructed for specific purposes can gain autonomy from their original
purpose and act to modify or provoke behaviour. They can shape communal orientation to
development, act to constrain the autonomy of the leadership and key power brokers and
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serve as a point of reference in disputes. As Lonsdale suggests "its values have fired but
also disciplined ambition" (Lonsdale 1992 p317). This is a significant advance on
instrumentalism, which tends to present the moral components of ethnicity as ideologies
constructed to serve the immediate purposes of elites. This approach significantly
broadens previous definitions of ethnicity and allows an analysis of the relationship
between ethnicity and development to go beyond regarding ethnicity as merely a resource
mobilised by elites for their own, albeit benign, purposes. From this perspective, the
relationship between ethnicity and development can be conceptualised as part of a
framework of values about the nature of being a member of an ethnic group. These
conceptions of civic virtue influence the conceptions of the purposes of development
(Chapter 5) and relationships between the development associations and the community
(Chapter 6). This dominant conception of civic virtue is the basis for authority within the
group and the point of reference in determining the authority of development interventions
(Chapter 6).
Ethnicity is one of a multitude of identities and ills necessary to understand its appeal
over other forms of identity. According to Bell, "ethnicity has become more salient [than
classj because it can combine an interest with an affecthie tie" (Glazer and Moynihan
1979 p38). Brown compares the relative power of ethnic appeals and competing
affiliations, focusing on the impact of symbolic cultural attachments. He outlines three
main criteria used to establish identity, the social environment, emotional security and
interest (Brown 1989). Ethnic attachments satisfy the requirements of emotional security
by fulfilling the role of an extended kinship group giving the individual a collective position
towards other groups. These putative ties are likely to be based on myth and symbolism
rather than on any shared history, but are strengthened by more concrete similarities such
as language or culture to sustain the belief in common kinship. Psychologists, such as
Adam, emphasise the centrality of the psychological need for community and a distinctive
identity, which is rooted in pre-existing sentiment (Adam 1995). The power of ethnicity as
a social construct can be linked to the use of imprecise symbols to mark ethnicity. The
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central role of symbolism in allowing the combination of self-interest with emotive feelings
of self-belonging is outlined by Cohen, "symbols are effective because they are imprecise.
Though obviously not contentless, part of their meaning is 'subjective'. They are,
therefore, ideal media through which people can... behave in apparently similar
ways.. .without subjecting themselves to a typology of orthodoxy. Individuality and
commonality are thus reconcilable" (Cohen 1985). Symbolic matters are central to ethnic
identity because they allow people to behave differently whilst being members of a
community. Ake relates the importance of myth and symbolism to both the colonial past
and contemporary insecurity; "if the tenacity by which some Africans cling to certain
cultural symbols and a fabricated past seems surprising, one must consider the
implications of lacking a sense of self and being lost in a cultural wilderness. More and
more people are finding this intolerable and are fighting determinedly not only to assert
their cultural identity but also to claim self-determination for it" (Ake 1993). This reinforces
the constructivist approach to ethnicity presenting the use of culture as a creative
response to environmental factors and helps to explain both the persistence of ethnicity
and its relative autonomy from material forces.
3.2	 The ethnic gap in the development discourses
Although there has been copious research into the phenomenon of ethnicity in Africa,
scant attention has been paid to its relationship with development. In section 1, three
types of development were outlined, development as an evolutionary historical process,
development as practice and development as vision. The thesis focuses primarily on
development as practice, whereas development studies has applied the insights provided
by social anthropologists and sociologists to the relationship between ethnicity and
evolutionary development. Other than attempts to apply the terminology used by
sociologists and social anthropologists to debates about the nature of the state and civil
society in Africa, there has been remarkably little research into the relationship between
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ethnicity and development. Instead, ethnicity is treated by development studies as the
realm of historians, political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists. This is all the
more remarkable as one of the defining features of the discipline is its focus on the
relationship between development and other forms of identity, particularly gender. Two
decades ago Stavenhagen (1984:21-8) suggested that this neglect by development
studies is 'not an oversight but a paradigmatic blind spot'. Since then, although analyses
of ethnicity have become increasingly sophisticated, the development discourses have yet
to even begin to apply these insights to purposive development. For some theories, the
concept of ethnicity presents analytical problems that make it easiest to overlook it or
subsume it within other explanatory variables. The bulk of the approaches to development
take ethnicity for granted, and if they do include ethnicity as a subject of analysis, it is
presented in essentialist terms.
Liberal modemisation theories and vulgar Marxism share a similar universalistic analysis
of the nature of social change, which imply that northern models of development can be
transplanted unproblematically to southern contexts. For the modernisation approach,
ethnicity is seen as a temporary phenomenon belonging to a world of traditional,
generalised, diffuse, particularised social ties, which will be replaced by specific,
differentiated, rational interests as a consequence of the process of development. Any
remnants of ethnic ties are seen as a problem for the ethnically neutral state, whose
defining purpose is modernisation in economic and cultural terms. This approach is
remarkably similar to the essentialist approach of Smith outlined in section 3.1.1. For
vulgar Marxists, ethnic attachments are part of residual pre-capitalist social relations.
Their continuing existence hampers the development of class-consciousness and retards
class formation. More sophisticated Marxist analyses also have a tendency to view
ethnicity as an epiphenomenon, and have given less importance to horizontal rather than
vertical social cleavages. These analyses tend to focus either on the relationship between
race and class, giving the latter primacy and seeing the former as false consciousness
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masking the true economic nature of social cleavages, or on the ideological role of
ethnicity for manipulative ruling elites.
The Dependency approach, which has refined Marxist and structuralist approaches to
development, has concentrated on the effects of international macro economic
relationships on the economies of developing countries. Their main emphasis was that
these structural conditions gave little room for actors in the peripheral countries. Hence,
internal relationships within the periphery have often been overlooked, and even local
elites were characterised as collaborating with international economic interests rather than
having independent agency and interests of their own, whilst the broad mass of the
population is often portrayed merely as victims of an international economic system.
On a practical level ethnicity is a politically sensitive subject in many African countries, a
fact which undoubtedly deters much southern and northern scholarship. It is possible that
NGO sponsored research also seeks to avoid becoming embroiled in this type of political
controversy.
Some research has examined the impact of ethno-political structures and ethnicity on
wider development, focusing on the destruction caused by ethnic violence and the divisive
impact on national economic integration caused by ethnicity (Allen 1992). For example,
Nnoli outlines how ethnic divisions in Nigeria create barriers that inhibit the market and the
flow of labour and discusses how a great deal of development activity is based on ethno-
political calculations rather than on technical criteria (Nnoli 1995). Inter-regional co-
operation is inhibited by the divisive and exclusionary nature of ethnically-based
competition. For Nnoli, ethnic competition for resources has "polluted the political process,
distorted the economic process and generated tension ... not conducive to foreign
investment" (Nnoli 1995 p8). Nnoli takes an instrumentalist approach to ethnicity regarding
it as an ideology created by self-serving elites. However, his work is undermined by
regarding the politicised and divisive forms of ethnicity as a primary cause of the
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weakness of the African state, rather than as a symptom of these problems. Although it is
impossible to deny that much damage has been done to African development in the name
of ethnicity, the central problem of ethnicity is not ethnic identities but, as discussed
below, the way the state has sought to deal with them.
The approaches outlined above share a similar limitation related to their narrow
conception of ethnicity, which is related to politically motivated sentiment. This limitation
prevents the possibility of examining positive aspects of the relationships between
ethnicity and development, as the primary purpose of research from these perspectives is
to examine the usually negative impact of ethnicity on national integration. The one
exception to this trend came in the late 1980s from Murphree who tentatively outlined an
approach, which would allow examination of how the constructive elements of ethnicity
had been harnessed for the purposes of development (Murphree 1986). He used a broad
conception of ethnicity based on Hyden's notion of the economy of affection: an
intermittent system of support located in a network of communal rights and obligations,
where economic decision-making is embedded in non-economic conditions. For Murphree
as the activities of the post-colonial state are alien to the social and economic conditions
of the peasantry, these alternative economic ties can be functional and rational for them.
This conception of ethnicity moves beyond the focus on the exclusionary aspects
determined by the intervention of political actors. It is economically and culturally-based
on day to day relations and for Murphree (1988) this constitutes a broader salience of
ethnicity within the informal economy. Although this approach pointed to the possibility of
investigating the relationship between purposive development and ethnicity, it failed to
produce any empirical research 4. The proposed use of this concept by Murphree (1988)
and later Mombeshora (1990) was limited by a lack of theoretical grounding and emphasis
on contingency. This led their work to be essentially proposals for future descriptive
accounts of the positive aspects of ethnicity at micro contextual levels. The economy of
affection model, which underpins Murphree's approach, describes rather than explains
4 Ttiis lack of empirical output could also be related to political difficulties in Zimbabwe.
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relationships within ethnic groups. It also presents these relationships as an uncontested
system of rights and obligations, which serves the basic needs of much the population
rather than appreciating that these relationships may reinforce inequality within the group.
These criticisms notwithstanding, if the descriptive approach of the economy of affection is
supplemented by the theoretical and empirical advances provided by constructivism, a
viable approach to understanding the relationships between ethnicity and development
can be established.
3.3	 Ethnicity and the state in Africa
As previously stated, the crisis of the nation state is the only area where the development
discourses have analysed the relationship between ethnicity and development in Africa. A
brief summary of these debates will serve to illustrate both the role of the state in shaping
the context for the construction of ethnic identities and the relationships between
institutions based on ethnicity and the state. Amin characterises the distinguishing feature
of the elite in peripheral countries, and particularly Africa, as its inability to control the
subordinate terms of the nation's integration within the world economic system (Amin
1997). Brown (1989) suggests that the state's relationship to ethnicity is influenced by its
lack of autonomy from the interests of dominant social groups and its degree of influence
over society. These are in turn influenced by the interaction between the composition of
the elite, national ideologies and the framework of state institutions. According to Ake
(1993) the post-colonial African state can be characterised as non-autonomised as it is
the primary site of accumulation for elites, which is crucial to their formation as a class. In
the context of limited non-state economic opportunities, control of the state distribution
mechanisms becomes crucial to economic advancement. In this process, the state itself
becomes a focus of class struggle rather than mediating it and politics becomes a
scramble for access to resources.
51
lhonvbere suggests that, as the state serves the interests of metropolitan capital and the
elite, it has little relevance for the existential conditions of the population. This leads to a
withdrawal from civil society and the formation of alternative attachments to institutions
such as ethnic self-help groups. Thus the state is overwhelmingly dependent on
repression rather than ideological forms of domination which further de-legitimises the
state and weakens civil society (lhonvbere 1994). lhonvbere's approach overlooks how
alternative forms of domination can be institutionalised within civil society. A more
sophisticated analysis of the institutionalised relationship between the state, civil society
and ethnicity is provided by Rothchild's hegemonical exchange model (Rothchild 1985).
This sites these alternative forms of institutional attachments within civil society rather
than characterising participation in them as a retreat from it. In these networks although
the state lacks the capacity to impose its decisions, it has developed mechanisms to
manage ethnic diversity, whereby the state and ethno-regional interests engage in a
process of mutual accommodation on the basis of commonly accepted norms. Within
these institutional arrangements, Chazan focuses on the ethnic balance within the elite
and particularly on the pivotal role of ethnic intermediaries, whose position is based on
their organisational skills, contacts and institutional base (Chazan 1992).
Thus, the political elite constructs ethno-corporatist structures to diffuse ethnic tensions by
managing the process whereby ethnicity becomes a political resource for factions of the
elite. At the same time the elite harnesses the inclusive aspects of ethnicity through
enmeshing members of ethnic groups in patrimonial networks, ensunng loyalty through
the distribution of resources through ethnically-based relationships. The functioning of
these mechanisms seems to operate on a normative framework that emphasises equality
between groups. Mombeshora (1990) outlines examples where the perception of
inequality in political participation led to leaders perceiving it as legitimate to mobilise their
constituencies. Nnoli argues that the perception of egalitarian distribution based on
ethnicity is crucial for the maintenance of the legitimacy of these structures.
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Whilst this conception of ethno-corporatism is somewhat vague and generalised, it
illustrates trends that Welsh suggests are widespread and able to adapt to a wide variety
of regime type (Welsh 1996). The functionality of these relationships is debatable, as
these systems of patronage are often presented as constraining economic development
and hampering the evolution of democratic structures, as the obligations embedded within
them are widely manipulated by all sectors. However, these ethnic patronage networks
can also be seen as a means of integrating geographically and culturally diverse
communities with the state. The inclusive aspects of ethnicity cut across other cleavages
and could be harnessed for development purposes. In the context of retrenchment of the
state, the powerful attachments generated by ethnicity could become a means for
mobilising communities through the ethnically-based welfare and trading institutions that
already provide significant material and emotional support. The egalitarian and democratic
elements of ethnic identity can be harnessed into a normative framework to facilitate and
regulate participation within democratic structures.
3.4	 The uses of ethnicity as an analytical concept
The constructivist approach regards ethnicity as a conceptual tool located in the
observer's mind rather than as an innate quality of social groups. Although both
academics and interest groups constructed ethnicity, it has been appropriated and
renegotiated by members of ethnic groups and now exists in their consciousness. The
power of ethnicity as a concept flows from its constructed nature, as the persistence of
ethnicity is related to its status as a flexible subjective construct, rather than an 'objective
fact'. This conceptualisation of ethnicity has implications for its use as an analytical
category for social research, which can be related to ontological distinctions between the
real and the actual. Olsen suggests that we can discuss the ontological status of ethnic
categories at a situational level as, conceptions of ethnicity have actual effects and are
therefore real...it is a causal mechanism.. .even if the idea is not an accurate portrayal of
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the world" (Olsen 1998 p10). Similarly, Allen argues that, despite their origins researchers
cannot dismiss ethnic labels, as they represent the social reality of the researched (Allen
1994). Therefore, ethnicity will be treated as a valid analytical tool even though this debate
suggests caution in its use for research.
Banks produces a similar point in warning of the dangers of the researcher projecting their
own understanding of ethnicity onto the subject under the impression that this
understanding is coming from the subject. Therefore, according to Banks it is necessary to
reposition the analyst and subject, whilst accepting that the concept of ethnicity remains
valid (Banks 1996). This leads into Banton's view that it is crucial to distinguish between
the actor's and observer's models of social structure in order to understand the
significance of empirical research. He describes this as the process of interpreting the
actor's practical language by the observer who labels attitudes as ethnic and then
conceptualises them in terms of the relationship between attachments and the
maintenance of boundaries through the use of abstract concepts. This process of
abstraction of ethnicity is based on a distinction between the necessary conditions for
ethnicity and the signs taken for deciding if a group meets them. This can lead to
contradictions as it is unlikely that the actor and observer will share the same
interpretative scheme (Banton 1994). It is necessary to locate ethnicity as the observers
perception of the understandings of the observed. In Eriksen's terms, TMsocial scientists...
have excelled in creating models of societal formations and cultural systems of
classification. At the same time, they have paid much less attention to modelling and
understanding the ongoing flow of social life as defined from within - and if they have done
the latter.. .they usually fail to demonstrate the relationship between levels. Addressing the
relationship between macro processes and local life worlds.. .is essential for any proper
understanding of ethnicity" (Eriksen 1999 P61)
If one accepts ethnicity as a valid analytical context there are still problems. The tendency
to privilege ethnicity, when taken in the context of the multi-stranded nature of collective
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identities, has become of central concern to some constructivists. In Eriksen's words, "by
isolating ethnicity as a focus for research, one easily loses everything else from sight. This
is perhaps the cardinal sin committed by many students of ethnicity" (Eriksen 1999 p45).
The empirical implications are highlighted by Agbese in his study of Nigerian Hometown
Associations, suggesting that there is a tendency for researchers to label all activities by
certain groups as ethnic, whereas in reality the subjects attach a variety of meanings
related to other attachments to their behaviour (Agbese 1996). However, it is also
necessary to distinguish between how actors present their interests and the processes
influencing the negotiation of these interests. Thus, the purpose of using ethnicity as an
analytical construct is not to present a positivistic explanation of what ethnicity is but to
explain and contextualise the competing understandings of ethnicity and other collective
identities coming from within the group. These issues resurface in Chapter 3 where the
methodological implications of using constructs such as ethnicity are discussed in greater
detail.
4	 Conclusions: conceptualising the relationships between ethnicity and
development
As illustrated in section 3.2, scant attention has been applied to the relationship between
development and ethnicity. The existing research focuses primarily on the negative
relationship between politicised ethnicity and the historical or evolutionary aspects of
development, particularly the impact of development on state formation and ethnic
conflict. However there has been virtually no research into the relationship between
ethnicity and purposive development. The various theoretical approaches to ethnicity in
Africa can be applied to its relationship with purposive development. Three approaches,
based on essentialism, instrumentalism and constructivism, could be used to investigate
the relationship between ethnicity and purposive development. From an essentialist
perspective development is a form of communal action caused by ethnicity. Thus, people
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undertake collective action for development purposes based on ethnicity because of their
ethnic attachments. Although this approach is flawed, it could well be the way that
participants in indigenous development associations understand their participation. From
an instrumentalist perspective ethnicity is an ideology that is mobilised for specific
purposes. Although this approach tends to focus on politically or economically motivated
ethnic sentiment, it could be used to analyse the extent to which ethnicity is mobilised for
constructive purposes such as development. The literature on indigenous ethnically-based
development associations either takes ethnicity for granted or uses some form of
instrumentalism. Before discussing a proposed constructivist approach to the relationship
between ethnicity and purposive development, I will outline the approaches taken in the
existing literature.
The bulk of the literature on indigenous ethnically-based development associations treats
the role of ethnicity as a basis of association in a superficial manner, with only a small
proportion attempting to investigate the ambiguities and complexities of this relationship.
As descent is the main determinant of whether these organisations are seen, by
members, as ethnically-based , the role of descent in delimitation of communities should
be critically evaluated. However, much of this work treats community as an unproblematic
concept, implying an ahistoric, primordial and territorially defined homogenous community
with fixed boundaries. Woods takes a different view suggesting that although the basis of
identity within Hometown Associations is that of the dominant ethnic group within the
locality, it is rare for this to have anything but an instrumental basis (Woods 1994).
However, he fails to discuss the issue further thereby regarding instrumentalism as a self-
explanatory term. Mcnulty and Lawrence improve on this position, suggesting that
contemporary definitions of this concept go beyond the purely territorial by introducing an
element of time, reflecting the dispersed nature of the group and how social organisation
is underpinned by loyalty to the patrilineal hometown (Mcnulty and Lawrence 1996). This
form of instrumentalism is analytically useful as it implies that these organisations are an
institutional form of politically mobilised ethnicity exhibiting its contingent and fluid
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characteristics. However, these approaches fail to investigate the uses of ethnicity and are
subject to the limitations of the instrumentalist approach outlined above.
Lentz provides a more sophisticated instrumentalist analysis of ethnicity as a basis of
association. She outlines the contemporary realities of geographical mobility, multiple
group membership, and overlapping cultural, economic and political boundaries. This is
contrasted with the primordialist self perception of the members, based on assumptions of
common heritage and culture, which are reflected in the organisations' official statutes
where membership is restricted to 'indigenous people' defined through birth and marriage.
The seeming paradox between contemporary realities and primordial self-image is
resolved by the group through the ambiguity of these terms and the flexible interpretation
by group members (Lentz 1995). This type of instrumentalist approach to ethnic identity
can be used to understand the data contained in much of the other work on indigenous
ethnically-based development associations. Competing definitions of the community may
be the result of internal relationships within the organisation. Divisions within the founding,
often multi-ethnic, educated elites and pressure for inclusion from other classes,
particularly 'traditional leaders' and merchants, have often led to the adoption of ethnically
exclusive definitions, which have acted to cement cross class alliances. Similarly pressure
to overcome divisions related to competing identities, such as kinship and village, can
increase the salience of ethnicity within the organisation. Thus ethnicity can be inclusive in
class, status and geographical terms whilst being exclusive in non-ethnic terms.
One of the strengths of the literature on indigenous development associations is that it
locates the role of ethnicity in a wider political context. Negotiation with the state and other
organisations can influence the definitions of the community and the scope of the
organisations' activities. There is often pressure not to organise outside the locality or in
areas perceived to be controlled by other ethnic groups, as the organisation may be
drawn into and 'ethnicise' political conflicts (Lentz 1995). State regulation and informal
mechanisms of integration affect the organisations' formal position, as there are often
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prohibitions on explicitly organising on an ethnic basis. However, the organisations'
responses illustrate the flexibility of their identities, as when ethnic associations were
banned in Ghana and Nigeria many transformed into Hometown Associations. External
pressure to appear unified can also increase the salience of ethnicity within these
definitions of community leading to an emphasis on common heritage to legitirnise claims
of being representative of a distinct sector of the population. The history of inter-ethnic
relations within the locality is also a significant factor in defining the community, as those
areas with traditions of ethnic co-operation are more likely to be represented by ethnically
heterogeneous associations (Lentz 1995).
The approach taken by Lentz, whilst explaining the process of mobilising ethnicity within
the association, has other limitations due to the use of an instrumentalist approach, which
regards ethnicity as having only one function. Although she treats the central aspects of
the group's primordial self-perception as ambiguous, there is no analysis of the processes
of constructing these concepts. In line with the instrumentalist approach, these concepts
are regarded as being harnessed for specific ends by elites. There is little investigation of
the perceptions of the membership and thus their understandings are presented as
passive and open to manipulation by the elite using ethnicity. Furthermore, this approach
fails to explore how the group negotiates traditions, as a point of reference, to enable the
associations to take advantage of new opportunities. There is little evidence of how these
constructions have influenced group identities or whether they have become embedded in
the consciousness of the group. In addition to regarding ethnicity as only having one
function, these approaches only identify a single conception of ethnicity within the group.
There is no information on whether competing conceptions of ethnicity, as the basis of
group membership, are articulated by dissenting groups within the community. Thus, the
perception of the dominant group of the nature of ethnicity is generalised to the whole
group. At a fundamental level, these approaches do not analyse how perceptions of being
a member of the ethnic group are related to the activities of the organisation. They focus
on the uses of ethnicity, rather than examining how previous constructions of ethnicity can
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be embedded into the association. Thus these approaches fail to appreciate how the
activities of the group act to recreate ethnic identity or could become a marker of
differentiation.
These limitations point to the need to produce a viable constructivist approach to analyse
the complexities of the relationships between ethnicity and development within indigenous
ethnically-based development associations. The constructivist approach can build upon
instrumentalist understandings of how ethnicity is used by the leadership to achieve
specific ends, such as mobilising resources, managing internal disputes and positioning
the association in civil society. However, it will also provide a theoretical framework to
investigate other dimensions of ethnicity. This approach will site the dominant
development discourses in debates about the nature of civic virtue within the group. It will
allow the key concepts of the dominant development discourses to be redefined in relation
to constructions of ethnic identity. Thus, participation in development can be seen as an
aspect of participation in the affairs of the ethnic group. Debates about the nature of
participation and internal perceptions of participation can be related to meanings of group
membership particularly fulfilling the rights and obligations embedded in ethnic and other
identities i.e. civic virtue. This introduces a new dimension to the relationship between
ethnicity and development, as participation in development activities can become an
integral aspect of ethnic identity.
My approach will contextualise the formal structures of accountability of the associations
in indigenous culture and social organisation to examine who they are accountable to and
for what activities. This approach will also examine two areas of accountability that have
currently been overlooked, informal channels of accountability and the expectations of
appropriate forms of leadership that are embedded in conceptions of civic virtue. This
approach enables an investigation of the relationship between the development
associations and the so-called 'traditional' sector, an issue that has been overlooked in
the development literature. Contemporary notions of civic virtue are constructed to
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legitimise survival strategies by relating them to 'traditions' of the group. Thus,
conceptualisations of the effectiveness of development interventions can be directly
related to the material and non-material aspects of civic virtue. Indigenous conceptions of
effectiveness can therefore include processes of generating stability and reproducing
ethnic identities and other issues that cannot be quantified by mainstream notions of
accountability. However, this approach accepts that as conceptions of effectiveness are
linked to ethnic identity, they can be contested from within the group and that this process
is likely to draw upon ethnic 'traditions'. Ethnicity is not, as essentialists suggest an
unchanging resource that can be harnessed, Its role is more complex than as
instrumentalists suggest, an ideology which can be mobilised and then dissipates. It is a
dynamic process, which, whilst contextually rooted, can build upon itself. The process of
purposive development by indigenous development associations can be regarded as an
element in the construction of civic virtue and is therefore an aspect of how people
perceive themselves. The activities of these associations can be seen as an aspect of
how people locate themselves as indMduals within the group and how the group locates
itself in interactions with others.
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Chapter 3
Methodology and methods
Methodological standpoint
The methodological approach in the thesis is informed by what has been labelled
'postcolonial studies' (Arnfred 1995). The core epistemological assumptions of this
approach are similar to the concerns of the constructivist approach to ethnicity outlined in
Chapter 2. This is part of the wider constructivist approach to social studies and is strongly
influenced by feminism and post-structuralism, and involves deconstructing assumptions
embedded in the dominant conceptualisations used by development studies. The
supporters of this approach seek to distance themselves from mainstream development
studies. However, this artificial dualism seems at odds with their general epistemological
position. The aims of postcolonial studies are congruent with those of many
anthropologists and sociologists. Furthermore most mainstream participatory approaches
to development studies, whilst not purporting to be postcolonial share some of the aims of
postcolonial thinking.
The postcolonial approach has two fundamental methodological premises. The first is that
data should be placed in a historical and political context. This is hardly a theoretical
breakthrough, as most mainstream approaches to social studies would at least claim to do
this. The second aspect builds on the first by deconstructing the concepts used in the
process of data analysis and placing them in the wider context of neo-colonial north-south
relationships. Thus, it can be distinguished from conventional research where "the
researcher is firmly placed as the subject with her theories, concepts and hypotheses to
be applied and tested in the field" (Arnfred 1995 p3). In line with participatory approaches,
the process of research is regarded as a dialogue between the subject and objects. This
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approach makes theoretically explicit differences in the methodological approaches taken
by a range of academic disciplines. In the case of anthropology, Max Gluckman draws a
distinction between data provided by informants providing 'apt illustrations' for hypotheses
created by the researcher and theories being generated by the data. In this thesis, I have
attempted to use the ways that the informants have conceptualised the relationship
between an indigenous NGO and its beneficiaries rather than seeking to impose
externally derived categories on their perceptions. However, I am aware that the evidence
provided in the thesis is my interpretation of the theoretical constructs used by my
informants. According to Amfred, "the researcher is the conceptualiser, by inspiration from
the types of knowledge that she finds in the field" (Amfred 1995 p4).
In Chapter 2, I noted that researchers must draw a distinction between ethnicity as a way
that people make sense of the world and ethnicity as a conceptual tool in the mind of the
observer. The postcolonial approach highlights the discrepancy in mainstream
development studies between the analytical tools used by researchers and the
experiences of the researched. As Mulinari suggests, "definitions of reality are not about
what people do, but about what is considered sociologically relevant in their doing"
(Mulinari 1995 p44). Thus, the analytical tools used by the researcher become a focus of
research, as they may well have different meanings to the observer and the observed. For
Swantz this process will involve reconstructing conceptual categories as "knowledge and
experience from the ground level of peoples' everyday lives needs to meet the minds that
conceptualise, even if it shakes all well worked out theoretical constructs" (Swantz 1995
p23). In the thesis, the salient concepts used by the dominant development discourses to
analyse the trusteeship between NGOs and their beneficiaries will be analysed in the
context of indigenous social organisation and culture. Rather than following definitions of
these concepts applied by northern academics and practitioners, the thesis will highlight
and contextualise various indigenous perceptions of concepts such as development
(Chapter 5), participation (Chapter 6), and accountability (Chapter 6).
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2	 The case study and locations
2.1	 The case study
The issues researched in the thesis required detailed analysis of the social, cultural and
economic networks that underpin indigenous approaches to development. According to
Thomas (1998), focusing on a Single case study, enables the researcher to examine the
inter-relationships within the case in detail. Using this approach enabled me to explore in
depth the complexities of the inter-relationships between notions of civic virtue, survival
strategies, ethnic identities and development within a group of development associations.
My approach is informed by what Yin calls 'embedded single case study' (Yin 1994 pp.
41-44). Although I focus on a single group of organisations there are several units of
analysis: GPSDO as an organisation, two of its urban and rural-based sub-committees,
and within the two areas, I examined specific locations (as I explain below).
GPSDO as the most successful and oldest development association in Ethiopia was the
most obvious choice of case study. However, I also examined other potential candidates.
There were very few similar organisations operating in Ethiopia outside Gurageland. I was
aware that a range of indigenous NGOs are operating in Oromia. However, it proved
difficult to contact them and I was advised that some of them might be linked to opposition
political forces. I also considered investigating the ethnically-based development
associations that had recently been established across Ethiopia. During a preliminary visit
to Ethiopia, I had discussions with leaders of ethnically-based development associations
such as the Oromia Development Association, the Amhara Development Association and
the Southern Peoples' Development Association (SEPDA). Although these informants
were supportive of any future research, from these discussions it was clear that these
organisations were closely linked to the state and not emanating from the beneficiary
community.
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Three distinct but interrelated models of purposive development can be discerned in
Gurageland; state-based development, mainstream development agencies and
indigenous development associations. The first model of development is directed by
government agencies such as the departments of agriculture, education and health. This
approach has been supplemented by the activities of the Gurage Zone Development
Association (GZDA), a member of SEPDA. This organisation has built upon the
experiences of Tigrayan development associations linked to the Tigrayan Peoples
Liberation Front (TPLF) and reflects the ideology and practical concerns of the EPRDF
government. Currently, it tends to act as an arm of government, implementing the
activities of the agriculture department. As such, its activities reflect the aims of current
government policy, particularly in relation to facilitating rural self sufficiency by increasing
agricultural production through natural resource conservation. The organisation and its
partners believe that with maturity, GZDA will reflect the aims of the rural community,
however, at present its purposes are to establish a sustainable organisational structure in
Gurageland and to implement government policy. GZDA has only recently become active
in Gurageland, there was little knowledge of it in Moher and it had been operating for less
than a year in Enamor. GZDA is not the central focus of the thesis as it represents an
external model of development imposed on the Gurage communities by the government,
rather than an indigenous model of development derived from Gurage forms of social
organisation and notions of civic virtue. However, there are references to GZDA
throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapter 7, as an understanding of its role and
orientation assists in analysing the debates about the legitimate forms of development in
Gurageland and relationships between development associations and the state.
The second model of development intervention in Gurageland consists of the activities of
mainstream development agencies including bilateral agencies, non-Gurage national
NGOs and international NGOs. The thesis discusses the internal factors that have
contributed to the indigenous Gurage models of development, however, it should be noted
that perhaps the most important single contribution to the Gurage orientation to
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development was the establishment of a school in the largest Sebat Bet town, by catholic
missionaries. More recently bilateral agencies such as Irish Aid and GTZ have established
capacity building partnerships with local government and GZDA. Non-Gurage national
NGOs such as the Catholic Secretariat have implemented a range of development
projects across Gurageland. The international NGO sector including Action Aid and Water
Aid has recently begun to implement projects in Gurageland. In the late 1990s, some
international NGOs became closely associated with GPSDO through capacity building
(PACT) and joint project implementation (OXFAM and Save the Children).
The indigenous approaches to development in Gurageland were pioneered, in the 1960s,
by The Gurage Road Construction Organisation (GRCO), in western Gurageland, and the
Allemgana - Walamo Road Construction Association (AWRCA), in the east 5. Both
organisations were founded by members of the urban Gurage elite at the request of rural
elders and successfully harnessed the obligations embedded in Gurage urban rural
linkages through using indigenous institutions such as urban Idirs to mobilise communal
resources. Currently the activities and orientation of GPSDO and its affiliates, such as the
Moher Development Association and the Enamor Development Association, exemplify
this model. In addition to GPSDO and its affiliates, western Gurageland is served by a
range of indigenous development associations based on affiliations of clan, village and
family. In addition to this many village level development projects are financed by
prominent individuals. These institutions have varying levels of formality, with some being
ad hoc creations to undertake specific projects whilst other clan-based institutions are
more formal and have a long history of providing benefits to the community. Although
there are commonalties within this sector, there is also significant diversity within the
indigenous models of Gurage development related to the formality of the associations, the
nature of their linkages with the community and the scope of their activities. There are
AWRCA was a road construction organisation founded in 1961 to link the eastern Gurage areas
with Addis. This organisation was the subject of Gedamu's Ph.D. thesis (Gedamu 1972).
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differing histories of development endeavour in western (Sebat Bet), northern (largely
Kistane) and eastern (largely Silte6) Gurageland.
The thesis focuses only on development activities within the Sebat Bet areas of
Gurageland facilitated by GPSDO and its affiliates. Thus, the term 'indigenous models of
development' is applied to development which is facilitated by GPSDO and its sub-
committees. The use of the term 'Gurage' in this thesis applies only to Sebat Bet Gurages.
The use of these terms should not be taken to imply that analysis based on some Sebat
Bet Gurages can be generalised to other groups of Gurages. Furthermore, the
organisational structure of GPSDO grants much operational autonomy to the sub-
committees, which each have their own independent financial base. Thus, even within
GPSDO it was clear that there were significant differences within the sub-committees
related to levels of activity, organisational structure and the formality of their relationships
with the community particularly institutions such as ldir and Shango.
I had anticipated that much of the research would take an approach similar to mainstream
development studies, investigating issues of participation in development and
mechanisms of accountability between the organisation and its beneficiaries. During the
course of data collection, it became apparent that these terms had very different
meanings to the informants and me, and that it would be necessary to contextualise
informants' perceptions of these concepts. Before undertaking the fieldwork, I had
considered that the objects of the research may not share my perception of the meaning
of development, however, it was only during data collection that I realised that this should
be an area of research. Before the fieldwork, I understood the theoretical aspects of the
constructivist approach, however, I had not been able to translate this understanding into
specific research questions that went beyond an instrumentalist approach. Thus, I
expected to focus on the ways in which the leadership of GPSDO used ethnicity as a
resource to mobilise the community and manage relationships within the organisation. It
6 In April 2001 Siltes voted to reject Gurage ethnic identity.
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was only during data analysis that the complexities of the relationship between Gurage
identities and the indigenous Gurage model of development became apparent.
2.2	 Locations
The choice of location for the fieldwork was dictated by the case study methodology and
Gurage migration patterns. Thus although the research is investigating rural development,
much of the research was based in Addis Ababa, the main site of Gurage migration and
headquarters of GPSDO and its sub-committees. As I explain in Chapter 4, Gurages
migrate across Ethiopia and beyond in search of trading opportunities, however the thesis
relates only to the perspectives of Gurages in part of Gurageland and Addis Ababa. I
decided to focus in more detail on the activities of two sub-committees. The two rural
locations were selected according to the following criteria:
1. The sites should be in separate Worredas. In the context of the devolution of power to
the Worreda officials, informants had suggested that there were considerable
differences in the relationship between GPSDO and Worreda officials in the four
Worredas in Sebat Bet Gurageland.
2. Much of the previous research conducted in Gurageland had focused exclusively on
Cheha whereas the other areas have received little academic attention. This has
caused some resentment amongst other houses as previous researchers, particularly
Shack, were accused of implying that evidence from Cheha could be generalised to
the other houses. This had several implications for the research. Cheha has been
historically politically dominant and has had a longer history of education leading it to
supply the vast majority of the officials of GRCO and GPSDO until 1989. The Cheha
sub-committee seems to have been more successful than other sub-committees, and
thus the locations I chose did not necessarily focus on the best practices in the
indigenous model.
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3. Gurageland consists of a range of topography ranging from high mountain to midland
plateau and a few sparsely populated low-lying river valleys. I wanted to select
locations from the midland and highland regions in order to reflect upon the impact of
the different agricultural practices and migration patterns.
4. The development discourses articulated by Ethiopian academics and the NGO sector
emphasise the constraining impact of proximity to political centres on the autonomy of
rural associational life. I also expected that distance from the political centre would
increase the autonomy of the indigenous sector and would impact on its relationship
with development activities. Therefore, I wanted one site to be located in the environs
of the Worreda capital and the other to be some distance away.
I discussed these criteria and my overall research strategy with GPSDO activists, who
made no attempt to sway me towards one site or another, with other urban Gurages and
my research assistants. Moher was selected as the first site, as my first research assistant
had previously worked there, could understand the dialect and had knowledge of key
networks in the community. GPSDO officials described the Moher Development
Committee as a typical representative of the sub-committees, although it had become
actively involved in rural development later than the other committees. Moher is a
mountainous area in the Eza and WoHane Worreda and some distance from the Worreda
capital Agena. The Eza, Wollane, Moher and Akilil houses inhabit this Worreda 7. Within
Moher, the only place with available accommodation was Cheza Sefa, the largest
settlement in the area and site of the high school built by MDA. Moher is one of the least
developed Sebat Bet areas of Gurageland and was the last to be connected to the road
system. The development association also constructed a telephone centre in Cheza Sefa
and the government opened a piped water system along the main road during the
fieldwork. The closest medical facilities are 20 km away. Sebat Bet Gurages have diverse
religious affiliations with equal numbers of orthodox Christians and Moslems, which
continue to be influenced by indigenous belief systems. There is also a small but
At the time of writing, the administrative boundaries of the Gurage zone were under revision.
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influential Catholic minority and a few Protestants. Unlike other areas, Moher is almost
entirely orthodox Christian. Strict adherence to religious obligations, such as abstaining
from work on all saints' days and the Sabbath, is an integral aspect of rural life. As a
highland area, chat production is less prominent in Moher than other Sebat Bet areas and
there was little evidence of coffee production. This lack of opportunities for cash crops and
the dense population has led to very high levels of male migration. In Moher, the research
focused on the town of Cheza Sefa and two surrounding Jafforos, and two Jafforos in the
neighbouring Korer Peasant Association (an area served by an elected committee
representing a population of around five thousand. PAs were originally established by the
Derg to facilitate participation in government).
The choice of Moher as the first research site then restricted choice for the second to
Enamor as it was the only midland site other than Cheha, which included a Worreda
capital. The Enor (Enamor), Aner and Indegagn houses inhabit the Enamor Worreda. The
Worreda capital, Gunchire, is within the area inhabited by Enamors and is well connected
to the Ethiopian highway system with daily buses to Addis Ababa. Gunchire has a range
of facilities including a high school built by the Enamor Development Association (EDA),
and a piped water system and clinic provided by the government. The EDA also electrified
the town although recently the system has fallen into disrepair. The area around Gunchire
is a centre for the production of chat and to a lesser extent coffee. Enamor is inhabited by
both Moslems and Christians with the former being in the majority and indigenous belief
systems continue to be influential. Both Gunchire and Moher suffer from soil erosion
particularly of common grazing land. The research in Enamor focused on the town of
Gunchire, two Jafforos in the neighbouring Shanka PA, and was supplemented by some
research in a nearby Fuga Jafforo.
The thesis focuses primarily on development associations, also called sub-committees,
representing two of the seven Sebat Bet houses, Moher and Enamor. However, this data
was supplemented by discussions with representatives from almost all the GPSDO sub-
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committees. I also made brief visits to the major settlements and GPSDO development
projects in all seven Sebat Bet houses. Whilst discussing my research strategy with
officials from the various sub-committees, it became apparent that although the sub-
committees co-operate within GPSDO, they also enjoy operational autonomy and there is
much competition between the sub-committees. Thus, it Is clear that there are both
similarities and major differences in their organisational structures in Addis Ababa, their
relationships with Idirs in Addis Ababa, their levels of activity and their relationships with
Worreda and zone officials. These issues came into focus when comparing the major
differences between Moher and Enamor, and therefore it would be unwise to attempt to
make broad generalisations about the nature of the Sebat Bet Gurage model of
development from these two case studies. During the course of the fieldwork, I moved
away from regarding the selected areas as representative samples of GPSDO or Gurage
development in general and attempted to coritextualise the unique features of each area.
2.3	 The impact of the researcher on identities
Anthropologists have come to appreciate that academic research can have unintended
effects on the communities under study. Tim Allen suggests that "just by using ethnic
labels in their writings, scholars have contributed to the formation and development of the
identities to which they refer" (Allen 1996 p92). He notes that "academic works, some of
them published decades ago, may remain unread but are nevertheless invoked to show
why primordial sentiment appears to dictate events."(Allen 1996 p92). In the case of the
Gurages, Shack's research and particularly his publication, The Gurage: A People of the
Enset Culture (Shack 1966), has had a major impact on the construction of ethnic and
other identities. Shack's research emphasised the homogeneity of Gurage culture, social
organisation and ethnic identity. According to Markakis, this lent scientific credence to the
creation of uniform Gurage ethnic identity at a time when Gurage identities were
responding to a variety of environmental factors related to mass urban migration
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(Markakis 1998). Markakis' approach oversimplifies this process by treating the
indigenous populations as homogenous passive consumers of academic research and
thereby underplaying indigenous agency in the process of appropriating academic
research for the construction of identities.
During the course of the fieldwork, it became apparent that a wide range of Sebat Bet
Gurages were aware of previous research into Gurage histories and cultures. This
literature included research by academics, such as (Shack 1966; Gedamu 1972; Nida
1996); indigenous intellectuals, such as (Mariam 1972; Bereka 1986; Neri); and
government sponsored research, such as (Alemu 1999). However, much of this
knowledge was partial, highly subjective and in the case of Shack, based more on the
criticisms levelled against it, some valid others less so, rather than the contents of the
text8
. In Chapter 6, I outline how articulation of knowledge of Gurage history, traditions
and culture is an essential aspect of the process of becoming a respected elder.
Indigenous intellectuals, such as rural elders and urban intellectuals have contested much
of what has been written about Gurages, including one prominent Gurage visiting Shack
in the U.S.A. to demand that he revise his research. They juxtapose their interpretations of
its limitations with their own knowledge of the histories and traditions of the Gurages.
Previous research was often used as a straw person to demonstrate the intellectuals' own
credentials as an authority on Gurage traditions or to further their own interests. In this
process, new understandings of Gurage traditions and cultures are constructed. Thus, it is
not the research per se that impacts on the construction of collective identities, but the
way that understandings of the research are interpreted and articulated by the intellectual
strata and accepted by the wider society as a way of understanding the world. The critical
attitude of Gurage intellectuals towards Shack influenced my approach to the research.
This attitude conjured up images of a viva staffed by a committee of elders demanding
that the thesis accurately reflect Gurage culture. This led to self-imposed pressure, during
8	
critiques of Shack refer primarily to The Gurage: A people of the Enset culture (Shack 1966). I
These critiques seem embedded in Gurage culture and include criticisms of his methods and focus
particularly on an accusation that he generalised his findings based largely on one sub-clan to the
rest of the Gurages. The subsequent revisions of his views (Shack 1974) seem to be unknown.
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the fieldwork, to discover and accurately portray objective facts about Gurage
development, rather than to analyse the data as my understandings of their discourses.
Without foresight of the particular political and socio-economic circumstances and internal
competition, it is extremely difficult to predict the nature of the impact of this research on
Gurage identities. The dominant Gurage development discourse is in part constructed to
make sense of contemporary events and legitimise activities by drawing on the
developmental history and culture of Gurages, which is embedded in the dominant notions
of civic virtue. The salient external contexts are discussed at more length in subsequent
Chapters. Chapter 7 discusses the recent conflict between GPSDO and the EPRDF
government, increased state penetration and political challenges to the legitimacy of
Gurage urban rural connections. The Gurage survival strategies outlined in Chapter 4 are
challenged by soclo-economic and demographic changes discussed in Chapters 4 and 8.
These changes may well have caused some Gurages to question whether the dominant
notion of civic virtue still produces rewards. The period immediately before the fieldwork
(April - December 1999) had been particularly traumatic for GPSDO due to a number of
external and internal factors. These included government attempts to undermine the
organisation by destroying its financial base and prohibiting the organisation from
mobilising support in Gurageland (see Chapter 7). Six months before commencement of
the fieldwork, a period of intense internal conflict within GPSDO culminated in the ousting
of its leadership and reforms to its mechanisms of accountability (see Chapter 6). The
discourses outlined in subsequent chapters are in part the product of attempts, by
different groups of Gurages, to make sense of the new environment in which GPSDO
finds itself. They are also the products of a long period of contestation within the urban
and rural elites, which involved various intellectual strata constructing notions of the role of
participation in development and leadership in what it means to be Gurage.
The findings of the research are thus, not presented as objective social facts about the
nature of the indigenous Gurage models of development, but as forms of understanding,
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constructed by the dominant sections of the urban and rural Sebat Bet elites, that make
sense of the new and challenging social and political context. The discourses outlined in
the thesis reflect the ways in which they have sought to understand contemporary issues
in a period of socio-economic and political change. Although, these discourses are based
on various constructions of Gurage histories and cultures, it is not the place of the
researcher to challenge the accuracy of these histories or to attempt to construct an
objective model of Gurage society. The purpose of this research is to explain how different
sectors of the Gurage communities use these constructions of Gurage civic virtue to
resolve contemporary issues.
3	 Informants
3.1	 Selection of the informants
3.1.1 Urban informants
The selection of informants was initially driven by the case study approach. Therefore, the
key informants in the first stage of the Addis Ababa fieldwork were GPSDO officials. The
leaders and activists in GPSDO can be placed into three categories: the founders and
other figures from the GRCO period (pre 1989); the leadership of GPSDO from 1989 to
1998; the current leadership of GPSDO and the sub-committees. The three groups had
differing views on certain issues, particularly the nature of accountability within the
organisation and the balance of power between the house-based sub-committees.
However, they all articulated the dominant Gurage development discourse. The leaders of
the sub-committees introduced me to the leaders of associational life, particularly house
and clan-based Idirs. The Idir leaders are highly respected and knowledgeable and as
discussed in Chapter 4, they have close links with the indigenous development
associations. The Idir leaders and sub-committee activists led me to the wider urban
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community. This approach to the selection of informants could lead to a self-reinforcing
view of the extent of community participation in development discussed in Chapter 6. The
implications of this approach, particularly for homogenising Gurage perceptions of
development, are discussed in section 3.2. With these limitations in mind, it became clear
that it was necessary to contact a broader group of urban informants.
Locating alternative urban informants was done on a pragmatic rather than systematic
basis. Some informants were contacted through the research assistants and friends of
acquaintances. I also contacted informants such as merchants, traders and bar owners
through visiting their premises. This group of informants included various categories of
traders ranging from the owners of large shops and trading ventures to small traders and
artisans in the Mercato to street traders. However, this group did not include the business
elite, which according to some informants is de-linked from the wider Gurage
communities.
Urban Gurage intellectuals are a heterogeneous group comprising professionals and
successful businesspeople born in Addis Ababa and Gurageland. They had a central role
in interpreting Gurage history and traditions in an urban setting. This group was highly
influential and tended to be active in Gurage associational life. In particular I wanted to
see how they conceptualised the role of development in the Gurage community and to
understand how they articulated their views to the wider community. However, it should be
noted that this group was usually contacted through the networks associated with the
development associations and Idirs. Therefore, the data they provided is likely to be in line
with the dominant Gurage development discourse. Contacting Gurage professionals and
civil servants with fewer ties to these networks was difficult and, as discussed in section
3.2 below, this group was barely represented in the data.
The final category of urban Gurages was political activists such as, MPs representing
Gurageland and figures linked to opposition parties. These groups provided information
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on government development policy, particularly as it relates to indigenous development
associations. I also attempted to get information on the causes of and salient events in the
conflict between GPSDO and the EPRDF government.
I also had detailed discussions with mainstream development agencies, such as NGOs
and bilateral agencies, that had partnerships with indigenous Gurage and other
development agencies in Gurageland. The relationship between mainstream development
agencies and GPSDO is not the central focus of the thesis. Therefore, the purpose of
these discussions was to get background information on the salient aspects of their
relationships with GPSDO. This included how relationships between mainstream
development agencies and GPSDO influence the relationships between GPSDO and its
beneficiaries, relationships within GPSDO and the extent to which engagement with
mainstream development had impacted on the orientation and activities of GPSDO.
3.1.2 Rural informants
For pragmatic reasons, contacting informants in Gurageland followed the hierarchies of
political authority and status as I tended to follow the order of Zone, Worreda, PA leaders,
elders, heads of household, women and youth. In order to obtain permission to undertake
the research the first group of informants contacted were the representatives of the state.
This group included Zone and Worreda officials such as the heads of Economic Affairs,
Social Affairs, Women's Affairs, Culture and Planning departments and the leaders of
local PAs. This group provided information on how government development policy was
implemented in the localities. They also provided government opinions on the nature of
development problems in Gurageland, their perspective on Gurage survival strategies, the
relationship between the state and indigenous development associations, and the roles of
the various rural strata in development. This group also included Development Agents
(extension workers) from the Department of Agriculture and GZDA officials.
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Prominent elders and others active in community affairs were usually identified in advance
by urban residents and GPSDO activists. I tried to follow the hierarchy of elders as those
of lower status seemed uncomfortable if they were interviewed before the highest status
elders. This approach may appear to legitimise communal hierarchies, however this was
balanced by the need not to offend key informants and the critical role that this group
plays in communal affairs. Developing a relationship with the elders was critical to the
success of the research project, as their support provided legitimacy in the eyes of other
potential informants. I assumed that this group would fulfil the role of an indigenous rural
intellectual strata, as they act as interpreters of tradition and were thus the most
knowledgeable about Gurage histories and cultures. Furthermore, they have acted as
contacts between the rural community and GPSDO and have a central role in rural
associational life.
I was able to contact a wider range of people in the rural than urban areas, as there were
fewer difficulties related to identifying potential informants. Community members were
selected at random in the different locations. Farmers were selected by waiting in the
Jafforo and arranging meetings, or by visiting farms where Debo groups were working.
Access was also negotiated at associational events such as Senbete, Idir meetings, clan
and house shangos and Mahber. In both locations market day provided an opportunity to
meet with a wide range of informants and arrange interviews. I did not use PA meetings
as a point of access to the rural community, as during this period these meetings were
used to discuss politically sensitive issues such as the forthcoming elections and the war
with Eritrea.
The approaches taken in contacting rural informants in Moher and Enamor differed due to
the nature of associational life in the two areas and the extent of prior knowledge of the
two areas. In Moher the rural sub-committee of the development association continues to
function and maintains close links to the leaders of rural associational life and the Moher
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PAs. In addition my research assistant was known in the area and was able to harness
some of his contacts to gain access to the community. Associational life in Moher
appeared more active than in Enamor, possibly due to the intensity of their religious
obligations. In Moher, there were almost daily associational gatherings such as Idir,
Shango, Mahber and Senbete in addition to PA meetings. In Gunchire, the situation was
more challenging, as the Enamor Development Association had no functioning rural
infrastructure. Associational life was dominated by state-linked institutions such as the PA,
therefore, in order to contact informants in the villages, PA leaders and Development
Agents were used as access points in three Jaforros. Although this approach facilitated
access to the community, there is a strong likelihood that informants identified me with
these agents of the state. This may have had some impact on the research, as the
Development Agents were the key actors at the village level in GZDA. I tried to maintain
some distance, by not allowing them to observe my interviews and made the informants
aware that I was not involved with the government. The impact of using these actors as
access points is difficult to evaluate, however it must be viewed in the context of a lack of
privacy in rural areas. Furthermore, my research was discussed within rural urban
networks with information passed in both directions as some key rural actors were aware
of my research before I arrived in their areas. As I seemed to be linked to the
Development Agent and political structure, in Enamor many informants seemed to believe
that they were obliged to participate in the research. I am unsure of the impact of this as I
explained that participation in the research was voluntary, and it is probable that if
informants were uncomfortable they would have engaged in avoidance strategies.
3.2	 The missing voices
From a constructivist standpoint, the notions of civic virtue that underpin the dominant
Gurage development discourse are likely to be contested. The construction of this
discourse is likely to involve articulating conceptions of tradition in order to benefit certain
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sections of the Gurage community. As discussed in Chapter 2, identifying and privileging
one group of a given society as historical actors capable of creating ethnicity is
problematic. During the course of the fieldwork, it became apparent that there were
criticisms of the dominant view of Gurage development. However, with a single exception,
these counter discourses were closely associated with government hostility to the urban
rural relationships embedded in the dominant notion of civic virtue. In Chapter 7, I outline
the political and ideological reasons for government suspicion of the dominant Gurage
notion of civic virtue. Generally criticism of GPSDO and its sub-committees rarely
extended to questioning the fundamental aspects of the dominant notion of civic virtue,
outlined in Chapter 4, and the way in which it is embedded within Gurage identities, as
discussed in Chapter 8. Instead, criticism was directed towards various categories of
people who had not fulfilled their obligations to the community rather than questioning the
legitimacy of these obligations or the institutions that have been built upon and sustain
them.
As discussed in section 3.1, the choice of informants particularly in the urban areas was
constrained by necessity. It was far more difficult to locate informants who would be likely
to articulate counter discourses. Thus the thesis outlines and explains the basis of the
dominant Gurage development discourse. This is the understanding articulated by the
urban elites, associational activists, rural intellectuals and is apparently accepted by the
bulk of the community. Whilst not wishing to privilege this view over others it should be
noted that very few informants explicitly or implicitly criticised the fundamental
underpinnings of this discourse. Although other members of the Sebat Bet community
may articulate critical discourses, they were not presented to the researcher. The lack of
counter discourses may be due to patterns of land ownership and the dominant economic
role of migratory activities, outlined in Chapter 4, combined with a perception that the
benefits from development interventions are equally shared by the rural population,
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. The only discourse that attacked some of the fundamental
relationships that underpin the contemporary notion of Gurage civic virtue was outlined by
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a prominent member of the urban elite. This critique is discussed at length in the
postscript to Chapter 5 as, although it is an isolated opinion, it may well reflect the views
of de-linked, professional Gurages, a category under-represented in the thesis.
The choice of informants was dictated by the case study approach and pragmatic
concerns and has led to some voices being dominant. This limitation in the selection of
informants was reinforced in the production of data, as I developed a close relationship
with the most articulate, confident and charismatic informants. In Enamor, I developed a
rapport with some professionals and civil servants, whilst in Moher this tended to be with
the clan leaders. In Addis Ababa, my respect for the leadership and activists within
GPSDO and their support and enthusiasm for the research led me to develop a close
relationship with some of them. Thus, there is a likelihood that information received from
the relatively powerless and least educated would be subordinated and that the research
risks further marginalising their views. As Lonsdale suggests uSome . .were clearly better
than others at stating their view of the world to strangers. They not only won an argument
about civic virtue, they seem to have silenced their critics" (Lonsdale 1992 p295). Thus,
the weight I give to responses from the more articulate, those more confident in the
presence of foreigners and those most proficient in English undoubtedly could play a role
in marginalising critics. In the future, this research could well be harnessed to promote the
dominant Gurage development discourse, which presents a particular conception of
development as embedded within Gurage notions of civic virtue. Thus, it is important to
highlight the internal and external context in which the data for this thesis was gathered
and who the informants were. My research focused on certain sections of the community
and therefore may give their perceptions privileged status. In line with the discussion in
section 2.3, I acknowledge that this research could be used to legitimise the dominant
Gurage development discourse by imbuing it with 'scientific status'. Allen suggests that in
relation to the impact of academic research on the communities under study, academics
"have much less control over the interpretation of what we write than we would like" (Allen
1996 p92). However, researchers can make the wider context of their research clear and
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outline whose voices are predominant within it. Thus, I re-iterate that the findings outlined
in this research are largely based on my interpretation of the dominant Gurage
development discourse that, in my opinion, is used by certain groups of Sebat Bet
Gurages to make sense of the world. (do not claim that all Gurages or even all Sebat Bet
Gurages uncritically accept these views; only that this is the way that the dominant urban
and rural Sebat Bet Gurages currently construct the relationship between development
and civic virtue.
4	 Data collection methods
4.1	 Methods
The main method of data gathering in both the rural and urban areas was semi-structured
interviews. This consisted of discussion around a pre-determined list of key issues,
focused to particular categories of informants. The discussion usually began with open-
ended questions about the nature of development in the area, what the informant saw as
the key developmental problems in the area and who was responsible for development. I
would then focus in on salient issues raised by the informants to allow for adaptation to
informants' agendas and concerns. When interviews were less structured, the informants
had greater control of the interaction and tended to yield more interesting and unexpected
data. This also seemed to make them feel that I was valuing their opinions and allowed
them to participate in setting the agenda for the interaction. Whilst this was slightly more
time-consuming for both of us, there were only a few occasions when the lack of control
led to long and irrelevant answers. This was exacerbated in translated interviews. It was
apparent that informants would discuss the content and nature of the interviews with other
members of the informant's network and tried to prevent interviews becoming dull or too
intrusive. Interviews conducted in Amhanc or Guraginia had to be more structured than
those conducted in English and were based on a list of specific questions. This approach
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often reduced the scope for follow-up questions and constrained the ability of the
informants to discuss issues at length.
Urban interviews were usually conducted in the informant's workplace or home in order to
minimise disruption to their schedules and to create a relaxed atmosphere. Visitors often
interrupted interviews conducted in the home and although this reduced privacy, it served
to broaden my network of contacts. The main limitations of using informants workplaces
were that, in the case of merchants and traders, there was much disruption caused by
onlookers and background noise, and in the case of civil servants, electronic equipment
such as tape recorders could not be taken into government offices. The location of rural
interviews varied considerably, some were conducted in informants' homes and places of
work whilst others were held at communal meeting places such as Shangos, markets and
Idirs. I also held interviews in my lodgings, which provided an incentive for participation,
as refreshments were also provided.
During the initial part of the urban fieldwork, I presented key informants with a typed
transcript of the interview. This was extremely useful at first in correcting some basic
misunderstandings and provided me with an idea of where conceptual and linguistic
confusion was likely to occur in future. Ultimately this technique proved time-consuming
for the informants and it could only be used when informants had a very high standard of
English. This approach evolved into arranging as many follow-up interviews as possible in
order to build up rapport and provide the informants with information about the nature of
the research.
The original intention was only to conduct interviews individually, however often the
number of participants was determined by the setting of the interview. The rural interview
schedule was dependent on the inhabitants work schedules, therefore the best
opportunities for interviews were either at associational gatherings or during breaks in
communal work groups. Thus, group interviews were often unavoidable. In addition,
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during the course of interviews in the rural areas and in Addis Ababa, impromptu groups
would form. This would put informants at ease and acted as a means of disseminating
information about the nature of my research on their terms. This approach had both
positive and negative outcomes for the research. On occasion, this technique produced
dynamic interactions within the group whereby informants actively discussed and refined
ideas. This seemed to happen mostly with younger and educated informants and where
they appeared to be of relatively equal age and status.
In the context of the limited resources available, it was difficult to do group work in
Amharic, as it was often beyond the capability of a single research assistant to translate
the responses immediately and control the group. Many of the issues that I wanted to
discuss were seen as sensitive, as informants seemed unwilling to discuss them in a
public forum. This was particularly the case with issues that could be related to politics
and internal conflict within GPSDO and, to a lesser extent, local power structures and
personal finances. In addition to self-censorship, some informants were silenced by others
in the group when they mentioned issues deemed to be sensitive or unsuitable for
discussion with outsiders. Usually the responses elicited from group interviews were of
limited value as there was a tendency for only the person of highest status to speak and
for others to merely agree with them or remain silent. This was particularly a problem
when attempting to get responses from women or young people, as there was an
assumption that certain people can speak on behalf of the community. In this situation,
observing the dynamics within the group was of equal or greater value than the actual
responses provided. The interactions within the groups revealed the contextual nature of
status hierarchies as, within the same group, different people would dominate the
discussion and would be deferred to at different times according to the nature of the
issues raised. Analysing these interactions also revealed which subjects are sensitive and
to whom in the group. Generally, it seemed that older informants within groups were more
willing to discuss sensitive issues such as inter-clan relationships. In group interviews, the
responses were often made for the consumption of the group as a whole rather than the
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interviewer. This had a contradictory impact on the data as, in some cases, individuals
would exaggerate their own contributions to the community, or the importance of their own
clan or house, whereas some prominent individuals would downplay the significance of
their contribution to the community when interviewed in a group. This could be related to
the expectation of highly respected people behaving humbly.
In Addis Ababa, informants generally consented to the use of tape recorders when being
interviewed. During recorded interviews discussions became conversational and less
structured. This proved most valuable in interviews conducted in Amharic as it allowed the
discussion to be reviewed and translated later in depth. However, it was clear that when
the interviewee found issues sensitive they would glance nervously at the tape recorder
and respond less than candidly and often refuse to elaborate. This issue was partially
resolved by ceding control of the tape recorder to the informant, which enabled them to
decide which issues required the confidentiality that not recording implied. This seemed to
lead to many informants being much more confident and candid than if no parts of the
interview had been recorded. As interviews were usually transcribed within 48 hours, I
was able to demonstrate that the tapes were constantly re-recorded and that there was no
possibility of them falling into the wrong hands. Tape recorders were not used in rural
areas, as I believed that it might intimidate some informants.
4.2 The absence of PRA and survey methods
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and other participatory methodologies have become
increasingly important in development studies. This approach allows many of the
concerns listed above to be addressed particularly allowing the researched to have some
input into the agenda of the research. These approaches are particularly popular with
practitioners who have little time to engage in long-term research methods. The limitations
discussed in section 4.1 with reference to group interviews can also be applied to
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participatory exercises such as PRA. This method is used mainly by development
practitioners, who have substantial incentives for people to co-operate. With many other
demands on informants' time, I seriously doubted whether it would have been feasible to
arrange group exercises. PRA did not seem an appropriate method of investigating the
research topic. Although PRA can be relevant to project planning and revealing
information about resource use, it seemed less appropriate for questions designed to
reveal perceptions that are more abstract. The main advantage of participatory
methodologies is that they allow informants' concerns to be priontised in the research,
however, my approach of semi-structured interviews involved a high degree of informant
participation.
Household surveys did not seem a valid means for acquiring data on this subject matter in
this soclo-cultural environment. It seemed an inappropriate means to explore the
subtleties of the meanings embedded within responses, and therefore would have
produced misleading data. During interviews, questions had to be constantly rephrased
and refined in line with informants responses in order to overcome conceptual and factual
misunderstandings. This was particularly apparent when informants used a range of
names to refer to the organisations. Indeed, appreciating that the informants and I were
often using the same terminology to describe different things led to major conceptual
breakthroughs. A quantitative method could not have revealed the differing meanings that
have been applied to important terms in the dominant development discourses. A survey
would have been incapable of exploring the situational factors affecting responses and
discourses used by the informants.
The structure of a survey would make it extremely easy for the informants to give answers
that they deemed to be the most inoffensive. It was probable that there would be a very
high rate of non-response as most rural interviews required a period of negotiation and
many informants missed appointments due to other engagements. For an extensive
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survey, it would have been necessary to train up a group of research assistants, time
which could have been more usefully spent in interviews.
4.3	 Research Assistants
In addition to the ability to translate, I wanted research assistants with knowledge of local
culture and political issues so that they could provide advice on how to handle sensitive
issues and negotiate access to networks of informants. Much of the criticism of the work
of Shack can be traced to his selection of and reliance on his research assistants.
According to urban and rural informants, Shack's assistants were all from the same sub-
clan of the dominant clan in Cheha which led to distortion of his data, as it tended to
overemphasise the importance of this sub-clan, clan and house. Therefore, I attempted to
strike a balance between research assistants' knowledge of the dialects, culture and
access to informants whilst maintaining some distance. Although local research
assistants, if available, would have facilitated better access, it was preferable to select
Gurage research assistants who were not from the house under study. Ultimately
knowledge of the local dialects did not seem crucial, as most rural interviews were
conducted in Amharic with some use of the local dialects to clarify certain terminology.
The first research assistant was a Kistane Gurage graduate student in anthropology. His
previous work in Moher involved some interaction with key urban and rural informants.
However, he seemed to be perceived as an outsider, which had implications for the
research. In Addis Ababa some of his contacts refused to co-operate with the research, or
were extremely hesitant to discuss development in Moher in anything other than the most
vague terms. He was relatively young and not active in urban Gurage associational life.
The difficulties that we encountered suggest that gaining access to the key urban and
rural Gurage networks does not automatically translate into good information. For many
informants this seemed to require credentials and a degree of trust, which can only be
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established by an insider. In rural Moher he commanded a great deal of respect and was
able to facilitate access to elders, PA leaders and the wider community. However, many of
the rural people continued to be suspicious and even fearful of our motives. Furthermore,
his previous position seemed to lead to many rural informants behaving deferentially.
The second research assistant was a Cheha Gurage in his sixties who had previously
worked on Catholic Secretariat development projects in Gurageland. He was a member of
clan and sub-clan Idirs and attended the same Catholic church as many of the most
significant historical figures in GPSDO, and was active in a Cheha sub-committee. These
associational ties enabled me to overcome many of the difficulties I had encountered in
negotiating access as he seemed to be a part of many of the most important urban Sebat
Bet Gurage networks. He also had credibility in both the rural and urban areas due to his
previous employment with the Catholic secretariat that had previously been active in
development in much of the Gurage zone. His position as an insider influenced the
direction of the research, as he was knowledgeable about sensitive issues which had
previously only been hinted at, specifically political relationships and internal relationships
within GPSDO. Whilst providing much background information, he was also able to
arrange contacts with individuals who were both knowledgeable and prepared to discuss
these issues. When he was present, urban interviews tended to take on a different
atmosphere, as informants seemed more relaxed and tended to speak to him rather than
through him to me. They also seemed more prepared to discuss sensitive issues, perhaps
because they assumed that I already had some knowledge of these issues. As his
presence seemed to increase greatly my credibility, I also engaged him in interviews
where his translation skills were not required. Being aware of the dangers of over-reliance
on the interpretations of research assistants, I cross-checked information that he gave me.
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4.4 Gender
The major limitation to the thesis is issues relating to gender. Historically women have had
little role within GPSDO and a range of pragmatic issues severely constrained my ability
to research gender issues. In urban areas it proved very difficult to contact women, as the
networks that I used to access the community were male dominated. There appeared to
be no female participation in the sub-committees and households are represented in Idirs
by the male head. Migrants such as merchants were all men. The situation varied in the
rural locations. During the course of the research in Moher, there was little evidence that
gender relations have changed from the situation in the 1950s described by Shack as
absolute male superiority, whereby women have no authority (Shack 1966). More
recently, "the ideal pattern of relations between husband and wife in Gurageland" was
described as "male domination and the separation of the sexes. [The] husband as a family
head... makes all major decisions which he considers necessary for the welfare of the
family" (Abute 1997 p58). In Moher, it was almost impossible to arrange interviews with
women and I only managed to speak to three female informants, two young women who
worked at my lodgings and a female Development Agent. In Enamor it was possible to
speak to female informants, however these interactions were constrained by a number of
factors. Generally, it was only possible to speak to women in groups, during work in Debo
(rotating, single sex agricultural labour group with 6 to 15 members) and breaks from
work. However, interviewing women whilst they were working was difficult, as often the
householder would disapprove due to the disruption caused. Furthermore, there are strict
taboos preventing men from observing women during the preparation of enset, the main
form of female work during the research period. This was partially resolved by
constructing screens, however, this further increased the disruption to production.
Interviewing women during breaks from work was also difficult, as these breaks were
short and the women had to prepare food and care for children.
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Thus discussion of the role of women in development and their perceptions of Gurage
civic virtue in this thesis is limited and tends to reflect male perception of the role of
women. Whilst not wishing to endorse the view presented by male informants that women
participate in development through heads of household, discussion of gender issues in the
thesis is limited to the perceptions of Gurage men, with a limited contribution from a few
rural women and urban female intellectuals.
5	 Ethical issues and sensitivities
During the course of the research, it became apparent to me that several issues had
major ethical dimensions. These can be grouped into two areas: issues of sensitivity to
the informants, and the nature of my research contribution to GPSDO.
5.1	 Sensitive issues
To an outsider, the relationship between GPSDO and the Gurage communities would
appear to be uncontentious, however this was far from the case as the relationship
between GPSDO and the government was extremely sensitive. Indeed a previous
attempt, in 1997, to investigate the relationship between GPSDO and its rural
stakeholders received no co-operation from the government (Molla 1997). The Zone,
Worreda and party officials that I dealt with were, without exception, helpful and co-
operative and freely gave up their time to assist in the research. However many
informants in the rural and urban areas were unwilling to discuss politically sensitive
issues. The current leadership of GPSDO and the sub-committees generally declined to
discuss any details of their relationship with the government other than stating that it
varied between houses and Worredas and that it was generally improving. Some
informants requested anonymity or declined to answer sensitive questions, as they feared
sanctions being taken against their businesses, others feared their pensions being
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removed, whilst some civil servants feared that their careers would be adversely affected
by openly criticising their superiors or party policy. It is not necessary for an outsider to
assess the validity of these fears. However, in the context of the recent history of Ethiopia,
with networks of informers during the Derg period, and the perception of many urban
Gurages that they are a target group, these fears were real to the informants. In the light
of these fears, I assured informants of absolute confidentiality. Some data openly critical
of the government could be traced back to sources and have not been included in the
thesis. No serving members of GPSDO or the sub-committees explicitly criticised
government policy or officials, however other data could potentially harm the relationship
between GPSDO and the government and have been left out of the thesis.
The second aspect is related to internal conflicts within the Gurage communities and
within GPSDO. The approach of informants to an outsider who may publicise internal
conflicts varied. Many informants refused to acknowledge that there had been any internal
conflict or refused to discuss its implications for GPSDO and the Gurage communities.
However, once I had demonstrated that I had some knowledge of conflicts within GPSDO,
some informants clearly relished the opportunity to promote their views. Many rural
informants were also unwilling to criticise rural power structures. This was most obvious in
the discomfort shown by some informants when attempting to reconcile party discourses
and other affiliations. For example, informants with political affiliations were expected to
be critical of the behaviour of known elders in relation to changes to the Gurage
customary law (Ya Kitcha, Chapters 5 and 7) yet seemed unable to openly criticise them.
Discussion of internal conflicts often led to avoidance strategies or to coded criticisms.
Informants were usually unwilling to discuss the nature of economic networks and the
nature of economic activity during migration, as they were deemed too sensitive to
discuss with an outsider. In Chapter 4, I suggest that much of the information on the role
of ethnic and sub-ethnic networks may well represent a counter discourse to the dominant
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Ethiopian perceptions of Gurages as a secretive ethnic group who use their ethnic
networks for business advantage.
5.2	 The contribution of the research
The other major ethical issue was about the nature of my contribution to the Gurage
communities who assisted me in my research. This was most apparent in Moher, where
most informants believed that I was part of a development project, which would bring
tangible benefits to the community. Discussing the nature of academic research had little
impact on informants' perceptions and ultimately I had to begin discussions by
downplaying direct developmental issues in the research and focusing on the contextual
aspects. This perception on the part of the informants probably led to contradictory
distortions of the data. On the one hand there was an emphasis, particularly by those who
felt that it was their duty to secure resources, on claiming that no development agencies
had been active in their area. On the other hand, other informants seemed unwilling to
criticise previous development projects and would try to demonstrate their worthiness to
receive developmental assistance by emphasising their role in previous development and
their flexibility.
The direct contributions of the thesis to the Gurage communities and particularly GPSDO
are likely to be limited. As discussed above, it may well act as a point of reference in
internal discussions of the nature of Gurage civic virtue and its relationship to the Gurage
model of development At a tangible level the thesis and subsequent publications will
serve to publicise the activities of GPSDO to a wide audience including potential donors
and partners. The thesis may also provide 'academic legitimacy' for GPSDO's claim to be
the most successful example of indigenous community development in Ethiopia, which
can be harnessed by the leadership as they struggle to renegotiate their relationship with
the Ethiopian state. At a broader level, the thesis will contribute towards an understanding
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of the contributions of ethnicafly-based development associations. It provides a
framework for understanding a broader salience of ethnicity in development. These
understandings can be applied to a range of indigenous development associations. At a
methodological level, the thesis raises significant questions over the extent to which the
meanings embedded in the concepts used by dominant development discourses are
shared by people on the ground. This in turn questions whether the conceptual tools used
by the dominant development discourses are applicable to indigenous development
associations. In addition to raising questions, the thesis proposes ways of locating the
conceptual tools used by researchers in the reality of people on the ground.
6	 Conclusions
GPSDO is the most successful and well-known example of indigenous development
endeavour in Ethiopia, and could well be the only successful example of long term
indigenous community development in Ethiopia. Therefore, it is not surprising that
understanding and replicating 'the Gurage model of development' has become something
of a Holy Grail in Ethiopian development discourses. The intention of the thesis is more
modest, as I seek to understand the forms of trusteeship between GPSDO and the Sebat
Bet communities. My approach is to relate the orientation of indigenous Gurage
development associations to Gurage social organisation. The thesis seeks to locate the
dominant Gurage development discourse, articulated by the urban and rural intellectual
strata, in contemporary Gurage notions of civic virtue, the processes of Gurage
citizenship. Although I use the terms Gurage and Sebat Bet Gurage interchangeably, the
thesis refers only to the relationships between the Sebat Bet Gurage communities and
GPSDO and its sub-committees. The methodological approach taken in the thesis can be
applied to other similar organisations. The conclusions drawn from the data are largely
specific to the relationship between GPSDO and the Sebat Bet Gurage communities at
the turn of the millennium.
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Chapter 4
The social world of the Gurage migrant and conceptions of civic virtue
Introduction
Migration is a central element of the lives of Gurage people. Migration to other parts of
Ethiopia is crucial for the economic viability of most rural households, therefore almost all
rural Gurage men are involved in migration. Migration and the social adaptations it
necessitated have become embedded within Gurage cultures and value systems. Any
explanation of Gurage society must be grounded in an understanding of the nature of
Gurage migration patterns and its impact on Gurages. For example, migration is now a
central aspect of Gurage masculinity. Migration is also central to Gurage beliefs about
their origins as an ethnic group. Although Gurages now have a strong attachment to their
current territories which form the basis for their house identities, their oral traditions
suggest that they are composed of several distinct groups of peoples who migrated to
Gurageland in the past and eventually became the Gurages (Alemu 1999).
The chapter begins by introducing some of the rural institutions that have been built upon
by Gurage migrants. Then the chapter will illustrate the economic and cultural pressures
that lead to high levels of Gurage migration. The approach taken in this chapter is
influenced by the way of conceptualising migration put forward by Emanuel Marx (1990).
This analyses migration in terms of social networks and focuses on how migrants are
connected to series of groups in different locations. The chapter will explore the complex
social world Gurage migrants construct in order to survive socially and economically. It will
examine the web of rights and obligations within the Gurage communities, particularly the
obligations to rural kin and illustrates how many of these networks of trust and co-
operation have been institutionalised. It will show how migrants and other urban Gurages
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obligations to the rural sectors of the community shape a broader orientation to the rural
areas. Urban Gurage orientations to development are an extension of their wider
orientations to the rural areas, often expressed in terms of kinship, that form a web of
rights and obligations. Gurage urban networks have been characterised as an example of
'the economy of affection' (Baker 1992) and using more current concepts they might be
seen as social capital (Coleman 1988; Fukuyama 1995). However, my focus is to analyse
the rights and obligations embedded within Gurage migratory survival strategies as the
central element in the dominant constructions of Gurage notions of civic virtue.
2	 Rural institutions
This section introduces some of the institutions and social practices in the rural areas. The
relationship between these institutions and development will be discussed at greater
length in Chapters 5 and 6.
2.1	 Shango
Shango are the Gurage customary courts where legal disputes are settled according to Ya
Kitcha, the Gurage customary law. This institution has various tiers that reflect some of
the elements of Gurage identities such as family, village, clan, house and Sebat Bet. In
principle Shango decisions are binding on all Gurages and are backed by Ya Kitcha and a
range of powerful sanctions. The Shango is seen as the voice of the community and its
authority is widely accepted, however, it is attended mainly by male heads of household
and dominated by elders. Although that there is no prohibition preventing them from
attending, unless directly involved in a case, women, low caste Fuga and young people
rarely participate in these meetings, as they believe that it is the domain of the elders and
that their contributions will not be taken seriously. In addition to settling legal disputes,
Shango provides a forum for elders and heads of household to discuss communal issues.
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In Chapter 6, I discuss the central role of the house Shango in securing legitimacy for
development interventions.
2.2	 Idir
A range of residential and clan-based ldirs serve the population of Gurageland, their
primary function is to provide social and financial support at times of bereavement. All
rural households are members of at least one Idir. The functions of Idirs vary according to
the levels of contributions expected of their members. The most basic Idirs have no direct
contribution and members are expected to only attend funerals and wakes, rather than
provide financial assistance. Most ldirs require a monthly financial contribution from
members and will provide them with financial support on the death of a member of the
household. Some members of this type of Idir who cannot afford to contribute financially
can provide services to the Idir in lieu of financial contributions. Some large and well
established Idirs may also provide a range of types of social insurance, such as loans for
members payment of land tax and subsidising the transportation and hospital costs
incurred during serious illness, with the money being deducted from the death settlement.
In Moher, this sector is particularly dynamic and became relatively wealthy through
lending money at interest from their capital, however this practice was recently prohibited
by the government. These Idirs now invest their surplus in cattle, which graze on common
land. The Idirs in the area around Gunchire seemed less dynamic and concentrated solely
on their original purposes. The role of rural Idirs in development is discussed at length in
Chapter 6.
94
2.3 Senbete and Mahber
Senbete are informal gatherings after church at which the congregation eats together and
discusses communal affairs. In Moher, the congregation and the community are virtually
synonymous, as the entire rural population is obliged to attend church. Thus, Senbete is a
central institution in Moher and provides a point of access to the community for
development interventions. Other Sebat Bet areas are more heterogeneous in religious
affiliation and thus Senbete are of less importance. In Moslem areas gatherings after
worship fulfil a similar function.
In the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the 15 leading saints are celebrated each month.
Mahber are gatherings to celebrate these saints' days and involve communal eating and
drinking and provide a forum for the discussion of communal issues. In most Christian
Sebat Bet areas, people refrain from work and celebrate the monthly day of the patron
saint of the local church and the monthly celebration of St Mary's birthday. However, in
Moher all 15 saints' days are observed in this manner.
3	 The causes of Gurage migration
3.1	 Push factors
The Gurage zone is one of the most densely populated areas of Ethiopia with population
density varying between 200-300 per square kilometre. Prior to the construction of a road
network there were few opportunities for cash cropping and surpluses of the staple crop
enset were of limited trade value as it was perceived as unpalatable by the Amhara ruhng
groups. Thus, in order to meet financial obligations, particularly land tax after 1929,
regular migration to the urban centres to generate income became necessary. This
process of regular cyclical migration was facilitated by a combination of the seasonal
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nature of male agricultural labour in enset producing areas which reflects the rural sexual
division of labour and the relative proximity of Gurageland to Addis, which allowed men to
migrate for large parts of the year. The rural economy continues to be based on rain fed
agriculture with enset supplemented by grains and pulses and, in some areas, cash crops
such as chat, eucalyptus and coffee. Due to the high population density, small land
holdings and the limited application of agricultural technologies, high levels of migration
are still necessary for economic survival in many areas particularly the most highly
populated areas and those with only limited opportunities for cash cropping. Although
migration has increased the demand for hired agricultural labour, other than retailing there
are still few opportunities for wage labour in rural Gurageland. This has led to an
estimated 95% of Gurage males being involved in migration at some stage of their life
which has led to 60% of Gurages now residing outside the Gurage zone (Alemayehu
1999). According to one economist, 85% of land taxation in Guragetand is paid through
migrants remittances (personal communication 1999). There is a widespread perception
that the economic survival of rural households is dependent on migrants' remittances to
pay taxes and to exist beyond a subsistence level, i.e. to purchase clothes and pay for
festivals.
3.2	 Pull factors
In contrast to the limited economic opportunities in Gurageland there is a perception that
other areas, particularly Addis, provide many economic opportunities for industrious
Gurage men. Young men and their families are aware of the kin and village level networks
used to assist migrants in finding employment and accommodation. The rural community
regularly sees many examples of highly successful migrants who return for festivals. In
the past, migration to urban centres enabled access to the benefits of urban life such as
hospitals, electricity and water. In particular, access to formal education was limited to
those rural Gurages living close to Endeber, the largest Sebat Bet Gurage town where a
I was unable to verify the accuracy of this statistic, particularly whether or not it accounts for
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missionary school was located. As a response many boys stayed with relatives in the
urban centres, as youths engaged in urban occupations could potentiafly pursue
education. As migration has become a central part in Gurage life, it is embedded in
Gurage cultures, with expectations that young men will support their household financially.
In addition, role models such as male relatives and their peer group are either resident in
Addis or regular migrants. Gurage perceptions of masculinity seem to be influenced by the
idealised migrant discourse discussed later. The social and cultural expectations of
migration reflect economic pressures that are part of being a male Gurage. In addition to
paying land taxation Gurage men are obliged to support relatives, amass capital to marry
and establish a household and to finance festivals.
3.3	 Patterns of migration
Although almost all rural-born Gurage men seem to be involved in migration, there are
significant differences in their migration patterns. On the basis of their orientation to
Gurageland and other Gurages, many informants drew a distinction between the Addis
born, 'sons of Addis', and those born in Gurageland, 'Mercato Gurages'. Although these
distinctions illustrate how Gurages conceptualise different urban residents, they seem
arbitrary and do little to illustrate the variety in Gurage migratory survival strategies and
how this impacts on orientations to Gurageland. These migration patterns are complex
and vary between individuals and during the course of a man's life. Rather than placing
categories on the different types of migration, I will out'ine the factors that can be used as
indicators in attempting to typologise the various migratory strategies (see Figure 4.1).
This can be regarded as a continuum ranging from urban Gurages who rarely or ever visit
rural Gurageland ('sons of Addis') to cyclical migrants who migrate to Addis annually to
supplement their incomes ('Mercato Gurages').
cyclical migration and if it includes women and children.
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The key factor in distinguishing migration patterns is the ownership and control of rural
resources, particularly land. Although all adult male Gurages are entitled to own land,
many urban Gurages chose either not to exercise this right or cede control of it to other
relatives. The performance of agricultural labour also indicates the nature of ties to
Gurageland, in some cases the migrant himself engages in agricultural labour, whilst
others hire workers or are involved in reciprocal arrangements with other villagers. The
presence of rural and or urban wives also dictates the nature of ties to Gurageland. These
factors are constrained by the degree of flexibility permitted by the migrants' urban
occupation, as traders have greater freedom to rotate between urban and rural areas than
civil servants and professionals.
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Figure 4.2
The Gurage household as an economic unit
Flow of labour
Flow of resources
As an adaptation to the socio-economic conditions created by their incorporation into the
Ethiopian economy, and in the context of the sexual division of labour in enset-producing
areas, the Gurage household can be seen as an economic unit that operates in different
locations (see Figure 4.2). This illustrates the artificiality of dichotomising the urban and
rural Gurage communities. Not only does the household bridge geographical gaps, it also
harnesses the resources of different generations, as unmarried men living in Addis
continue to be seen as key elements of the household providing money. Married men are
also under some obligation to support their parents' household if they have the financial
capacity to do so. This has been conceptualised as Gurages being 'urbanised peasants'
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(Nida 1996). Others such as Gedamu see Gurageland as a suburb of Addis Ababa due to
the improved communications links and regular migration (personal communication 2000).
In urban Ethiopian cultures, the term Gurage cames a range of negative meanings, many
of which have resonance with stereotypes applied to economically intermediary groups in
other societies. The term Gurage is often applied to those with an obsession with making
money and can mean to cheat or steal. In the past Gurages were subject to
discrimination, which effectively limited their employment to spheres despised by the
Amhara elites such as manual labour, artisans and trade. A caste system, officially
abolished by the Derg, operated in Gurageland, which prohibited the Wolleba caste -
approximately 95% of the population - from engaging in occupations such as carpentry,
metal working and leather working, which were restricted to the Fuga, Nefura and Buda
castes respectively. However, these restrictions did not apply to migrants working outside
Gurageland, where Gurages have taken an instrumental approach to work and have
become involved in a range of occupations Including manual labour, artisans, service
industries and, most notably, trade.
Gurages responded to the negative stereotypes and discrimination through the
construction of counter-discourses and the recreation of Gurage identity. The cohesive
urban social world created to counter the effects of discrimination included a range of
urban institutions for social and economic advancement and to reinforce urban rural
linkages. Many of the Gurage counter-discourses about themselves are rooted in the
period of urbanisation in the 1950s. A range of discourses reflect how Gurages see
themselves and also impacts on their activities. One of the most pervasive, in terms of its
impact on Gurage men and masculinity, is an idealisation of the Gurage migrant. This
discourse has appropriated elements of the negative stereotypes and presents an
idealised hard-working and enterprising Gurage man. He is flexible and takes an
instrumental view of labour, being willing to undertake any work in order to advance
himself and support his family. He saves money to invest in future business ventures,
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whilst at the same time supporting his rural kin and maintaining his social obligations to
other Gurages. Thus, in addition to sending money back to his parents, he returns for
festivals, particularly Meskal and Arafa, and for ceremonies such as weddings and
funerals. He also maintains strong associational linkages with other urban Gurages such
as village, clan and house-based ldirs. He is willing to help other Gurage migrants,
particularly those from his home village and clan. Yet most of his economic success is due
to his own individual effort rather than his Gurage linkages. This pervasive discourse
seems to underpin Gurage explanations of their migration patterns and the majority of
case studies outlined below are remarkably similar. The impact of a series of linked
discourses relating to Gurage networks and a golden age of Gurage development is
discussed at more length in the conclusion.
4	 Rights and obligations of migrants
The perceptions of Gurages held by other ethnic groups and sometimes reflected in
academic research, such as Baker (1992), present them as the classical 'other'. They are
portrayed as more cohesive, secretive and exclusive than other ethnic groups in Ethiopia,
and use this to promote their economic interests. However, Gurages rarely present their
obligations in ethnic or house terms. They see their primary obligations being to their
family, then home village and then clan, although this is not necessarily presented in
economic terms. A leader of GPSDO expressed this, "People in the cities feel obligated to
support their locality. It is a natural phenomenon that starts from the family. If you talk
about the well being of society you start from your home then go to your neighbour. The
obligations start with supporting your family, your clan, your bet [house], then the other
Gurages, then the rest of Ethiopia." This section is based on interviews with a range of
Sebat Bet Gurage migrants, however, it draws heavily on detailed interviews with five
migrants whose responses characterised the experiences of many other migrants. The
five cases are listed below:
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A) Enor (Enamor) shop keeper (late 30s)
At the age of 10, A and his brother came to live with their uncle in Addis. The uncle
gave them some money to start work as Listros (shoe shiners, the archetypal first
occupation for Gurage boys). After 2 years, the brothers then took over the uncle's
coal retail business and for 5 years, they shared the profits with him. Later they
were given a shop by A's brother's in-laws with whom they shared the profits for
three years. Since then, they have rented their own small shop. The brothers'
wives live on the same plot in Gurageland and the brothers rotate between
Gurageland and Addis working on the land and sharing the proceeds. They both
send money back to their rural families.
B) Cheha artisan (70+)
B came to Addis at the age of 15 to get money to help himself and his family.
Initially he was an apprentice saddle maker. After 15 years he started his own
business with savings from his wages and through a small Ikube, and now co-
owns a shop in the Mercato. He returns to Gurageland occasionally for festivals.
His son looks after his land, although he controls the proceeds. He sends money
to his rural family.
C) Enor bar owner (50s)
C came to Addis as a child and stayed with his mother's relatives to support his
parents and to be independent. After his relatives had lent him the money to buy
equipment, he initially worked as a Listro. He saved money from this and started a
wood selling business. He was introduced to an Ikube by his older brother, which
he used to expand his business. He has a second wife in Gurageland. He returns
for Arafa (an Islamic festival) and at least twice every year for 2-3 months at the
start of the rains to plough and plant cereals, and in November to harvest them
and to plant and harvest enset. When he goes to Gurageland his urban wife runs
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the business. In the rural area, his wife and relatives run the farm and employ
hired labour.
D) Cheha street trader (22)
D came to Addis at age of 12 and stayed with a cousin. He migrated to help
support his parents and family. He now shares a rented room with his younger
brother and another friend from his village, who are both engaged in similar work.
He started by trading leather goods produced in his Addis neighbourhood. He
started an Ikube with nine other more established youths from his home village in
order to set up the business. Later other boys from his vil'age introduced him to
selling electrical goods. He saved from his previous work and formed another
Ikube to set up this business. As he is young and unmarried he has no land in
Gurageland, but he sends clothes and money back to help his parents pay land
taxes. He returns to Gurageland for Meskal (an orthodox Christian festival) and
other celebrations such as funerals and weddings.
E) Eza wholesaler (40s)
E came to Addis at the age of 15 to earn money to help his family. He stayed with
his older sister who helped him buy the equipment to work as a Listro. Later he
worked as a servant, however his friends from the same area, who were working
as fruit vendors, told him that he could earn more money selling fruit, and together
they formed an Ikube to provide him with the capital to start his own business. Now
he supplies fruit vendors with fruit from the government wholesaler. He returns to
Gurageland four times a year and for festivals. During these visits he manages the
farm and arranges hired labourers, who are paid monthly wages and given
contributions for festivals. His mother and wife use the proceeds from the farm and
he sends them money. When he is in Gurageland, his brother and friends take
care of his business.
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The rights and obligations embedded in Gurage networks vary over time and tend to
expand with age and increasing financial capacity. The critical change in the structure of
his networks occurs when he establishes his own household. The only constant feature is
that the obligation to contribute financially to the parental household is seen as an
essential aspect of being a Gurage man. All migrants suggested that their prime
motivation for migration was to enable them to support their rural families from a young
age. The response of E typifies all, "I had to come to Addis as there is no chance of
earning money in Gurageland". For C, "it is the tradition and culture of the Gurages to help
their kin in the rural areas. The land is small and the money is crucial for taxes and
festivals". B stressed that urban remittances were crucial to the economic survival of
Gurage households, "if we do not send money how do you think they would survive?"
Gurages in Addis send money and other items home via returning migrants or when they
visit Gurageland. In addition to money, all migrants, including youths, are expected to
return to the rural areas for Meskal and festivities such as funerals and weddings. Most of
the migrants interviewed stayed with relatives when they first arrived in Addis. Urban kin,
such as siblings, uncles and cousins, are expected to help these young migrants by
providing accommodation, assisting in employment and securing access to credit.
For youths (unmarried men) migration takes place in the context of parochial networks of
existing migrants and peers. In addition to family ties, young unmarried men use networks
based on their home village to provide a range of social and economic benefits. According
to D, "we knew them there and do the same work and live in the same area here. We see
other youths every day". The extent of this village level network is evident in the way in
which accommodation is arranged. D suggested that young migrants without urban
relatives are sent to the house of a widow from their village who rents rooms to those
without relatives. They are allowed to stay in her house for 5 days without payment whilst
they find employment. This village-level mutual interdependence is institutionalised
through village lkubes, which provide the capital to develop a business, and through
village Idirs, the only ones in which youths participate. These institutions and friendship
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networks provide a range of benefits for the young men and an arena to discuss potential
business opportunities. Most of the informants suggested that not only did they get access
to credit through Ikubes, but they also obtained ideas and information on potential
business opportunities from friends. For example, E describes how, whilst working as a
servant, 'friends from the same area, who were working as fruit vendors, told me that I
could earn more money selling fruit. Together we formed an Ikube to give me the capital
to start my own business." The young men seem to feel a strong sense of mutual
obligation and expect that their peer group will support them in economic hardship. In
some cases, prominent men from their home village will provide some assistance through
providing employment, giving advice on business opportunities or as acting as guarantors
in Ikube. In addition, their network tends to expand with the length of stay in Addis and the
increased strength of their business, as they meet other young men engaged in similar
work.
The youths seems to have little contact with the other identity-based networks of older
Gurage men, based on clan and house. According to D and his friends, young people 'do
not know the older people of the clan, we do not know the other clan members. People
who come together in clan Idirs are older people who are married and settled here or in
the countryside." Similarly 'we do not have relationships with [other people from Cheha]
our relationships are mostly with other people from our village". Although it appears that,
this group, as individuals, has few direct connections with the house or clan these
obligations and participation in these affairs are expressed through the head of household.
As all young men contribute to the household indirectly, they facilitate the household's
financial obligations. They are also seen as the responsibility of the head of household.
According to the informants, the migrant's social world expands as his network diversifies
and becomes based on more varied business contacts. His parochial kinship and village
level contacts continue to be important and form some of his obligations. The critical time
is when he marries and establishes a household. This gives him the right to ownership of
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rural land. He continues to have obligations to his parents, although his primary obligation
is to his own rural household. He is then admitted into the domains of heads of household
such as clan and house-based institutions. Although there is a perception, held by other
ethnic groups, that Gurages use their clan and house linkages for economic advancement
all informants claimed that this was not the case. They focused on other aspects of clan
obligations, particularly dispute settlement, the payment of blood money and social
insurance. According to C, clan is most important "when you need to pay blood money or
if a family member is killed by someone outside the clan. Then you need your clan." B
suggested that, "the clan helps in homicide cases and when blood money must be paid as
all members must pay if the concerned person or his relatives ask." Whereas, "the clan
would not directly help my business, however, if there was an accident like a fire they may
help me restart through organising an Ikube and allow me the first collection". The
informants suggested that generally the clan did not help their businesses. According to B,
"if a person looses his business he returns to the countryside and restarts when he can
and clan members may help." It seems that the migrants call on all their contacts rather
than just the clan or house to help resolve business problems. Similarly E claims that "the
tribe [house], clan or being a Gurage does not help [his business] in any way, personal
effort is what counts." If he had serious financial problems, he would turn to his close kin
and business contacts.
There was some variation in attitudes to clan related to the strength and size of the clan
and the extent to which clan cuts across geographical boundaries such as village and
house. Those who were members of large and powerful clans seemed to have a greater
expectation of assistance. When clan cuts across geographical boundaries such as village
and particularly house, there seemed to be less affiliation and informants felt a greater
obligation to those in the home village rather than clan.
lthough informants claimed that house connections provided few economic benefits,
there was some limited social assistance. According to C, "when I need people, it is the
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Enor people who come to help me first. Then I say I am from Enor. They are closer to us.
If we need to go to hospital and there is nobody to take us then an Enor person will come
first to take us because we think of ourselves as Enor when occasion demands, if we
have problems. If I am in a position to do so I will help all Gurages from Enor, Cheha or
Eza [all Sebat Bet] but priority is to Enor." Another informant said: "It is very difficult to
enumerate the social obligations, during occasions such as weddings the community has
to participate including contributing money or gifts. In death there are contributions and
they stay in the house for a week to give support. If the individual is a businessman and
fails, they contribute money informally not through Ikubes. It is informal expectations not
formal laws. Individuals should participate in money or activities in social gatherings."
These norms and values are illustrated further in the following statement: 'Being a Gurage
you can not say 'I can live by myself and I do not want any contact with the other
members of the society'. If you are born a Gurage, if you are a member of the Gurage you
have to assist your family. The shoe-shiners are young kids but they assist their families in
the rural areas. If you do not help your immediate family you will be outcast. This is a
strong social obligation. Having a child is an investment, as their lives are partly
dependent on their children in Addis."
Social rights come with citizenship and are not granted automatically by virtue of being
born a Gurage. For example, rights that come with clan membership are only activated if
one demonstrates commitment to the clan through membership of institutions particularly
Idirs. Members of Idirs can expect some form of support from other clansmen in times of
crisis such as serious accidents and fire. However those who are not members of these
institutions may receive some form of assistance from clansmen but this is not automatic.
According to E, 'If he is not a member of the clan Idir and if something happens to him
and he needs financial or moral support and he comes to the clan Idir to ask for advice or
support they won't receive him in a good manner. They will ask Where were you
yesterday when we were meeting? Why didn't you join us before?' They will refuse to help
him". Other informants suggested that the clan may help clansmen in various situations
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but this is determined by elders on the basis of the extent to which the concerned
indMdual has shown commitment to the other clansmen by assisting them in similar
situations. This is of central importance and recurred across the different layers of Gurage
identity. It reveals a perception that the rights that are embedded in membership of
Gurage communities are not automatically granted to people merely by virtue of their
birth. These rights must be earned by demonstrating a commitment to Gurage citizenship
by fulfilling the obligations inherent in being a male Gurage. The rights and obligations of
Gurage civic virtue are institutionalised within Idirs. In Chapter 6, I discuss the central role
of elders in determining the nature of Gurage civic virtue and who is considered to have
met the criteria.
5	 Urban institutions
Outside the extended family, there are few binding obligations on Gurages to provide
assistance to other Gurages. However, voluntary obligations towards other clansmen and
house-members have been institutionalised in Idir and to a lesser extent Ikube. These
institutions, discussed in section 2, have rural origins and have been recreated and
transformed to meet the particular needs of migrants in the Addis environment. Richard
Pankhurst (Pankhurst and Endrias 1958) suggests that although Ikube and Idir have
spread to all urban ethnic groups they originated in Gurageland. This view is backed by
Gurage oral traditions, which suggest that the institutionalisation of clan obligations took
place long before the monetansation of the Gurage economy. Institutions similar to Idir
provided a range of benefits for their members in times of bereavement and these
institutions subsequently adapted to changes in the rural economy to become Idirs.
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5.1	 Idir
Depending on their age and financial capacity urban Gurages are members of a range of
Idirs, including residentially-based multi-ethnic Idirs and those based on affiliations of
house, clan, sub-clan, village and lineage. The primary purpose of Idir is to provide
financial and social support at bereavement. These institutions pay out a fixed sum at the
time of bereavement. They require members to attend funerals and provide refreshments
during mourning. Many Idirs own tents and utensils for mourning. The dynamism of this
sector can still be seen in the urban and rural areas where enterprising ldirs have
expanded from bereavement to a range of welfare provision and some have found
alternative means of generating income. Some large and well-established ldirs may also
provide a wider range of social insurance such as subsidising hospital costs incurred
during serious illness, with the money being deducted from the death settlement. They
may also provide transport to hospital. Other functions of Idirs include reinforcing identity
and rules such as exogamy. For example, according to some informants, one urban
Cheha Idir was created by urban elders as a response to a case of intra-marriage within a
clan. They provide a forum for people of that identity to meet and discuss issues of
concern to them, such as rural development.
The functions of Idirs are largely social rather than economic. Although they reinforce
social obligations to other Gurages, this does not seem to extend to business affairs. All
informants said that Idir members do not discuss business affairs at the meetings.
According to one informant, membership of a clan Idir in Addis had not affected his
business "they are people like me, some in a better position some worse. We do not
discuss business at these meetings. We meet at a fixed place and time and then separate
and may not meet until the next month". However, people acting on behalf of migrants will
use their idir contacts to provide new migrants with employment opportunities and
guarantors for lkube.
109
Informants suggested that there were significant differences in their orientations to the
various types of ldir. In particular the clan ldir was regarded, by informants, as being about
more than just the financial aspects of bereavement. According to E, "the clan Idir is a
family affair... we meet more often and on different occasions than we see members of
other clans, so we tend to help each other. It stands for you in times of difficulty, whilst the
others only give you the money that you are entitled to. In times of accident, family
misfortune or legal cases, members of the clan Idir are entitled to moral and financial
support." Another suggested that the services provided by the house and clan Idirs are
different from the residential ldir as they pay for the corpse to be taken to Gurageland.
NThe clan Idir is more close knit than others. The clan Idir helps in the case of accidents as
all members will help in some way. People from the village keep in contact via the ldir."
Currently there is debate amongst NGOs, the Ethiopian media and academics on the role
of Idirs in urban development. Some NGOs are attempting to harness Idirs for
development using them as a basis for micro-finance. This approach focuses on the
potential for residentially-based urban Idirs and seems to underplay the long term role
played by identity-based Idirs in activating urban - rural linkages for developmental
purposes in the Gurage communities. Allula Pankhurst (personal communication 1999)
puts this current debate in historical context, suggesting that the re-emerging role of this
sector in development is a response to the expansion of political space during the early
EPRDF period, which can be compared with previous periods such as 1962-68 and the
early 1970s. The role of Idirs in urban development and facilitating limited participation in
metropolitan governance in the late imperial period is outlined by Ottaway (1976).
However, these institutions and their leaderships were labelled as reactionary threats to
the new class based organisations, the PAs and Kebeles (urban dwellers associations),
established by the Derg. During the mid to late 1970s, the Gurage ldirs operated more
covertly and only began to re-emerge in the mid I 980s.
110
In terms of their contributions to rural development the most significant indigenous
institution in the urban areas are Idirs which, in addition to their welfare functions, have
provided a social forum that gives a point of access to the urban communities. Although
urban Gurages, like other ethnic groups, are involved in ldirs based on residence or
occupation, many are also members of Idirs reflecting affiliations such as house, clan,
sub-clan and home village. Although all these types of ldir have contributed to rural
development, it is usually the house and clan-based Idirs that are harnessed for rural
development by the association, whereas PAs often contact village Idirs to mobilise urban
resources in small-scale development projects. These institutions were not established for
development purposes. However, as their structures provide access to networks of urban
Gurages, they have been crucial in mobilising urban resources for rural development over
a long period of time. Idir meetings provide a forum for the dissemination of information
from the leadership of the development association to the wider community and a point of
access to the development association leadership. Although these structures provide a
framework for urban dwellers to influence decision-making in the development
association, their primary role is the mobilisation of urban financial resources. Some
house Idirs impose a 10% development levy on all Idir fees and also makes ad-hoc
donations to development projects from the Idir capital. Whilst the clan Idirs, whose
members are usually also in the house Idir, are less likely to have a development levy
they make ad-hoc contributions to individual development projects. Discussion of
development within the Idirs centres on the financial capacity of the ldir and its members
and the merits of the scheme, particularly the scope of its beneficiaries.
According to the development associations, most urban Gurages are members of clan or
house Idirs or can be contacted through the Idir membership. Therefore, the association,
in conjunction with the Idir leaders and other prominent urban dwellers, use these
structures to identify Gurages residing in the urban areas and assess their financial
capacity to contribute to rural development. In addition to the mobilisation of financial
resources, Idirs and their leadership also provide a structure for identifying people who
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potentially can contribute their skills, knowledge and contacts for development. This was
evident recently when the General Assembly of the MDA, at the behest of the previous
leadership approved a change in leadership from its previous base of businessmen with
limited formal education to university educated professionals particularly civil servants. As
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, the institutional networks provided by Idirs were
used to identify potential recruits and the leaders and encourage them to volunteer their
services.
The use of Idirs as the principal means of accessing the urban community has provided
an effective means of mobilising their resources, however, it also reinforces a common
conception of community as being limited to male heads of household, as membership
tends to be restricted to heads of household to prevent multiple death settlements, which
could undermine the Idir's financial base. Through the Idir leadership, strong pressure can
be exerted on members to participate in development. As it provides a range of critical
socio-economic functions one of the possible sanctions for non participation in
development is expulsion from the Idir.
5.2	 Ikube
The urban institution of lkube is an informal, ad-hoc rotating credit association. Members
pay a set regular sum to the Ikube treasurer and in turn draw the money collected. This
has become the main form of saving and generating capital for starting and expanding
businesses, particularly for those migrants who do not have wealthy relatives.
Membership is based on close ties, as the institution requires a high degree of trust.
Typically, the first Ikubes established by migrants are based on village level and family
contacts. For new migrants it essential to get the support of a guarantor usually an
established family member or villager. One informant stated that, ikube requires much
trust so the members must know each other well and therefore it is easier if they all come
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from the same area. Most importantly there must be a guarantor who knows them
thoroughly this is most likely to be from their own village". Although Ikube primarily has an
economic purpose, the informants claimed that, generally, business is not discussed at
Ikube meetings other than with the guarantor, who expects to be informed of their financial
capacity. Similarly, membership of an Ikube in itself does not confer any other benefits to
the participants. The informants suggested that other Ikube members would not
automatically assist them in times of financial crisis although they would be likely to form a
new Ikube and allow the person to receive the first distribution.
Whilst Ikubes have a significant role in Gurage migratory survival strategies they have no
discernible direct role in providing rural infrastructure. Although they are not harnessed by
the development associations, they indirectly serve as vehicles for rural development as a
proportion of the resources they generate are returned to the rural areas. As Ikubes tend
to be temporary, informal, and are established for a specific purpose, their composition
varies according to the nature and extent of the participants' social networks. Ikubes can
be based on a range of urban identities including non-ethnic ones, such as residence,
occupation and friendship networks. Over time, migrants and other Gurages are members
of various Ikubes, which tend to broaden with the length of stay and the establishment of
relationships not based on elements of ethnic identities. The Ikubes of young people and
recent migrants are likely to be based on kinship and village level contacts, where
members share an orientation to a locality, however, at this stage in their life these
individuals and, therefore, their institutions have a limited financial capacity. Furthermore,
this group of unmarried men is often excluded from definitions of community used by the
development associations i.e. male heads of household who participate in associational
life particularly Idirs. I explore definitions of community in more detail in Chapter 6. The
Ikubes of older migrants or settled Gurages are often multi-ethnic or are comprised of
Gurages from diverse house backgrounds and this wide range of affiliations makes them
unsuitable to be harnessed for developing a specific rural area. Ikubes with a significant
non-ethnic component are seen as unsuitable for harnessing for development, as large
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proportions of the membership will not have a stake in the benefits. Due to the
geographically defined nature of the beneficiaries in contrast with the territorially defined
Gurage development associations, even lkubes made up of Gurages or Sebat Bet
Gurages are not suitable.
No informants, including migrants and development association activists, had ever
considered that Ikube could have a role in rural development. According to a leading
member of GPSDO, Ikube is based on the participant's economic status, If your capacity
is to pay 100 or 10 Birr per month you may be Eza or Cheha or Indegagn but your Ikube is
based on economic status. (Development] institutions should be based on house or clan
as development is geographical. If you work with an Ikube someone is from Eza someone
from Cheha or the east [eastern Gurage] for development there is no geographical basis
so there is no way of working for development purposes. It is not appropriate." This
suggests that the importance of the functions of the urban institution to the participants'
social and economic well being, and the levels of trust involved, have little role in
determining its potential to be harnessed as a resource for development. Rather there
must be a personal attachment to the beneficiaries in terms of kinship, village, clan or
house. This will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.
6	 Conclusions: analysing migration and understanding Gurage conceptions of
civic virtue
This analysis of the social world of Gurage migrants has some important limitations. First,
the research focuses primarily on GPSDO and its affiliates, which I argue, reflect male
migration patterns and men's orientation to Gurageland. The orientation of this chapter
reflects the nature of the male migration patterns and focuses on the institutions that they
have recreated in the urban areas. Therefore, women's experiences in this process are
largely overlooked. Second, although Gurage migrants are active in a range of economic
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spheres, the chapter may well reinforce the stereotype of Gurage migration as being
mostly trade-based. The informants were from a diverse range of social groups, however,
they were all involved in some form of trading. The labourers contacted were unable to
contribute to the research due to constraints of time. Third, I focus primarily on Gurage
migration to Addis Ababa, however, Gurages migrate to all of the main urban centres in
Ethiopia and to smaller locations throughout southern Ethiopia to engage in trade. Finally,
this chapter has focused on the institutions that reflect the layers of identity that constitute
Gurage ethnicity as these institutions are harnessed for development purposes. Some
researchers have suggested that Gurages avoid non-ethnic associational ties (Baker
1992), a view that lends credence to stereotypes of Gurage ethnic exclusivity. Most
informants stressed that they and other participants in Gurage institutions are also active
in a wide range of non-ethnic associational life including Kebeles, Idirs, trade associations
and churches. The ex-leader of GPSDO expressed these concerns; "you should not give
the impression that when we say we (Gurages] stick together it means that we do not
mingle with other people. We are well known for mingling with any type of community and
society. It is one of the characteristics of this [Gurage] society, they associate with others."
As outlined in Chapter 1, the central argument of this thesis is that Gurage orientations to
development are an extension of their general orientation to the rural areas. The rights
and obligations to other Gurages discussed in section 4 of this chapter are embedded in
migratory survival strategies and are a central element in contemporary Gurage notions of
civic virtue. The main elements of this aspect of the dominant construction of Gurage civic
virtue are migrants' interdependence and rural dependence on migrant remittances and
gifts from urban kin.
Socio-economic changes have limited the opportunities for the migration patterns outlined
in the chapter and call into question the extent to which adherence to civic virtue still
produces benefits. The changing orientations of other ethnic groups towards the
occupations historically dominated by Gurages have limited the opportunities for
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economic advancement of migrants. Furthermore, there is a perception that the economic
niches historically controlled by Gurages have become saturated. This has led to
perception amongst the Gurage intellectual strata that the nature of migratory survival
strategies must be refined. There is thus an increasing focus on the importance of
education (see Chapter 5). Ya Kitcha (the Gurage customary law), which reflects the
views of the dominant rural and urban elites, recognises that opportunities for migrants
are more limited than in the past. "Situations have changed and financial success cannot
come as easily as it used to in the past by starting from shoe shining" (Ya Kitcha I 3.2a)
and "education is a must to upgrade skills for the proper management of businesses" (Ya
Kitcha I 3.2c). Thus, the networks and institutions discussed above are of less importance,
as the 'traditional' model of Gurage migration represented by the idealised migrant
discourse is now constrained by socio-economic changes.
These socio-economic changes are also linked to cultural changes within the 'sons of
Addis'. These changes are related to a process of de-linking from the Gurage community
and Gurage networks, by the urban elite and young people born in Addis. This has been
accompanied by a reduction in interest in rural affairs and the development of alternative
non-ethnic ties.
The following statement by an urban intellectual encapsulates a range of issues that are
discussed below.
"There is an increasing feeling amongst the older generation of Gurages who have
a stronger tie [to Gurageland] that in the new urban generation the attachment to
the rural areas is getting weaker. All my family except my parents were born here
[Addis] and their attachment to Gurageland is weak. None of us will go there for
anything. In the next generation, the links will get weaker. The older generation
senses this urgently but are incapacitated to do anything about it. I suspect that
the weakening is stronger at the higher income level than the lower. However, I
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cannot see why the poor would have the strong attachment if they are born and
raised here. The new generation is born here and feels more citizens of Add is
Ababa. The attachment to the extended family is very very weak. I sense that
Gurages are a strong part of the urban community so they have developed a
different identity based being part of the urban community unlike the previous ones
who were new migrants to the city. Now their affinity is closer to the urban people
than anything that the Gurages have to offer. We do not speak the language, our
ethnic food, kitfu, is now the national food. Whatever link there was has gone."
In the past ethnically-related (house and clan) associational life was central, or presented
as central, to survival strategies. The evidence in this chapter suggests that family and
village ties are more important to early migrants and, as the migrant becomes settled in
Addis, ethnic ties become increasingly important for social but not economic purposes.
Economic-based ties do not seem to underpin the high levels of communal attachments,
however discourses rooted in earlier experiences seem to continue to act to extend their
strong ties of kinship to clan and house. These orientations are apparent in three
interrelated discourses, which reflect Gurage perceptions of the relationships between
Gurages in the urban environment and the relationships between urban and rural sectors
of the Gurage communities. These discourses: the idealised migrant, the all
encompassing Gurage networks and the golden age of Gurage development, together
make up Gurage notions of civic virtue.
The social relationships constructed by migrants during imperial times, in which Gurage
social worlds were a defence against economic and to a lesser extent social
discrimination are presented as unchanging and all encompassing. In their current form,
these discourses could well be a response to the new sets of relationships and the de-
linking of the Addis born. A discourse outlining a golden age of Gurage development is
linked to the 'idealised migrant' and 'all encompassing social networks' discourses. This
golden age seems to correspond with an interpretation of events that took place during
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the early road building phase of GRCO. Many urban informants reminisced about the
ease with which the development associations located them and the solidarity, which led
to high levels of voluntary contributions from all sectors of the Gurage communities. The
discourse reflects a perception that the Gurage communities were much closer in those
days and that few urban Gurages could resist the sanctions imposed on those who did not
contribute (this is discussed further in Chapter 6). Gurage development was the ultimate
expression of the cohesiveness of Gurage community and in particular the strength of its
institutions. In Chapter 8, I discuss how development has become a symbol of Gurage
identity.
The present construction of these interrelated discourses about the nature of Gurage civic
virtue can be seen as a response to socio-economic and demographic changes. These
changes challenge the underlying assumptions that relate to Gurage orientations to the
rural areas and development. The discourses tend to be juxtaposed with the process of
de-linking from Gurage communities and culture of many young Addis born particularly
the wealthy and well educated.
This discourse is used by GPSDO leaders as a point of reference particularly in Moher
where it seems to have formed the basis for their approach to mobilising the during high
school construction. As discussed in subsequent chapters this discourse has been used
by some urban and rural Gurages to critique GPSDO and has been harnessed in conflicts
within the organisation's leadership.
The long-term success of GPSDO illustrates that these networks have acted as
developmental resource for over thirty years. However, there are also features of these
forms of social organisation, which have the potential to contradict aspects of the
dominant development discourses. As Gurage development strategies are a reflection of
male networks in the urban areas, they place the participation of women and younger men
in the extended household, rather than as indMduals. GPSDO harnesses and reflects
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urban-rural relationships, which could be regarded as unequal and paternalistic. In
Chapter 5, I discuss how the specificity of Gurage orientations to development mitigates
this and in Chapter 6, I discuss the relationship between the dominant construction of
Gurage civic virtue and the processes of legitimacy within the dominant Gurage approach
to development.
The target community of GPSDO is limited to those who participate in identity based
institutions or can be contacted through them. These institutions tend to be composed of
regular migrants and those born in Gurageland thus those with more limited attachments,
such as the Addis born and civil servants, are more difficult to mobilise. With the more
limited opportunities for trade in Addis, it is likely that in the long term the membership and
financial base of organisations based on this type of attachment will decline.
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Chapter 5
Sebat Bet Gurage perceptions of development
I	 Introduction
The chapter focuses on the perceptions of development within the communities in Moher
and Enamor. Section 2 of the chapter will interpret and explain how an indigenous NGO,
and the community it serves, perceive the purposes of development. This is something of
a departure from the mainstream approaches to development, which rarely discuss how
the objects of the research conceptualise the key analytical categories. The section
discusses the factors that have contributed to the construction of the Gurage models of
development and the possible tensions that this could create with the dominant
development discourses. It also examines the relationship between Gurage
understandings of rural poverty and their perceptions of the purposes of development. It
suggests that Gurage perceptions of development are intimately linked with their survival
strategies and are related to the way in which Gurages assign activities to particular
spheres.
The third section examines how the perceptions of development affect which activities are
seen as development and which are not defined as development. I argue that this
represents a distinct model of public action to which activities must conform in order to be
defined as development. The Gurage model of public action is based on a particular
construction of civic virtue, which applies the rights and obligations to the community
inherent in Gurage citizenship, to the process of development.
The fourth section examines how the construction of civic virtue is located in the
relationship between Gurage cultures and their model of development. I argue that the
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Gurage model of development is rooted in Gurage cultures yet draws a distinction
between culture and development. To illustrate Gurage perceptions of cultural change, the
section draws on the process of transcribing and modernising the Gurage customary law,
Ya Kitcha, which took place in the 1990s.
Although the chapter refers to Gurage perceptions of development, it reflects the
perceptions of urban and rural Mohers and Enamors, members of the Gurage elite and
activists from GPSDO. Due to this selection of informants, related to issues discussed in
Chapter 3, the perceptions outlined in this chapter are mostly those of male Gurages.
2	 Sebat Bet Gurage perceptions of the purpose of development
Gurage perceptions of the purposes of development are shaped by a understanding of
rural poverty, which contains both understandings of the nature and causes of rural
poverty and a set of responses to rural poverty. These conceptualisations of rural poverty
are discussed in Chapter 4 and are presented as the primary factors that push men to
migrate. The interrelated causes of rural poverty are seen, by Gurages, as the small size
of land holdings and lack of other economic opportunities in Gurageland. The main
response to rural poverty has been cyclical or semi-permanent male migration to the
urban centres, which is underpinned by a web of rights and obligations within the rural and
urban communities. The original purpose of Gurage development was to provide
infrastructure, particularly roads, that would facilitate their migratory survival strategies. In
addition to this, Gurages intend development to modemise the rural areas by providing
rural kin with access to the benefits of urban life as experienced by migrants. Thus,
Gurage perceptions of the purposes of development reflect their understanding of the
causes of rural poverty and the survival strategies they have created as a response. In
particular, migration patterns and the networks of communal obligations have created a
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distinct perception of what activities constitute deve'opment that differs significantly from
definitions outlined in the dominant development discourses and by the current Ethiopian
government (see Chapter 7):
• Development activities and projects tend to facilitate the existing Gurage migratory
survival strategies rather than challenging or providing alternatives to them.
• A secondary purpose of development is to modernise the rural areas by providing rural
kin with access to the benefits of urban life as experienced by migrants.
• Communal perceptions of development reflect the obligations on migrants to support
the rural areas, thus Gurageland rather than the urban centres is seen as the site of
development.
This understanding of poverty is widely accepted by the urban and rural communities.
However, it should be noted that some influential urban residents critique the assumption
that rural Gurageland inherently lacks economic opportunities and that migration is,
therefore, the only means of wealth creation (this dissenting view is outlined in section 6).
Furthermore, the understandings of the causes of rural poverty and the responses to it
contradict a central element of EPRDF ideology: the need for rural self-sufficiency. These
different perceptions of the causes of and appropriate solutions to rural poverty have
become a source of conflict between the indigenous Gurage models of development and
the government. They are also the basis for the variations in the activities undertaken by
the two approaches. The differences between Gurage understandings of poverty and their
developmental responses, and those of the government are discussed in Chapter 7. The
dominant Gurage understanding of the relationship between poverty and development is
summarised in figure 5.1, which I now go onto explain.
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Figure 5.1
Gurage perceptions of the purposes of development
Gurage
Responses	 of rural poverty
understanding
of the causes
Perceptions
to rural	 of rural
poverty	 poverty
/	 Activities of
	
development
	 "H
Communal 4:A
Migration	 rights and	 development
	
obliations	 agencies
______________ Gurage perceptions of the purposes of
• Development facilitates rather than challenges the existing migratory
survival strategies.
• Development must modemise Gurageland.
• All development activities are located in Gurageland.
• The outcomes of development must be tangible.
• Development activities take place in the public domain.
• Development is a series of projects rather than a process.
• Development does not challenge existing social relations.
• Development originates outside Gurageland.
• The activities of development agencies influence definitions of
development.
2.1
	
The impact of migration on perceptions of development
Previous research on indigenous African development associations has emphasised how
the social changes caused by urban migration facilitated the foundation and growth of
development associations. Migration to the urban centres increased opportunities for
formal education, which in turn led to employment in the burgeoning civil service.
Education and contacts with government were essential resources that were harnessed
by the new elites when they formed development associations. Most indigenous
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development associations were formed by successful and educated migrants who had
been exposed to the benefits of 'modem urban life' such as education, water, health and
electricity (Kolawole 1996; Woods 1994; Wahab 1996). This process and the social
background of the first generation of leaders had a direct impact on the nature of
development taking place the rural localities. In this context, rural development is often
presented as bringing the benefits of modern urban life through the modemisation and
transformation of their rural homelands. This led to a developmental emphasis on
providing infrastructure particularly schools and services such as water and electricity.
The discourses that interpret the histories of Gurage developmental endeavour suggest
that the establishment of Gurage development associations followed a different pattern.
According to these discourses, rural elders acted as the instigators of formal development
during the initial road construction phase of Gurage development. However, these
attempts were only successful when elements from the educated urban-based elite
assumed leadership of the development associations and harnessed their networks of
contacts and other urban resources. Although the process of migration has significantly
influenced the perceptions of the purposes of development, the relationship between
migration and development in Gurageland reveals complexities that go beyond
modemising the rural areas. Although perceptions of the purposes of development reflect
a desire to provide benefits of modem urban life to rural kin, the primary purpose of the
indigenous model has been to provide infrastructure and services that facilitate Gurage
migratory survival strategies, and in particular to improve communications between
Gurageland and urban Ethiopia.
2.2	 Development to facilitate Gurage migratory survival strategies
In a passage often cited by GPSDO, the linguist Wolf Leslau, in the 1946 dry season,
describes the difficulties in reaching Emddibir, the largest and most accessible of the
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Sebat Bet towns. "A mule journey of seven hours [from Welkite] brought me to the town of
Emddibir. Internal travel is in the rainy season virtually suspended and movement
between villages is reduced to the minimum", cited in Gabre (1997 p50). In the context of
these difficulties in transportation and the need for male Gurages to migrate, improving
communications between Gurageland and the rest of Ethiopia, particularly Addis, rather
than directly providing infrastructure to transform rural Gurageland, was the initial focus of
formal Gurage development endeavour. General Wolde SeUasie Beraka, the first
president of GRCO, outlined the reasons for the focus on road construction "Gurage
people are very hard working but the area is very densely populated. Therefore,
periodically they are forced to migrate in search of various types of work. When a Gurage
went out and returns back to his homeland, he had transportation problems from Welkite
to the Gurageland. Because of transportation problems, they could not get teachers to
teach their children in Gurageland. When women were giving birth, they were forced to be
taken to hospitals. When the sick needed to go to hospital, they all had transportation
problems. For that reason, they [the rural elders] conceived the idea of road building."
The first indigenous development associations serving Gurageland, GRCO and AWRCA,
were both established for the sole purpose of road construction. The first activity
undertaken by GRCO was to construct a road connecting Emddibir with the national
highway system and thereby bridge the Gibe River, the major physical obstacle between
Sebat Bet Gurageland and the roads to Addis. GRCO then constructed a series of roads
in the Sebat Bet hinterland connecting each of the seven house areas with the national
road system. By 1990, the organisation had constructed over 500 km of roads in
Gurageland at a cost of over 15 million Birr (1 .5 million). As an extension of this service,
and in order to guarantee sustainable sources of income, both organisations invested in
fleets of buses that served their respective localities. By the early I 980s, some of GRCO's
affiliates were involved in other forms of development, such as school construction,
however, the organisation continued to focus on road construction until 1988 when it was
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renamed GPSDO to reflect a reorientation to encompass wider spheres of socio-
economic development.
The focus on reinforcing migratory survival strategies reflects the felt needs of the
community, as migration is an integral part of the economic survival of most households.
Although producing the staple crop can provide for the basic need of food, it provides no
additional income. A leading Gurage political figure stated "Enset does not provide the
necessary cash, it can't pay for taxation and clothing. It is a food security crop." One
peasant who migrated regularly stated "the land here (Moher] is too small. I grow enset,
which provides food but not money. I am the only worker in my household so often I must
migrate within Gurageland and to other places". According to the secretary of GPSDO,
"The Gurages have little land and the farmers do not earn enough. As the land is small,
infertile and eroded people are poor and ill fed. They are very poor so their children must
support them. If he is fortunate his parents can support him and he goes to school,
otherwise he has to go out to Welkite or Addis doing whatever work and collect money. At
the end of the year he goes back to that area and supports his family. We have a very
strong attachment to our parents. If we want to go there (Gurageland] or they come here
[Addis] the first thing we think about is transportation." Within the constraints of the
Gurage economy and culture, the financial capacity to pay land tax and secure access to
health and education can only be achieved through male migration and remittances from
urban kin. Thus, for Gurage households, being able to migrate to other areas is a
fundamental requirement, and the most important development interventions are those
which support their migration patterns and assist them in earning a living outside
Gurageland. The households supported by regular migrants were the major beneficiaries
from the road construction, as it has enabled them to migrate to Addis and other parts of
Ethiopia quickly and cheaply. However as men from virtually all rural households are
obliged to migrate in order to generate income, the benefits of road construction are
perceived to be spread equally throughout the community.
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Urban Gurages, who provide the bulk of financial and other resources for development,
also have a strong interest in improving transport links between Gurageland and urban
Ethiopia as it enables them to fulfil their social obligations to their rural kin with a minimum
of time and expense. In particular, road construction has enabled urban based Gurages to
return to Gurageland for religious festivals such as Meskal, Arafa and other ceremonies
such as weddings and funerals.
In addition to facilitating Gurage migration and easing the impact of social obligations on
urban Gurages, roads were seen by all informants as the pre-requisite for all other types
of development. All sectors of the Gurage communities suggested the provision of other
facilities, such as education, health and water, was impossible without first constructing a
road network. This was outlined by the ex-chairman of GPSDO Ult is futile to embark upon
an extensive rural development programme without taking the most elementary steps to
ensure regular movement and easy transport of goods and services. The provision of road
transport is a first step in answering the problems of rural society." He concluded, "In a
nutshell, road construction has facilitated availability of primary health care, dissemination
of education, development of other infrastructure, expansion of government administrative
offices, encouraged experts and researchers to work in the region, provided easy access
for relief operations, promoted [the] development of villages [into] towns and created job
opportunities." From discussions with development association leaders from the other
Sebat Bet houses, it seems that the areas of Gurageland where roads were first
constructed subsequently became the most developed. However, the fact that they
constructed roads earlier is also an indication of the greater financial and organisational
capacities of these communities that were subsequently harnessed for further
development.
During the late imperial and Derg regimes, the road construction phase of Gurage
development, members of the Gurage elite exerted considerable influence in central
government. Another motivation for road construction was that increased communications
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ensured that local government in rural Gurageland was accountable to central
government and therefore indirectly accountable to the urban based Gurage elite.
The emphasis on improving communications between Gurageland and urban Ethiopia
continued after the road building phase with the construction of telephone facilities in
many areas. The priority given to the construction of a telephone station in Moher
illustrates how the improvement of communications within the geographically dispersed
community is a fundamental felt need of the urban anc rural sectors of the community. It is
an illustration of the importance attached to the role of infrastructure in reinforcing family
linkages and other networks within the community. One elder, an active member of the
school governing committee, stated that "The community benefits from the telephone
almost as much as the high school. Previously people had to go to Welkite to contact
relatives, now it is easy to arrange something urgently and it cuts down on expensive
travel." According to one migrant residing in Addis, "My wife there [rural Moher] can call
me if there are problems at home." In the early 1990s, the MDA constructed a telephone
facility in a remote small town Cheza Sefa, the largest settlement and location of the main
weekly market and high school in Moher. Until late 1999 the town had no piped water
supply, thus although the area was connected to the outside world by a high technology
microwave telephone link, water supplies were manually drawn from the local river by
women. This contradiction also seemed to imply that development in the area was
directed towards the interests of men and the relatively wealthy, as in this area water
collection is deemed the domain of women and children. To a northern outsider this
seemed incongruous and at first sight appeared to be a classic example of misplaced
modernisation based on a symbolic project. However in the context of communities where
almost all men are involved in migration the telephone was seen by all informants as a
vital tool which enabled families to stay in contact, avert crises and manage family issues.
In the past, maintaining contact with migrants had involved an expensive and long journey
to the zone capital to use the telephone and postal facilities or passing messages via
other migrants.
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Most informants including women ranked the telephone as of equal if not greater benefit
to themselves and the community than the newly installed water facilities. People were
aware that the use of the telephone was related to wealth: "We all use it but not equally,
those with money use it more". However, they suggested that although use of the
telephone was related to wealth, the benefits were more equally distributed. The rural and
urban communities had mitigated the effects of differential use through developing
systems of passing on messages by utilising linkages within the community. This system
evolved to the point that the rural ldirs employed a message taker to pass on messages to
the rural population.
The telephone has strengthened the urban rural linkages within the networks of Mohers
that are an essential element of rural economic survival. For example, it allows urban
people to keep abreast of rural associational activities. This link has also proved
invaluable in organising other development projects in the area through enabling the
Addis based MDC to maintain regular contact with the PAs and rural development
committees. However, although the telephone station as a physical structure is seen as
development, the social effects of the use of the telephone, for example, reinforcing the
social relationships underpinning Gurage migration are not perceived as development, by
Gurages. Development is seen as pertaining to tangible structures rather than intangible
human relations.
2.3	 Migration and the modernisation of Gurageland
The literature on indigenous development associations suggests that their main aim was
to bring the benefits of modern life to their homeland. Although this was not the original
purpose of the indigenous Gurage development associations, modemisation has
subsequently taken on increasing importance. The modernisation facilitated by the
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indigenous sector has primarily focused on education, with the construction of high
schools, the repair and maintenance of elementary schools and the construction of adult
education centres and more recently kindergartens. It has also included the electrification
of several Sebat Bet towns and the provision of telephone services, with more limited
lobbying and fundraising for the provision of water and health services.
The increasing focus on modemising Gurageland through providing the benefits of
modem urban life reflects both the urban rural power relationships embedded in the
organisational structure of GPSDO and high rates of male migration in the Gurage
communities. Although GPSDO serves rural Gurageland, the organisation is based in
Addis, its elected officials are all Addis based, and its sovereign body the General
Assembly, is overwhelmingly comprised of urban residents. The urban leadership controls
both the overall development strategies of GPSDO, and planning for individual projects by
its affiliates. This process has a degree of input from the wider community through
consultation with Idirs and other urban networks. Thus, decision-making within GPSDO is
based on urban perceptions of what is development. Rural input into the process of
planning tends to take the form of consultation with male heads of household, most of
whom have lived in urban areas thus reinforcing the urban influences of communal
perceptions of development. Urban influences were evident in the ways that many rural
informants suggested that they wished to bring modem services to their communities.
Returned migrants use their experiences of urban life as frames of reference when
conceptualising development as facilitating a lifestyle that they aspire to in their locality.
One rural informant suggested I haven't always lived here [Cheza]. I have lived in many
places.. .when I lived in Awassa my house had electricity, water and a telephone so I
know the importance of such things". This view was further outlined by the Cheza PA
leader "All [rural] people are not equally concerned with development. People who migrate
have seen the effects of development in other areas and they try to change this area."
This pattern reflects the complex linkages between the urban and rural sectors of the
Gurage communities rather than a dichotomy between the two. Thus, perceptions of the
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importance of modernity reflect the urbanisation of the Gurageland and Gurage cultures
caused by migration, as discussed in Chapter 4, rather than the hegemony of an urban
elite. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the sectors of the community with least
exposure to urban life, particularly women, have the least input into the decision-making
processes and the consultation stages.
Modernisation of the rural areas could involve an element of self-interest in the cases of
cyclical migrants and many Gurages based in Addis. Providing Gurageland with the social
benefits of modern life could be seen as creating a relatively comfortable place of refuge
to be utilised in times of financial or political crisis. In many of the development
associations affiliated to GPSDO there is a preponderance of traders and businessmen
when compared to professionals and civil servants. This could suggest that the
development associations are dominated by sectors of the community who are most likely
to suffer from economic insecurity and hence have an incentive to improve the rural
homeland. Thus, this form of development could be seen as creating a safety net for when
migratory survival strategies fail. However, the large number of businessmen in the
development associations can be accounted for by their greater financial capacity than
professionals, and particularly the relative ease by which they can be contacted through
their associational and business connections. Furthermore, few migrants regarded
returning to Gurageland as a viable long-term option. "I prefer life in Addis, only economic
reasons prevent me from bringing my family here. Rural life is very difficult whereas life is
easier here. It is like comparing light to darkness, life in Addis is better in every way". A
leading Gurage economist backed this view. "The economy of the rural Gurage has
deteriorated so significantly that I cannot see how anyone would think there is a better life
there than in the cities".
This ret uctance to return to the home village was explained partly in terms of a lack of
services, an explanation which would suggest that the types of development undertaken
in Gurageland are indeed an attempt to improve a potential home. However, most
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informants suggested that the major deterrent to returning to Gurageland was a lack of
economic opportunities for men. This is a central aspect of the dominant Gurage
perception of the nature of rural poverty and is the key factor that obliges men to migrate.
For most of these migrants, a purely agriculturally-based life in Gurageland was not
financially viable. "The reason that I came here [Addisj was to support my family. How
could I go back [to Gurageland]. If we do not send money how do you think they would
survive?" Another who had considered returning stated, "it is mostly economic reasons
that keep me here [Addis], there [Gurageland] I grow enset but the land is too small to
provide for tax and clothing". This perception is also reflected in the attitude of the rural
residents towards their urban kin. "It is not just development, we depend on our brothers
in Addis for everything. If it was not for them we would not survive". It should be noted that
the situation in Moher could well be more acute than in other parts of Gurageland, due to
the unfavourable conditions for the cultivation of chat. The productivity of the agricultural
sector is also constrained by strict adherence to refraining from work during the Sabbath
and the 15 monthly saints' days. One Enamor stated! "the Mohers do not work, instead
they live off their sons." Although there is also a high level of migration in Enamor, it
seems that there are more economic opportunities there through chat cultivation. During
the fieldwork period, it was evident that there were far more men in Enamor than Moher
although this could be related to the timing of the visits. One Enamor elder stated, "now it
is possible to earn six thousand Birr (45O) from growing chat."
2.4	 The modernisation of Gurage migratory survival strategies
Within the dominant Gurage understanding of poverty, there is an acceptance that,
although migration is the only viable option for economic survival, the nature of migration
must be adapted to meet changing social and economic conditions. Thus, although few
Gurage development interventions have challenged the underlying assumption that
Gurage households can only become economically viable if men migrate, there is an
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appreciation that the nature of this migration and the skills needed for economic success
have changed. Thus far, there has been little development endeavour designed to
improve economic opportunities for men in the rural areas. The limited attempts by
GPSDO at improving rural livelihoods have focused on improving women's productive
capacity through micro finance and technological changes to agricultural production.
These do not appear to have been successful due to a number of reasons including
obstruction from the current government.
Dependence on migration has led GPSDO, its affiliates and other indigenous
development associations, to focus on education, including constructing and maintaining
primary and high schools, the provision of adult literacy centres, and most recently the
construction of technical schools and distributing educational materials contributed by the
Gurage Diaspora, and facilitating a compensatory education scheme. According to the
stereotypes held by other Ethiopians, Gurages take education very seriously, however, to
an outsider, Gurage attitudes to education are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand,
the civil service and professional elite owe their positions to attendance at schools in
Endeber and urban areas. The first generation of GRCO leaders were educated at the
Endeber School and made their break from farming and trading through education.
However, those in other important urban sectors particularly successful traders are not
necessarily educated. Indeed, some of the discourses about successful Gurage migrants
suggest that literacy is relatively unimportant for success in business. Stories abound of
illiterate migrants who started their urban careers as listros and through hard work
became highly successful businessmen without gaining any formal education. However,
all informants suggested that the construction of schools and education of youth were the
most important development activity. The views of the Moher rural community are
illustrated by an elder active in the rural development committee. aThe school is the rebirth
of the area. Prior to high school construction students had to migrate. Parents are now
more motivated to send children to school. It is especially important at the moment as due
to economic difficulties people cannot afford to send students to other areas." Similar
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attitudes were expressed in Enamor. "Before there were no schools here.. .but. . .the Addis
people and the Worreda administrator were instrumental in bringing education
here.. .people bless them for what they did here, because now our children can be
educated." In addition, more established urban migrants continue to maintain households
in Gurageland. These men have an incentive to support the extension of education in
Gurageland, even though this is likely to reduce the levels of household income.
The focus on education also reflects a perception amongst the urban elite and some rural
elders that the opportunities for migrants are more limited than in the past. This perception
has been reflected in the changes made to the customary law, Va Kitcha. For example,
article I 3.2a states that, "situations have changed and financial success cannot come as
easily as it used to in the past by starting from shoe shining". Whilst article I 3.2c suggests
that, "education is a must to upgrade skills for the proper management of businesses".
However, these statements reaffirm that the purpose of education is to equip the next
generation of Gurage migrants with the skills necessary for success in changing economic
and social environments, rather than challenging migration as a survival strategy. The
purpose of gaining academic qualifications is to secure employment outside Gurageland.
According to a group of Moher university students, "We would like to return here [Moher]
and work, as we want to help our people, they built the school. [However,] there is no
work for us here but we will still help the people in any way we can."
The elite is aware that the development of their locality is dependent on the education of
youth, which in turn increases the flow of remittances back to rural Gurageland. The
relatively high level of development attained in Cheha when compared to other Sebat Bet
areas was usually related to the presence of education facilities. A high ranking civil
servant instrumental in the establishment of a high school in Gunchire suggested, "This
region [Enamor] is the largest and most fertile but in health, education and amenities it is
not as developed as Cheha. The most important factor is education. Cheha had a number
of catholic missionaries who enlightened the people and those people engaged in
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education [theni exposed their people to health and education and created awareness.
We started later but Enor started to catch up, they have done well in the last 10-15 years
and are almost equal with Cheha".
2.5	 Gurage perceptions of the appropriate location of development
According to Alemayehu, the majority of Gurages reside outside Gurageland10 , however,
the indigenous development associations focus only on development within Gurageland.
This was also reflected in the attitudes of all groups of informants who saw Gurageland
rather than Addis as the appropriate location for development. "The purpose of the
association (GPSDO ) is to provide benefit for the rural area." These perceptions of
Gurageland as the only appropriate location of development projects reflect the
obligations on migrants discussed in Chapter 4, and particularly the flow of remittances
back to rural kin. It also reveals a perception of Add is as a place to earn money to fulfil the
obligations embedded in Gurage perceptions of masculinity. Regardless of their
circumstances, all migrants are expected to provide for their rural kin. Similarly all
migrants or residents in Addis are expected to contribute resources to development
according to their means and those who do not contribute are discussed in similar terms
to those who do not provide for their rural families. A Moher clan head gave his view of
those who do not contribute resources to development. "After getting a job they focus on
work and are not concerned [with developmentl, once they go to town they live their lives
in a selfish manner and forget about their origins." An urban Idir leader stated "Honestly
speaking they have less interest in development and any other issue concerning the rural
people. Such people may have the feeling for their parents' homeland but they are not
concerned with the problems of the rural people.
10 I was unable to verify the accuracy of this statistic, particularly whether or not it accounts for
cyclical migration and if it includes women and children.
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As discussed in Chapter 4, Gurage migrants have created a complex social world to
facilitate effective migration in economic and social terms. However, in contrast to similar
organisational forms in other parts of Africa, such as Hometown Associations and migrant
workers associations, the Gurage development associations are not involved in the
processes of providing services such as welfare for Gurages living in urban areas. The
development associations are closely connected with the urban Idir sector with a
significant overlap in personnel between the leadership of Idirs and the development
association. In addition, the urban Idirs act as the primary means of access to the urban
Gurage communities. However, the welfare services and other functions of urban Idir and
urban lkube are undertaken autonomously from the development associations and are not
classified as developmental by Gurages. While no informants suggested that the primary
activities of the Idirs constituted development, the founder of the Moher urban Idir stated,
"the [Moher] Idir was formed for mutual help. It also supports development, but its main
aim, especially at the time of formation, was welfare. The clan Idir was formed for self help
welfare, but now although they do development they are not primarily for development."
The founder of several Enamor ldirs stated "The strength of Idirs lies solely in burial
occasions. Development purposes were added only very recently and are insignificant".
When questioned about the role of Idirs in development, informants gave examples of the
relationships between GPSDO and the Idirs and related occasions when PA leaders or
other rural notables had contacted the urban Idirs for assistance in localised rural
development.
Activists within the development associations and rural elders appreciate that urban
lkubes have an indirect developmental function, as they increase the financial capacity of
their members to contribute to development, and make their members and the extent of
their financial capacity more visible to the rest of the community. Many Idirs have
secondary functions of providing resources directly to the development associations
through levies and supporting individual projects implemented by a range of development
associations and acting as forums for consultation and recruitment. The dominant Sebat
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Bet view of these institutions is expressed in Ya Kitcha article 14.5. "Idir and Ikube have
played and are still playing a supportive role in communal development endeavours. They
should be fostered and strengthened so that they may [become] one of the prime movers
of development". Nevertheless, urban informants drew a clear distinction between the
primary role of Idirs providing financial and social support at bereavement, and their
secondary functions of contributing to development. Informants were also aware of other
important functions of urban Idirs such as the maintenance of urban rural linkages,
reinforcing urban Gurage networks, maintaining Gurage cultures, and strengthening clan
and house identities. These were not seen as developmental activities, although all
informants recognised the importance of these activities as resources, which are
harnessed for other activities defined as development.
The apparent lack of concern within the indigenous development sector for the welfare of
urban Gurages is most striking when compared with the activities of many foreign and
indigenous NGOs that have focused on providing welfare and other forms of support to
Addis street children. To a northern outsider the presence of many Gurage children
working on the streets would suggest the need for the community to extend some of its
development endeavour to them. Although the Gurage Listro bears a passing
resemblance to the archetypal street child, researchers suggest that they should be
defined as Street workers rather than children of the street (P. Hiekonnen - personal
communication Sept. 1999), a perception that is shared by Gurages who expect that
these children should support their parents. In their perception, young workers are able to
take care of themselves through utilising village-based and kinship networks of support for
accommodation, career development and financing their businesses.
Urban activities, although using communal resources, are not seen as development, as
they are based on private networks. These activities are seen as natural for Gurages,
whereas development implies a sense of intervention. This reflects a perception of firstly
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the rural-urban divide and secondly the public-private divide, which I go on to discuss in
section 3.
3	 Indigenous Gurage approaches to development as a construction of public
action and civic virtue
Gurage understandings of poverty and the role of development in ameliorating poverty
lead to certain activities being defined as development, whilst others are excluded. I have
summarised my understanding of Gurage perceptions in a series of propositions relating
to the conditions that activities must meet in order to be defined as development by
Gurages:
Development must produce tangible benefits for the rural community, usually defined
as the provision of physical infrastructure in rural locations.
Development is perceived as activity that takes place in the public domain, as the
intervention must benefit the whole community.
Development is seen as a series of projects, rather than as an overall process.
. The activities of development agencies are a significant point of reference in defining
development.
Development does not challenge existing social relations, and there is an implication
that development will not cause significant social change.
Development is facilitated by outsiders, as Gurage perceptions of development tend to
exclude activities that rural people undertake for themselves without intervention from
external forces such as government or Gurages based outside the locality.
• Although the process of development Is built on Gurage cultures, cultural change in
itself is not seen as part of development, and the two spheres are presented as
separate.
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Although Gurage development focuses on facilitating migration, it is limited to the
provision of physical infrastructure and tends to exclude the social aspects of Gurage
survival strategies.
Figure 5.2
Models of public action and Gura ge perceptions of which activities constitute
development
Model	 Actor(s)	 Form of action	 Nature and extent
of benefits
State
Dreze and Sen	 or	 Collective action	 Public benefits
Public
Organisations
State
or
Public	 Public benefits
Mackintosh	 Organisations	 Collective action
	 or
or	 Collective private
Collective	 ends
Associations
State
or
Public organisations Collective action
Gurage civic virtue	 or	 or	 Tangible public
Collective	 Individual action
	 goods
Associations
or
Individuals
I now consider the implications of some of these points in relation to the concept of public
action. For Dreze and Sen (1989), the concept of public action is limited to activities of the
state or public organisations involving collective public participation in a process of social
change. For activities to be defined as public action, they must serve public rather than
private ends, thus the services provided by membership organisations for their members
are excluded from this definition. Mackintosh makes a significant departure from this
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position, as she holds that the definition of public action can be broadened to include the
collective actions of public bodies for private collective gain but not individual benefits.
Thus, the activities of membership organisations that provide benefits for a limited sector
are also included as public action (Mackintosh 1992).
The aim of this section is to relate the models of public action to Gurage perceptions,
rather than to review the models. As Mackintosh states, a major limitation of the approach
of Dreze and Sen is that it is ahistoncal and based on the subjective prejudices of the
observer of what constitutes a public body and particularly what constitutes public
benefits. This section seeks to relate the subjective perceptions of the informants at a
given point in time and compare them to these models. In particular it will outline Gurage
perceptions of what constitutes public benefits. The evidence in this section suggests that
Gurage perceptions of what activities constitute development differ significantly from the
conceptualisation proposed by Mackintosh and are closer to the definition of public action
outlined by Dreze and Sen (see figure 5.2). Gurage perceptions of what constitutes
development are not based on the nature of the development actors, but on the nature of
the benefits, and particularly how these benefits are distributed. (This is related to the
instrumental view of the process of development discussed in Chapter 6.) Thus, the
primary activities of a membership organisation such as Idir are not perceived as
development by the wider community or the members. However, when Idirs contribute to
development projects which meet the criteria outlined above, they are perceived as
assisting with development. As I will argue below, these perceptions form part of how the
Gurage construct notions of civic virtue and how contributing to development in particular
ways has become embedded in this construction.
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3.1	 Development must produce tangible benefits for the rural community
The types of development discussed above have all involved the provision of tangible
benefits to the rural community. This reflects a common perception, particularly in Moher,
that development is equated with the construction and use of physical structures such as
roads, schools, bridges and clinics. In Moher, government extension workers were
attempting to improve agricultural techniques, and the local community organised by the
PA's was involved in natural resource conservation, such as planting saplings on eroded
land, terracing and the construction of check dams. However, when questioned about
development that had taken place recently and what they saw as the developmental
priorities for the area, all Moher informants discussed physical structures, and only one
informant mentioned any activities related to farming or natural resource conservation.
The community's emphasis on tangible outcomes is related to the legitimacy of
development organisations being based on the extent of the communities' use of their
services, and the perception, discussed below, that participation in development is a
burden related to their communal obligations. Most urban Gurages began their
conversations about GPSDO with a statement such as "because of them (GPSOO I
GRCO] we can get there [Gurageland] and back in a day. Because of this they are close
to the people." This reflects a conception of the legitimacy of development being based on
tangible outcomes such as symbolic or visible benefits.
The perceptions of what is defined as a tangible benefit by the local inhabitants is
illustrated by the way that people perceived the construction of a large stone church in
Korer PA in Moher. In one Jafforo, the inhabitants had financed the construction of a very
large stone church. All the informants in the area were extremely proud of the church. This
project was portrayed as a developmental activity, and it was used as an example of how
they had demonstrated their commitment to the community, which in their view proved
their worthiness for further development. Similarly, other informants in Moher gave church
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construction as examples of development actMties that had taken place in their locality.
To an outsider it may seem unusual for a village with no access to water and a road in a
state of disrepair to devote an enormous part of its resources to such a project. However,
in the perceptions of Mohers, it was a physical structure that provided the community, who
were nearly all orthodox Christians, with a range of benefits. For this community, the
sacrifices that they had endured to contribute toward the church were evidence of their
worthiness as a community to receive development. This perception of church
construction as development was also shared by leaders of other GPSDO affiliated
development associations, Idir leaders and migrants from both Moher and Enamor.
However, these perceptions of the nature of tangible benefits are also contested.
According to a leader from Akilil, "Sometimes they [the rural people] do not invest their
money in things that do not show immediate results, for example preventing soil erosion.
They just want money or food or, like the Protestants, oil [for work]."
Perceptions around what benefits development should produce have also come up
against opposition in recent initiatives around AIDS, when GPSDO attempted to establish
an AIDS prevention programme in Gurageland. Awareness of the relationship between
male migration and AIDS, changing attitudes to AIDS amongst the educated sections of
the urban population, and encouragement from donors, led the leadership to attempt to
facilitate AIDS awareness projects within Gurageland. To implement the project, GPSDO
was in the process of establishing rural committees including rural elders, PA leaders and
women. GPSDO has trained members of the house sub-committees and then the rural
committees, although there was some resistance to the project from the committees partly
due to sexuality being a taboo subject. In practice, GPSDO has experienced significant
problems in mobilising the community due to the intangible nature of the benefits of this
project. Leaders of GPSDO suggested that Gurages preferred projects with immediate
tangible outcomes such as roads and schools. In projects, such as the AIDS project, with
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less obvious benefits, the organisation has experienced difficulties in promoting the
project to its normally enthusiastic core constituencies of urban and rural activists.
3.2	 Development is confined to activities that take place in the public sphere
Development is expected to provide tangible benefits to 'the whole community'. As I argue
in Chapter 6, the whole community is usually defined as all households within a given
locality. Development is, thus, limited to activities that provide tangible benefits to all the
people, or all households, within a given geographical or house locality. Thus, the services
provided by GPSDO are often legitimised as being done by and in the name of 'the
people' and providing benefits which serve the whole community.
This perception that development only includes activities that provide a tangible public
good is likely to exclude many forms of economic development that are undertaken in the
private sphere. Projects to raise the productive capacity of the rural area could be defined
as part of the private sphere of household economics and individuals' businesses. Thus,
whilst migrants acknowledged the assistance that their social networks had provided
them, they tended to see businesses as their own private affairs, and distinct from these
networks.
This strong distinction between the public and private spheres is evident in communal
attitudes to two projects that aimed to improve the Moher towns, namely the levelling of
Cheza Sefa, and the attempt to establish a new Worreda capital in Harawia. In the early
1 990s, a group of householders and merchants organised the improvement of the land in
the centre of Cheza Sefa, the main market town of Moher. The facilitators of the project
and the PA called a meeting of residents of the locality and the issue was discussed with
the PA. Eventually each of the participating households paid 500 Birr towards hiring a
bulldozer that levelled off parts of the town to allow the construction of houses, shops and
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bars. Although these activities are similar to other activities undertaken in Gurageland
which are defined by rural informants as development, this project was rarely mentioned
as a development activity other than by those directly involved. Most informants presented
this project as an example of the entrepreneurial and flexible outlook of Mohers and as the
private actions of a section of the community, rather than public action on behalf of the
whole community i.e. development activity. Although undoubtedly many people have
benefited indirectly from this project, the primary beneficiaries were a limited and small
group of activists who contributed financially. Thus, the project was for private rather than
public benefit and therefore not defined as development.
The second project was undertaken during the transitional period (1991-95) when the
administrative boundaries in Gurageland were redrawn. The process of redrawing the
administrative boundaries and particularly the siting of Worreda capitals caused some
controversy and competition between the Gurage houses. Some development
associations including the MDA became involved in intensive lobbying of zone and
regional authorities over the siting of the Worreda capitals in the territory of their house.
The association raised funds within the urban areas for the construction of a new town.
The site was cleared and the shells of houses, shops and bars were erected. Urban
informants and activists within the development association suggested that this project
was a legitimate development activity and an appropriate activity for the development
association. Informants suggested that it would have led to a range of benefits accruing to
the area, such as the siting of infrastructure, improved roads, a clinic and water facilities
and it would have increased economic activity through urban growth. However, the
Worreda capital was eventually sited some distance from Moher11 . It should be noted that
some rural people had reservations about the project as they suggested that it led to
significant conflict between the Moher and Akilil members of GPSDO and urban dwellers.
At the time of writing, the administrative boundaries are being redrawn and the Moher committee
is again lobbying for a Worreda capital to be sited in Harawia.
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The importance of benefits accruing to the whole community is also evident in the
perceptions of the activities of indigenous membership organisations. Idir and Ikube only
provide benefits to members and their families, whereas legitimate development activities
must be seen to provide benefits for the whole rural community. lkube is seen by urban
Gurages as a private business affair based on economic relationships rather than the
identity-based affiliations, which underpin the development associations. However, in
practice there is a significant overlap between the two, particularly for younger migrants.
In many parts of Ethiopia, NGOs are attempting to harness indigenous institutions such as
elders' committees and Idirs for development purposes. In particular there is a great deal
of activity in encouraging Idirs to become partners in micro finance initiatives. The
objectives of these approaches by mainstream development agencies bear a striking
similarity to some of the secondary activities undertaken by rural associational life in
Gurageland. The dynamic nature of Gurage rural associational life was most evident in
Moher where ldirs had, until recently, advanced money from their capital at interest to
their members. This money was used to purchase cattle and agricultural inputs and to pay
land taxes and for social obligations such as festivals. The system of loans was managed
by the membership, with no outside interference, and relied on communal linkages
underpinned by a range of sanctions. As a result of this activity the ldirs became wealthy,
and some of the profits from these activities were used to implement GPSDO
development projects and ensure their sustainability. The Idirs used their capital to pay
members' household contributions towards the construction of the high school, and they
make ongoing contributions towards the salaries of guards for the high school and staff at
the telephone centre. However, the government prohibited the ldirs from lending money
with interest on the grounds that it encouraged debt. The clan Idirs continue to lend
money without interest to their members, which is used to contribute towards the payment
of land taxes. The residential Idirs now invest the Idir capital in cattle, which graze on
communal lands. Most mainstream approaches would label these activities as
developmental, as they harness indigenous social capital and institutions to overcome
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rural poverty. Some of the more established Idirs have broadened their activities, from
providing financial and social support at times of bereavement to subsidising medical and
associated transport costs and providing a form of accident insurance. Rural informants
presented these activities as examples of how the rural institutions are dynamic and
flexible and are used by their members to overcome economic difficulties, however these
activities were never presented as examples of local developmental activity. This
illustrates the requirement for the outcomes of development actMties to benefit the whole
community rather than a particular sector. Idirs only provide benefits to members and their
families whereas legitimate development activities must be seen to provide benefits for
the whole rural community.
4	 The relationships between Gurage cultures and development
The final dimension of Gurage perceptions of development that I wish to address in this
chapter is the tension between the separation of development and cultural change on the
one hand, and the embeddedness of perceptions of development in Gurage values
around civic virtue on the other. Culture is an elusive and contested concept and it is
beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss its definition at length. However, for the
purposes of the chapter, the term culture will be applied to social practices within the
Gurage communities, institutions which are perceived to be indigenous to the Gurages
(such as Shango and Idir), the webs of rights and obligations Gurages have to their kin,
villagers, clan and house and indigenous systems of knowledge.
Although there are significant debates within the dominant development discourses as to
the relationship between culture and development, relatively little attention has been paid
to indigenous perceptions of this relationship or to indigenous perceptions of what
constitutes culture. In this section it is argued that although the indigenous models of
development are based on Gurage cultures, and a significant group accept that cultures
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can and must adapt to changing circumstances, purposive action with the intention to
cause cultural changes is not seen as within the development sphere. I will outline the
approaches taken to the relationship between development and culture in the dominant
development discourses, and then discuss approaches Gurages have taken to
conceptualising this relationship, focusing on why cultural change is not seen as part of
development. The section will draw on the process of modernising Ya Kitcha, the Gurage
customary law and will examine Gurage perceptions of the positive and negative aspects
of their culture12.
4.1	 The relationship between culture and development in the development
discourses
Within the development discourses, there has been much debate over the relationship
between indigenous cultures and development. Much of modernisation theory saw
indigenous cultures as a barrier to development, which was seen in terms of making the
developing world like the west in economic and cultural terms. Although this type of
approach is now largely discredited, the views of culture as a barrier to development are
also embedded within much of the neo-liberal and structuralist approaches to
development. Neo-liberals see elements of traditional cultures such as 'traditional' modes
of exchange and reciprocity as a barrier to the effective functioning of markets which is a
prerequisite for development. Many of the structuralist models of development would see
certain elements of indigenous cultures as reflections of unequal power relations, which
underpin poverty and marginalisation. It is implicit in many of these views that indigenous
cultures are one of the major barriers to development. However, there are also
contradictions. For example, the neo-liberal model is able to see indigenous modes of
exchange as a barrier to markets, whilst simultaneously being the source of social capital
which can be harnessed in order to promote non-governmental development. Within the
12 The term culture is used in the singular to reflect the perception held by Sebat Bet Gurages that
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various participatory schools, there is an appreciation of the contribution that indigenous
systems of knowledge can make to development interventions by providing responses to
problems based on indigenous forms of innovation. This focus on indigenous knowledge
has also affected the orientation of academics and NGOs towards the potential role that
indigenous institutions can play in development.
4.2	 Insider views: Gurage perceptions of culture
According to the Gurage discourses, the indigenous models of development are an
extension of their culture. Indeed, most Gurages claim that the strength of their culture
and particularly the strength of ties within the family can account for the uniqueness and
success of their model of development. I now provide statements from a range of Gurage
intellectuals, which I believe outline the central aspects of Gurage perceptions of civic
virtue and suggest that their notions of citizenship, including contributing to rural
development, are built on relationships within the family:
One Gurage political figure and academic stated, "they socialise their children to such an
extent that they will have to go back and give their cash to the parents and they receive
their blessings. They are assigned to do this. Nowadays maybe a small percentage will be
delinquents but they usually return. The Gurage method of social control is that children
return and usually marry in rural areas when they reach 17 or 18, then they invest."
Official GPSDO discourses stress that obligations within the family are the backbone of
Gurage development. The executive director of GPSDO stated, "the culture of family is
central to Gurage development. There are no other groups who annually visit their rural
families. Gurages must do this once a year. He will send things to his family. This linkage
and interdependence leads to development. The road construction facilitated this linkage
they share a common culture.
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and he can get to his family for funeral and back in a day and they therefore understand
the advantage of development. There are still problems in the rural areas due to small
holdings of lands so they all migrate to town. When they migrate they remit to the rural
and help their families which ties the relationship".
The ex-leader of GPSDO stated, "there are many rural areas in Ethiopia where people
migrate but mostly they remain in the urban areas [as] they find it difficult to return and
remain there. In Gurage this is not common. There is always an attachment back home
even if you do not have relatives or land there, people go back and see what is happening
there."
The importance of these relationships for development was outlined by one of the
founders of GRCO. "We have a blood relationship to the extended Gurage community so
we are culturally obliged to help them... Individually people think in terms of their families.
With regard to development, they think of the community as a whole."
The first president of GRCO expanded on this theme. "Our relatives are still down there.
They come here to visit us now and then [and] we go to visit them. This has been going
on for some time. That practice is good and we have retained it up to the present time. It
is also a necessary practice. We know of their problems. We have been the ones who all
the time were there to solve their various financial problems... Blood relations cannot be
erased very easily. These people in rural Gurageland live in very densely populated
areas. Their holdings are very small. Due to this, they have many problems that they can't
solve by themselves. We cannot live here in comfort when they lack many things down
there. We share what we have. They need help and we gladly help them."
The official discourses articulated by many urban Gurages and GPSDO often tended to
romanticise Gurage culture and see it as immutable. In particular, Gurage institutions
were seen as stable and unchanging and were juxtaposed with more temporary
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government-based institutions. This is discussed at greater length in Chapter 7. However,
in detailed discussions most informants were conscious of the extent to which Gurage
culture and institutions have adapted to changes in the wider socio-economic
environment. In particular, many of the rural elders held sophisticated understandings of
the ways in which changes in the socio-economic environment and the extent and nature
of state authority have constrained activities based on Gurage culture. Many elders were
aware that the extent of their authority was constrained by the degree of state penetration
and were aware that the scope of the activities of indigenous institutions such as Idir and
Zowa were strongly constrained by the state. AIthougt they did not present the Gurage
culture as part of the traditional sector to be juxtaposed with a modem sector, they did
tend to distinguish between the cultural and developmental spheres.
In Chapter 8, I discuss how culture is seen, by Gurages, as a means of differentiating
themselves from other groups. In Chapter 6, I outline how articulating knowledge of the
culture and histories of the Gurage is central to the process of becoming an elder in rural
areas and amongst some sections of the urban communities.
4.3 The role of indigenous knowledge
Not all aspects of culture have been seen as resources for development in the indigenous
model. The uses of aspects of culture, such as indigenous knowledge in development, are
constrained by the power relations embedded in Gurage cultures and by the nature of
development activities being undertaken. The leadership of the development associations
has a great deal of legitimacy within the urban and rural populations, due to their rural
origins and continuing linkages with the rural areas, and are therefore assumed to
understand the nature of rural problems. However, the indigenous knowledge of rural
people seems to be rarely used to either identify or resolve developmental problems.
Development is seen as requiring technocratic skills, which are not part of Gurage
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cultures. The use of Gurage cultures operates within the constraints of the power relations
that are embedded within the cultures, and thus are not used to facilitate greater rural
input into decision-making. A rural peasant remarked, "the rural people do not have a
deep understanding of development. This is because they are rural, not educated, and
have not been to other areas and seen other things. So they do not have much knowledge
of development." The relationship between indigenous cultures and instrumental forms of
participation that dominate Gurage development are explored further in Chapter 6. Most of
the development undertaken by the indigenous development associations is capital-
intensive application of technology or resources by external or government contractors to
produce infrastructure. Thus, the rural population believes that they do not have the
technical skills to contribute towards the construction of roads and schools. Rather, the
use of Gurage cultures in the sense of institutions and practices reflects the nature of rural
participation, and is therefore largely focused on securing legitimacy for interventions and
most importantly in resource mobilisation.
4.4	 Culture as a barrier to development and a resource for social transformation
The process of transcribing and 'modernising' the Gurage customary law, Ya Kitcha,
illustrates the approach that Gurage elders and the elites have taken to cultural
transformation and the processes this must undergo in order to be accepted as legitimate.
It illustrates their perception of culture as simultaneously a barrier to development and a
means of affecting social transformation. Thus, although Gurage cultures are often
romanticised and portrayed as immutable, they can be legitimately changed. The process
was instigated by Gurage elders at the Sebat Bet Shango, however, they felt that they did
not have the organisational capacity and resources to effectively undertake the project
and requested the assistance of GPSDO. Transcription of Kitcha took place over 10 years
and involved the participation of rural elders and members of the urban elite, particularly
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professionals, in a process of meetings, workshops and consultation held in Gurageland
and Addis.
The results of this process reveal a perception amongst Gurage elders and the urban
based professional elite that elements of Gurage cultures and traditions were acting as a
barrier to Gurages fulfilling their full economic and social potential. In addition to changing
the levels of fines and compensation for many offences, these groups identified several
activities, which reduced agricultural production, such as excessive consumption of
alcohol and chat. One informant gave an extreme view of the negative consequences of
aspects of culture on rural productivity. "Look at the culture and calculate the average
work day of the area. I honestly do not think that they work one hour a day. It was that
bad. They wake up, drink coffee in one house, they move to another house and drink
more coffee, then they start on arake [distilled grain] and they are half drunk by 3 or 4
o'clock and that is the end of it. It is only during the harvest time and that is very short and
there is little tilling. There is no economic activity taking place. It is scary." They attempted
to use the law to undermine traditional social practices that drained rural resources such
as extravagance at festivals. They also sought to bring customary laws in line with the
national law in relation to women's rights by outlawing bride price and forced marriage and
by increasing divorce rights for women and reducing the stigma attached to divorce. They
also put legal force behind obligations to contribute to development and it seems that fines
are now paid to the development associations.
Although elements of the culture were regarded as impediments to progress, the culture
was not seen as immutable. However, the seeds of the change were to be found within
Gurage cultures rather than outside them. In particular, the processes within Gurage
cultures and the views of Gurage participants using the culture as a point of reference
were seen as providing the answers to these social problems. The project explicitly used
the term modemisation to refer to the changes. This reveals a perception within the elite
152
and the elders that cultural change can be effected if this is done in line with the norms
and processes contained within the culture.
However, this process led to major controversies within the Gurage communities,
particularly between sections of the urban elite, between elders and younger people,
between men and women and possibly between Christians and Moslems. Although the
nature of the conflict varied between areas and social groups, it focused on the legitimacy
of the process and to a lesser extent the nature of the changes. The form that the disputes
took suggests that culture can be changed if certain accepted processes are followed.
The process was legitimised as the rural participants such as elders and clan heads had
much authority within the cultural sphere as they represented their communities at
Shangos. The urban participants were leaders of GPSDO and other aspects of
associational life and prominent professionals. These reforms also gained some
legitimacy through consultation with religious leaders such as priests, imams and
'traditional' figures. However, there was considerable controversy over both the process of
change and some of the contents of the changes. Certain groups, encouraged by the local
government, rejected the changes on the basis that in many areas they were not finally
ratified at the relevant house Shangos. This was due to the government prohibiting the
organisers from holding meetings in the rural areas. This was an indication that, although
it is possible to change culture from within, this must follow the accepted processes,
particularly in terms of the changes gaining legitimacy through consent.
It is difficult to say how much change this process has brought about. The majority of the
elders, who are responsible for adjudicating legal disputes according to Gurage law, seem
to have accepted the changes as they signed the final printed document. However, many
rural informants rejected some of the changes suggesting that they contradicted religious
obligations. A few informants suggested that they undermined the basis of the Gurage
legal tradition, which previously emphasised removing the burden of the sins caused by
crimes from the clansmen and kinsmen. In Moher, all the elders and clan heads with
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whom I spoke to claimed to support the changes and suggested that they were in
operation, whilst a small number of younger men opposed them on the basis that the
changes undermined Gurage traditions. However, there was very little criticism of the
process, as the changes had been accepted by the Moher Shango. In Enamor, the
situation seemed somewhat different as the government had prevented the organisers
from holding a Shango to legitimise the changes. Thus, although the rural elders in
Enamor with whom I spoke supported the changes and claimed that they were in
operation, there seemed to be a great deal of resistance from the wider community.
Notwithstanding these controversies, it must be noted that no informants conceived of
these changes as development Even the participants in the meetings did not consider
this to be developmental activity. This reflects a view that the potentially large-scale social
transformation facilitated by these changes is not development, as it does not produce
tangible outcomes such as the construction of infrastructure. Rather, these changes were
seen as a response to the changing social and economic environment.
5	 Conclusions
Gurage perceptions of the purposes of development are based on the understanding of
poverty embedded in the Gurage survival strategies. Gurage migration is a response to
their perception of the nature and causes of rural poverty and the available means to
counter it. Gurages perceive the main causes of rural poverty to be a lack of employment
and income generating opportunities in Gurageland, which is the result of land shortage
and can only be resolved through migration. In the past, people avoided poverty by
becoming successful migrants, with the majority engaging in trade, and an influential
minority using formal education. The groups who control the development associations
are successful migrants, or their descendants, and their experiences are points of
reference, used to articulate the dominant Gurage understanding of poverty. I argue that,
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for Gurages, improving the effectiveness of migration is the main purpose of development.
Hence GRCO initially focussed on road construction and currently GPSDO emphasises
rural education to equip the next generation with the skills necessary for successful
migration. However, there is a subsidiary aspect, which focuses on bringing 'the benefits
of modem urban life' such as health, electricity and water.
In this chapter, I have argued that Gurages define poverty in largely material terms. The
purpose of development is to provide tangible benefits usually in the form of physical
infrastructure in Gurageland in order to facilitate Gurage migratory survival strategies in a
changing socio-economic environment. In Chapter 6, I argue that this instrumental
perception of purposes of development has led to instrumental processes of development
in interventions facilitated by GPSDO.
In this chapter, I have argued that Gurages define development as the provision of
tangible public goods. This construction of public action contrasts with both Mackintosh
(1992) and Dreze and Sen (1989), as the nature of the actor is unimportant in determining
whether an activity is regarded as development. The critical aspect is that the activity must
benefit 'the whole community'. Development is an integral aspect of Gurage citizenship,
and the notions of equality embedded in constructions of citizenship act as a point of
reference when assessing whether an activity is worthy of being defined as development.
In Chapter 6, I suggest that Gurages regard contributing to development as a sacrifice
willingly undertaken, which reinforces the importance of equal distribution of benefits.
It seems paradoxical that, although the Gurages are renowned as the most
entrepreneurial of all Ethiopians, there is relatively little economic development in
Gurageland, and GPSDO has not focussed on interventions specifically designed to raise
its productive capacity. Although the construction of a network of roads facilitated an
increase in the production of chat, eucalyptus and coffee in certain areas, the
development of these primary agricultural products is constrained by the lack of available
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land. In Chapter 4, I argued that Gurages tend to regard economic actMties as within the
private sphere. This can be juxtaposed with their perception of development as public
goods. In the present Gurage development discourse, other forms of social transformation
must also produce tangible public goods. The relationship between Gurage cultures and
development is complex. Although GPSDO harnesses Gurage notions of civic virtue for
development purposes, influential sections of the urban Gurage elite and some elders
regard elements of Gurage cultures as contributing to rural poverty.
In Chapter 4, I argued that to receive assistance from the Gurage community and,
therefore, benefit from the rights inherent in Gurage citizenship, one must demonstrate
commitment to the community through participation in social affairs and accepting the
obligations of supporting kin and clansmen in times of trouble. This chapter has illustrated
how the obligations on Gurage heads of household, to financially support their rural kin
and other members of the rural community, has been extended to include contributing to
development. Gurage cultures and particularly the rights and obligations embedded within
them, are seen by the dominant Gurage development discourse as the foundation of their
model of development. Development for Gurages both builds on their notions of civic
virtue, and is a central element in its construction. In Chapter 6, I develop this argument
further, by suggesting that the dominant Gurage conceptualisations define community as
households whose heads demonstrate their commitment to the group through accepting
obligations including participation in development.
6	 Post script: internal contestations of the Gurage development discourses
This chapter has focused primarily on the perceptions of the purposes of development
embedded in the dominant Gurage understanding of poverty. Almost all informants, other
than government sources discussed in Chapter 7, articulated variants of the dominant
understanding of poverty, however, one notable individual contested its validity and
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suggested that this approach could have reinforced rural poverty. I briefly outline the
opinions of this informant as although he was a lone dissenting voice amongst the Gurage
elite I contacted, his views may represent a counter discourse expressed by de-linked
urban Gurages. It is not the place of the thesis to engage directly with the opinions of this
informant. The purpose of presenting this data is to illustrate that the dominant Gurage
perceptions of development are contested from within the community:
"The problem is that the economy of the rural Gurage has deteriorated so
significantly. One of the most important issues that institutions like GPSDO should
have addressed is, what are the fundamental causes of the economic deterioration
in the Gurageland? They have built roads, they have built clinics and schools but
from my observation, the life of the community around which my father was born
has deteriorated. In imperial times, the average household would always have
traditional foods, some vegetables, milk and cheese. So they had balanced diet.
Now its incredible there is nothing. I have heard that 70-80% of the Gurages are
subsidised by urban Gurages. There are no vegetable gardens. The people are
dilapidated. It is obvious that their life has deteriorated in the last 25 years."
"They [GPSDO] haven't looked at what is happening, it is demographic pressure,
the size of the land holdings reducing to the extent it won't support families, It is
rare to find young adults, It is old people women and children. Agricultural activity
has significantly stopped in the area I know."
"I have tried to provoke GPSDO to evaluate what they have done. This must ask,
are people better off today than they were when we started this? If the answer is
no, there is a serious problem. Have the roads helped at all? Maybe the
development strategy should have been something else. 80% of Gurage land tax
is paid by [urbanj relatives, such a community is not viable economically.
Everybody does a little thing in the community. They build a little clinic etc. There
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seems to be a Maithusian disaster taking place, they are opening clinics and
increasing the life expectancy and fertility, so the population pressure makes life
impossible. Maybe that's not how to tackle these problems.
The paradigm needs to be evaluated. Have we improved the economic life of the
average person? They may be able to get to Addis in a day, but how does this
help a peasant who can't eat? For the urban population it helps for burials etc.
They can go and come back so it is self-serving. They can get in touch with the
area quickly and come back so they do not have to stay longer. This is heresy.
(Academics] measure welfare inter-generationally, nobody can convince me that
Gurages are better off today. They argue that roads have facilitated trade but this
has probably hurt the community, more eucalyptus is bad for the soil, they now
have a chat culture."
This strong critique has several salient aspects that fundamentally challenge both the
dominant understandings of the causes of rural poverty and the approaches taken to
alleviating it. The informant suggested that, the dominant Gurage view of development did
not fully take account of the fundamental cause of iural poverty, the low economic
capacity of Gurageland. For him, interventions based on this lack of understanding had
entrenched Gurage poverty through facilitating migration, which lowered the productive
capacity of the area. Furthermore, the roads had contributed to harmful agricultural and
social practices. His overarching argument is that although development interventions had
provided services for the rural population they had done little to improve the material
conditions of people's lives.
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Chapter 6
Legitimacy in Gura ge development associations
Introduction
This chapter explores communal perceptions of the process of development by focusing
on the forms of trusteeship constructed to manage the relationship between GPSDO and
Sebat Bet Gurages. These processes and perceptions give GPSDO and its affiliates the
right to act on behalf of the wider Sebat Bet Gurage community. The forms of trusteeship
are explained by exploring the meanings that Sebat Bet Gurages have applied to terms
used in the dominant development discourses, such as participation and accountability.
The meanings attached to these terms by the Gurage communities can only be
understood in the context of Gurage social structures, histories and cultures. In Chapter 5,
I argued that Sebat Bet Gurage perceptions of the purposes of development are largely
an extension of their survival strategies and conceptions of civic virtue. In this chapter, I
argue that their understanding of the process of development is also built on the rights
and obligations embedded in Gurage notions of civic virtue and survival strategies.
In section 2, I focus on the dominant Gurage perceptions of the nature of community
participation in development and the ways that they conceptualise community. Discourses
outlined by GPSDO and the Gurage communities present the indigenous Gurage
approach to community participation in development as a model for the rest of Ethiopia
and beyond. However, the chapter will illustrate that Gurage perceptions of community
participation are distinctly at odds with the perceptions of community participation
embedded in the dominant development discourses.
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In section 3, I explore the sanctions that underpin the participation of the Sebat Bet
community in development. I focus particularly on the web of obligations on the Gurage
elite, which secures their services as leaders in GPSDO and its affiliates.
In section 4, I examine the processes of accountability between GPSDO, its affiliates and
the Sebat Bet Gurage community. I outline the two complementary and interrelated sets of
mechanisms of accountability. As a registered legal entity, 13
 GPSDO has established
formal procedures for decision-making and accountability. In addition to formal processes
a range of informal pressures and expectations are imposed on office holders. The
section outlines the official processes of accountability within GPSDO and the sub-
committees and compares their effectiveness with the web of informal pressures and
expectation on leaders of the organisation.
In section 5, I explore the other factors that account for the legitimacy of GPSDO and its
affiliates within the Gurage communities. Legitimacy is an ambiguous term. I define it as a
sense of ownership of the organisation, its interventions, and a perception that the
organisation represents the interests of the community and therefore has the right to act
on their behalf. As such, it draws on the notion of trusteeship outlined by Thomas (2000c)
and Cowan and Shenton (1996). In this section I explore how the legitimacy of indigenous
Gurage development agents is based on the personalised nature of leadership within the
development associations and the effectiveness of the interventions.
13 GPSDO has tightly defined structures of accountability established at the time of its change from
GRCO. However, it is difficult to establish whether this constitution, the GRCO constitution or more
ad hoc arrangements were actually in force during the period of fieldwork. Factions of the urban
elite allied with different generations of GPSDO/GRCO leaders were party to a legal dispute over
which memorandum of association was legally valid.
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1.1.1 Respect, authority and leadership within the rural Sebat Bet Gurage
community
Trusteeship is a concept used to understand relationships between organisations,
communities and individuals and as such involves analysing the exercise of power. Before
discussing Gurage perceptions of the trusteeship between their community and GPSDO,
it is important to discuss the perceptions of power, authority, influence and respect within
the Gurage communities. Analysis of the various meanings attached to and distinguishing
between power, authority and influence have a long academic history. The purpose of this
chapter is to uncover Gurage perceptions of power rather than to contribute to a
theoretical debate on the nature of power. Informants other than the highly educated did
not distinguish between power, authority and influence and used the same Amharic term,
'siltan', for all three concepts. The main point of distinction, for informants, was between
respect and authority. Respect can be related to age and hereditary position within clans,
however it does not automatically confer authority.
Within the rural areas authority is vested in a group of prominent elders and to a lesser
extent PA leaders, who are highly influential in all spheres of associational life and tend to
be the most active in promoting development. Becoming an influential elder entails a long
process of being evaluated by peers, particularly other elders. In this process, men must
demonstrate their worthiness by displaying a set of attributes based on the skills
perceived to be necessary for effective and fair dispute settlement. These attributes must
be demonstrated through their daily interactions with the community and particularly in
associational life. The main criteria are: altruism and commitment to the community;
wisdom, defined as knowledge of local history, laws and culture; impartiality; and the
oratory skills necessary to effectively articulate these attributes at meetings. Rural
informants presented these attributes as inherent to the individual and given by God or
Allah for the benefit of the community. These attributes reflect the lifestyle of the clan
heads who, by virtue of being free from the burdens of agricultural labour, are in a position
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to demonstrate their commitment to the community through service, such as arbitration.
Although clan heads command a great deal of respect, this is not automatically translated
into authority or influence over the community. As with other elders their authority and
influence is also dependent on the extent to which they are adjudged to have met the
criteria for becoming an elder.
Thus, although the elders are influential in rural Gurageland, they do not impose their will
on the community. In developmental activities it is evident that the elders act as enablers
allowing the community to take advantage of new opportunities through relating them to
Gurage history and traditions.
2	 Participation in development
In Chapter 2, I outlined the range of meanings that have been applied to participatory
development and the range of activities that have been labelled participatory. The purpose
of this section is to explain why community participation, in the Gurage models of
development, has taken particular forms related to indigenous social structures, culture
and customary approaches to communal co-operation. I then explain how the nature of
community participation affects the legitimacy of development interventions within this
model. The dominant Gurage development discourse is underpinned by an assumption
that all urban and rural Gurages participate in community development activities. A
GPSDO official commented, uthe whole community contributes to development". While a
rural informant stated uall the people here must contribute to development, each
household pays their share or sends someone to work on the Debo". Before analysing the
nature of community participation in development n Gurageland, I examine the concept of
'the whole community'.
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2.1	 Definitions of community
In some academic circles, the term 'community' is highly contested with feminists and
others suggesting that the term artificially homogenises social groups divided by class,
gender, age, status and other cleavages. The term community was used by all rural
informants to refer to male heads of household within a given locality and to male urban
dwellers with links to that locality. Rural informants tended to discuss local participation in
developmental activities in terms of how 'hizb', the people, had contributed to
development. When asked to define 'the people', the definition was always limited to male
heads of household. In the urban areas, the term community was generally applied to
people, mostly men, who had originated from a given locality and could be contacted
through urban associations, such as Idirs and Ikubes or informal trade based networks.
The salient aspects of this conception of community are that it is experienced through the
head of household and that commitment to the community must be demonstrated. A
Moher activist and GPSDO executive committee member commented, uThe community is
the rural people who live in the Moher area and also urban beneficiaries, people who have
land and farm in these areas. All people living in Moher irrespective of ethnic background.
The status of urban Mohers varies according to their perception of him. They are
members [of the community] because they are obliged to participate and contribute to that
community. Even if generations of his family are in Addis, he still has obligations to the
rural area. Membership of institutions and willingness to contribute is what determines
whether they are considered as a member of the community. If the person is not part of
the associations and refuses to contribute the law applies here and they will not be
considered as a member of the community." He then gave an example of how people can
cease to be members of the Gurage communities. When a group of Mohers converted to
Protestantism and attempted to evangelise in the rural area, the informant related. "The
rural people complained and ostracised them and persuaded the urban people to do the
same. Although these people are ethnically Moher they were expelled from the Idirs and
163
are not called upon to contribute to development. It is possible to lose your status as a
Moher."
The language used in the statement about urban Mohers above suggests that the urban
community is limited to male heads of household. However, a few professional women
suggested that they had been approached individually to contribute to development.
Nevertheless, contributions were usually through the head of household unless other
members of that household were members of an association such as Idir that had been
harnessed for a particular project. Activists within GPSDO were aware that some of the
resources contributed by the head of household came from other members of the
household. A GPSDO official commented. "The Listros [shoeshine boys] also
contribute.. .they come to Idirs or.. .their family will pay something, say 100 Birr, and
definitely they [the sub-committees] will get money from the Listros." Thus, in both the
urban and rural areas, the community participates through the household rather than as
individuals. This reflects the nature of the Gurage household as an economic unit
discussed in Chapter 4. This conception of community could be seen as excluding women
and youths from the process of development However, its impact should be understood
in the context of the nature of communal participation in development, which is perceived
as a burden, discussed in section 3.2. Women suggested that they were free from the
burdens of being obliged to participate in development. They contrasted this with the
situation in Derg times when they were obliged to participate in community development
programmes organised by the PAs. Some male informants suggested that women could
contribute to development through discussing proposed interventions with the head of
household, however, it was impossible to ascertain the extent of this. Anecdotal evidence
would suggest that women have little role in major decision-making within the household.
The definition of community is limited to households, in addition, membership is
dependent on the quality of the relationship between the head of the household and the
wider community. Membership of the community for heads of household entails a web of
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rights and obligations, which make up contemporary constructions of Gurage citizenship.
As discussed in Chapter 4, male Gurages must demonstrate their commitment to the
community through fulfilling their social obligations before they can reap the benefits of
community membership. In its present construction, Gurage citizenship requires that an
individual, head of household, contributes to rural development. The dominant Gurage
development discourse suggests that all members of the community contribute to
development. However, the conception of the nature of the Gurage community in this
discourse is somewhat self-reinforcing. An individual not contributing to development is
likely to be excluded from the community and institutions related to community
membership. Therefore, definitions of the community are limited to those who participate
in development and it is, therefore, self-evident that all members of the community
participate in development.
2.2	 Sebat Bet Gurage perceptions of participation
I now examine the nature of community participation in development. The section draws
on contemporary examples, particularly the construction of Moher high school and
telephone station and historical examples such as the construction of Gunchire high
school and road building during the GRCO period. These examples demonstrate that
although initiation of projects occurs in both the rural and urban areas, decision-making is
largely in the hands of the development association leadership. Rural participation largely
consists of contributing resources to projects determined by the leadership. This form of
participation serves the purpose of reducing costs and demonstrating the worthiness of
the rural community to receive developmental assistance.
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2.2.1 Initiation
The construction of Moher High School typifies the process of development in the
indigenous model and reflects the process of road construction outlined in Chapter 7.
According to rural informants, agitation for the construction of a high school in Moher
began in the early I 980s. A group of concerned elders and the primary school director
took the issue to the Moher rural Shango which appointed a high school construction
committee composed of prominent elders and PA leaders to co-ordinate the project. This
group liased with the government via a prominent Moher civil servant. However,
government support for the project was not forthcoming. In the transitional period (1991-
95), the committee and rural elders contacted the Moher Development Association 14 who
began to lobby the government for permission to build the school and to provide staff for
the school.
Once the project was taken to the sub-committee, responsibility was ceded to the Add is-
based sub-committee for planning. In both Moher and Enamor development interventions
facilitated by GPSDO followed a similar process. Ideas for potential development projects
were initiated by the sub-committee in negotiation with the urban elite including high-
ranking civil servants, prominent businessmen and activists in associational life. Most of
the projects undertaken by the sub-committees were initiated in a similar way, however
there are some variations. Other development projects are initiated by the development
association on an opportunist basis. For example, the telephone station was initiated by a
Moher telephone engineer bringing the idea to the Addis committee. The only significantly
departure from this model is in partnerships between GPSDO and international NGOs,
discussed below.
14	 terms Addis Development Committee and Moher Development Association refer to the
same entity: the Moher members of the Moher and Akilil sub committee of GPSDO.
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2.2.2 Consultation
According to GPSDO activists, once a proposal has been accepted by the sub-committee
it is discussed with the urban community, particularly the urban clan and house Idirs.
These negotiations secure wider acceptance of the plans and promises of financial
support and other resources from the urban community. In the case of school construction
in Enamor and Moher, and the construction of the telephone station, once the idea had
been accepted in Addis, the sub-committee members either visited prominent elders and
state representatives in Gurageland or summoned them to Addis for informal discussions
on plans for the project. When the development association had produced detailed plans
they consulted the wider rural community at associational gatherings. The Enamor
committee used PA meetings to consult the community, whilst in Moher indigenous
institutions, particularly Senbete were used. According to development association
leaders, the purpose of these consultations was to explain the benefits of the project and
the sacrifices that the rural people would have to make and to ensure that the rural
community supported the ideas and keep them abreast of developments. There was little
rural input into the planning process. Once the community had accepted the project, the
committee and the elders would negotiate aspects, such as the expected levels of rural
contributions and the location of the project. The outcome of these discussions would then
be put to the house Shango. If the project was accepted at the Shango, directives relating
to it would be backed by the Gurage customary law and a range of sanctions, discussed
in section 3.1, could be applied to those who did not participate in the project. The
purpose of consultation with the urban community is to secure acceptance for the project
and to establish an institutional framework for harnessing urban resources such as
finance, planning skills and contacts with government. Consultation with the rural
community is primarily to secure legitimacy for the decisions of the development
association and elders. Planning of these projects took place in Addis within the house-
based sub-committee, with the assistance of professionals who were contacted through
ldirs and other urban networks.
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2.2.3 Resource mobilisation
During the imperial and Derg regimes, GRCO and GPSDO had formal rural sub-
committees that worked in conjunction with the relevant government bodies, such as the
Balebbats, rural landowners appointed by the imperial government, and the PA and
Worreda development sub-committees in Derg times. However, more recently their rural
organisational structure has become more varied. Some areas have a formally constituted
rural sub-committee, others have a sub-committee activated for certain purposes, whilst in
other areas there seems to be no rural organisation. However, even in areas with no
formal rural organisational structures the sub-committees continue to maintain contacts
with prominent elders. The chair of the Moher rural development committee stated, "the
purpose of the rural development committee is to mobilise local resources for
development". This suggests that rural participation in development is limited to providing
resources, which according to the terms used in the development discourses is an
instrumental approach to participation. There is little scope for rural input into decision-
making other than negotiating and enforcing the levels of contribution. However, during
the rural fieldwork it was evident that contrary to the dominant development discourses,
there was little desire on the part of the rural population to become involved in decision-
making. One peasant stated, "the role of the rural people in development is to contribute
in anyway they are capable, be it in money or labour. But rural people do not have the
knowledge to participate in making important decisions." Another suggested that, "people
in Addis know more things than us and they discuss them when they come here". This low
opinion of rural capabilities was shared by most informants and suggests that rural people
are not empowered by the process of development.
In development interventions led by GPSDO and its sub-committees, the mobilisation of
rural resources has taken various forms. These forms reflect changes in the political
climate, however, they have all been led by rural development committees. In Chapter 7, I
outline how Balebbats were the main mobilisers of the rural community and how this role
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was given to PAs in the Derg and EPRDF regimes. In Moher the construction of the high
school and telephone facility shows an interplay between the state and indigenous
sectors. This illustrates the artificial dichotomy between the so-called 'traditional' and
'modem' sectors. The rural development committee which stands at the apex of rural
resource mobilisation, is composed of PA leaders and prominent elders, such as clan
heads. The committee ensures that the local PAs provide their share of resources and
acts as a point of liaison between the rural community and the Addis based Moher sub-
committee. The PAs are responsible for resource mobilisation, in the case of the high
school construction their role was to collect 30 Birr (approximately £3) from each rural
household. If households did not contribute the PA could take the case to the village, clan
or house Shango and apply sanctions discussed in section 3.1.
Rural ldirs were used by the rural development committee and PA to mobilise their
members' resources and to organise communal labour. During the construction of the
high school, some wealthy rural ldirs paid their members contributions directly from the
Idir's capital, whilst others lent money to their members to pay their contributions. The
rural Idirs jointly paid for the high school opening ceremony and during the installation of a
telephone service, the Idir leaders organised their members labour into Debo for land
clearance. In addition to making ad hoc contributions to development projects, as
permanent institutions, the ldirs make an ongoing contribution to the sustainability of
development projects. In Moher, the rural Idirs pay the salaries of a message taker at the
telephone centre and a guard at the high school.
Urban participation takes a similar instrumental form. GPSDO contacts what it defines as
the urban community through networks of friendship and employment and particularly
Idirs. All the migrants that I contacted were aware of GPSDO and, with the exception of
youths, all had been contacted by GPSDO and encouraged to contribute to development.
One commented, "part of our monthly Idir fee goes towards development and sometimes
the [Idir] committee will ask us to pay a lump sum for a particular project." Another migrant
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stated, "it [GPSDO] may not be as strong as it was before, but we still help it through our
Idirs. Before road construction, it took many long hours to walk or ride. Now we can go to
the country and back in one day". GPSDO activists use their knowledge of urban networks
and associational linkages to mobilise urban resources. One GPSDO official commented
"if you have a shop, there will be a chain of shops owned by Gurages. If you contribute
you tell the person in the next shop and all will contribute but there is no chain to get the
civil servants contribution. If you have a good tie with your family or you are a member of
an dir, you will be told how much you have to pay and you will pay. Once we have access
there is no way out but if there is no access you are not a member of an Idir you will not
be made to pay." The last statement emphases how associational linkages merge with
trade-based networks and kinship ties to include a large proportion of the urban Gurage
population. However, the informant was also aware that these networks could exert less
pressure on sections of the Gurage community who had fewer linkages, such as civil
servants.
Urban participation usually takes the form of cash contributions, however, members of the
community with other attributes, such as skills, contacts and organisational ability are also
expected to contribute these resources to development. This process is outlined in section
3.2.
2.2.4 Implementation
State agencies and contractors using hired labour undertook the implementation of
projects, such as the construction of roads and buildings. This was often supplemented by
communal labour, such as clearance work by Debo groups. When rural participation in
development takes the form of communal labour, Debo work groups of 8-15 people, which
are the main form of co-operative agricultural labour, have become the appropriate
organisational form. Pre-existing or impromptu groups are mobilised by Idirs or the PA
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and used to perform the labour intensive aspects of development work such as land
clearance. Each household is expected to provide one member to perform this type of
work and non-participation in development labour is punished by PA fines or the sanctions
outlined below.
2.3	 The meaning of participation
The meanings ascribed to participation by Gurages emphasise contributing resources to
projects according to their financial capacity, as determined by the development
association leaders, influential urban dwellers and rural elders. These meanings contrast
significantly from those embedded in the dominant development discourses. The
contribution of resources and time are seen as an integral aspect of wider obligations to
the Gurage community. The dominant Gurage development discourses outlined in
publications by Manam (1972) and Bereka (1986) and resonating through the discussions
with Gurages at all levels and localities are imbued with a sense of participation in
development being a sacrifice and a burden willingly undertaken. This perception of
participation as a burden reflects their instrumental conception of development as
outcomes rather than as a process. Thus, for example, GPSDO, in conjunction with
PACT, have attempted to build the capacity of the sub-committees. This has included
assistance in project design, implementation and contacting funders. However, this has
not been extended to the rural population and rural informants saw no need for the
development associations to build their capacity to identify and resolve developmental
problems. As discussed in Chapter 5, there is a focus on the tangible results of
development rather than on the process of development as empowering the rural people.
In the next section, I relate this conception of participation as a burden, willingly
undertaken, to the issues of voluntarism and leadership.
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I should, however, add some qualifications to my argument. My analysis has tended to
exclude much of the localised and small scale development activity originating from the
rural areas. In the past, the rural people have attempted to initiate large-scale
development activities, such as the attempts at road construction in the 1940s and 1950s
(see Chapter 7), early attempts to construct a school in Moher in the 1980s and the
transcription of and reforms to Ya Kitcha (see Chapter 5). However, as discussed in
Chapter 7, these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful until the organisational skills,
government contacts and financial capacity of urban Gurages were sought. This history
has probably contributed to a perception of dependence on urban resources. It should be
noted that numerous small-scale development projects, such as the construction of
wooden bridges and the repair of primary schools, have been initiated and implemented
by the rural population, with some financial support from village and clan Idirs based in the
urban areas.
In addition, GPSDO has recently become involved in partnerships with international
NGOs. Generally, the schemes were designed by GPSDO project workers in partnership
with the NGO and have included education projects, such as building kindergartens and
women's literacy centres. Each programme consists of seven projects, one for each of the
houses. The sub-committees decide on the location of the project. However, in Enamor,
for example, this did not appear to involve consultation with representatives of the entire
rural area and focused only on representatives of the locality, which seems to have
caused resentment and is discussed further in Chapter 8. The other main responsibility for
sub-committees is matching donor funds through mobilising resources in the urban and
rural areas. This seemed to be through institutions related to the particular locality rather
than the house, such as clan and village level Idirs in Addis.
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2.4	 Participation, sustainability and civic virtue
The participation discourses, outlined in Chapter 2 and articulated by development
agencies, may characterise the examples outlined as simply instrumental and non-
empowering. However, the investment of time and money by Gurages into development
projects must be understood in the context of Gurage discourses. In addition to increasing
the effectiveness of projects by contributing to the costs, the instrumental form of rural
participation, as resource mobilisation, increases the legitimacy of projects for the
development associations and their urban supporters in two ways. For urban Gurages, it
demonstrates the worthiness of the rural community to receive their assistance, while the
rural community is vested with a degree of ownership of the project, which assures its
sustainability. A GPSDO leader emphasised the importance of rural contributions to the
sustainability of development projects. "Sometimes they (the rural peoplel do not invest
their money in things that do not show immediate results.. .We try to explain about long
term benefits but there are no established structures, so if we tell them something they
may forget. So what we do is to get them to feel ownership by forcing them to invest their
own money so that they will take care of the project." This point was repeated by the chair
of Cheza Sefa PA, "Activities in which the people take part are fruitful because the people
will look after them, they will consider the project as their own. So they do not want to see
it damaged". In addition to sustainability, rural resource mobilisation also legitimised the
position of the rural population as recipients of assistance from the urban population by
demonstrating their commitment to the project and therefore to Gurage notions of
citizenship.
This dynamic is further illustrated by perceptions of the rural-urban relation by rural
Gurages. While rural informants expressed gratitude for the contributions that urban
Gurage had made to rural development, they stressed that the urban people were only
behaving in the way expected of them in Gurage culture and related this to their wider
obligations to rural kin. They continually stressed the sacrifices that the rural people had
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made for development and how this justified their entitlement to development. Their
participation in development was presented as their way of meeting social expectations,
which required that both urban and rural people should make sacrifices for the benefit of
the rural area.
3	 Voluntarism, sanctions and leadership
Voluntarism has been defined as "theories based on the intentions and motives of actors
who are thus assumed to act 'voluntarily' and not as 'determined' by the social structure"
(Abercrombie 1994 pp 447-448). This section discusses the elements of compulsion in
development activities undertaken by GPSDO. The dominant Gurage development
discourse suggests that in the past there was a golden age of Gurage development when
all members of the community participated in development. The purpose of this discourse
seems to be to juxtapose contemporary problems in resource mobilisation, particularly a
lack of commitment to Gurage development amongst the young and those born in Addis,
with this supposed golden age. However, accounts written during the road construction
phase suggest that resource mobilisation was in fact far more complex and problematic
(Mariam 1972; Bereka 1986). These accounts suggest that although there was much
public support for road construction, 'traditional sanctions' were used to ensure
participation. According to these sources, even when these sanctions were applied, they
were not always successful as certain individuals and groups avoided contributing to
GRCO. In the context of a communal desire for access to the benefits of development, the
authority of the Shango and the levels of trust invested in the development associations, it
is rare for people to refuse to contribute to development, without good reason. However,
households that do not contribute to legitimate development projects accepted by the
Shango, are liable to a range of sanctions, which I now go on to examine.
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3.1	 Sanctions
When a party to a dispute refuses to accept a Shango decision the institution of Yeka
(Moher and Kistane dialects) or Kayewa, (other Sebat Bet dialects) is used to resolve the
problem. In Moher, all those attending the Shango become Yeka, whilst in other Sebat Bet
areas normally only fellow clansmen and kin participate in Yeka. The participants decamp
to the transgressor's house and stay until the person accepts the will of the Shango. Being
visited by Yeka involves social stigma and a great deal of expense, as the individual must
provide hospitality for his visitors. If the person relents, he makes a symbolic offering by
slaughtering an animal and feeding his guests. If he refuses to accept Yeka, he is cursed,
ostracised, the matter is escalated to a higher Shango, and the process is repeated up to
the level of Ya Joka, the Sebat Bet Shango. If the house Shango accepts the legitimacy of
a development intervention, disputes relating to it may be regulated by Ya Kitcha and can
be enforced by Yeka. For development purposes, the main use of this institution is to
ensure that all members of the rural community participate in development projects.
Development projects facilitated by both the indigenous sector and the government have
used this institution to ensure that all households pay the appropriate level of contributions
or provide labour for development projects. Yeka and Ya Kitcha are also used implicitly to
regulate the activities of office holders in the rural areas to ensure an element of
accountability to the Shango and that they do not benefit personally from their position.
Rural elders suggested that, Yeka is as old as the first Gurager and there is a long history
of its use in Gurage development. For example, Gedamu (1972) suggests that in the
I 960s Yeka was used by Kistane Gurages to mobilise resources for developmental
purposes, while rural and urban informants suggest that this sanction was also used by
GRCO and continues to be applied by some sub-committees. However, there is some
dispute as to how it has been applied. The official position is that Yeka has only been
used to ensure that people contribute what they had earlier promised. However, many
informants suggested that it was used to oblige all members of the community to
contribute an amount fixed by the Shango to development. According to informants this
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sanction is used rarely and when it is used it is unusual for it to escalate beyond a visit
from elders which serves as a warning of the more drastic sanctions likely if the matter
escalates further.
In the course of Moher Development Association's largest project, the construction of the
high school, the institution of Yeka was transplanted to and evolved in Addis Ababa. The
development association realised that contributions from the urban population were
insufficient and presented the case to the Moher urban Shango, which established the
Addis Ababa Yeka committee. Rather than Yeka being composed of all those in
attendance at a particular Shango or kinsmen, a semi-permanent committee was
appointed by the Shango. This committee is comprised of prominent urban dwellers, such
as elders and ldir leaders. Its composition was decided on the basis of age, respect and
those with free time. It also has an ad-hoc component and can include people known to
the transgressor. Its function is to enforce development related decisions made by the
urban general assembly of the Moher Development Association. The Yeka committee
ensures that all urban Moher households contribute to development according to their
means, as decided by the development association executive committee in consultation
with prominent urban dwellers, such as Idir leaders. The arrangement in Moher seems
more formal than those in other committees where no formal Yeka committee has been
established. In other areas, ad-hoc groups of prominent urban residents fulfil a similar
function.
Zowa is the practice of removing an item, such as agricultural tools or cattle, from a
person's house to remind them to meet their financial obligations. In the past, it was used
in a consensual way to remind people to pay Idir contributions or fines for minor
transgressions. This sanction is only used once a decision has been legitimised by the
relevant Shango and is regulated by Ya Kitcha. Information regarding its current use in
development is somewhat contradictory as this practice potentially conflicts with
government protected property rights and has been officially prohibited by the Gurage
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Zone authorities. Thus, it is generally discussed in terms of how it was used in the past
during road construction or is currently used by other people and organisations in more
outlying areas away from centres of government authority. Some informants suggested
that this practice has been used recently for development through confiscating and selling
cattle in lieu of contributions to development projects. In most cases this was with the
owner's consent, however, withholding consent would leave the person liable to other
more drastic sanctions.
Ostracism is the ultimate sanction in the rural areas, as when invoked it becomes
impossible for a household to function socially or economically. This involves the
household being expelled from the community and therefore, unable to receive any form
of communal assistance, such as agricultural labour or protection of cattle and exclusion
from all rural social affairs, such as attendance at burial. Non attendance at burial was
immense stigma for the household and was considered the ultimate sanction by all
informants. Due its severity, this sanction is very rarely if ever used in the development
process, as normally the threat of ostracism is sufficient to ensure compliance. Cursing is
linked to Yeka and ostracism and is considered a powerful sanction. The threat of cursing
was a major element in Yeka in both the rural and urban areas during road construction.
As the curse could also affect kinsmen and clansmen, the threat of it encourages them to
put further pressure on the transgressor.
Development interventions are thus, underpinned by a range of powerful sanctions.
However, they are not applied indiscriminately. Informants suggested that the households
with known financial problems were often excused from their obligations to contribute or
were assisted by more wealthy members of the community. The power of these sanctions
also varies between the urban and rural areas, and between social groups in the urban
areas where it has lessened over time. In Chapters 4 and 8, I discuss the impact of de-
linking and the development of alternative affiliations on contemporary constructions of
Gurage civic virtue. For groups whose social and economic wellbeing is dependent on
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their 'inks with the Gurage community, these sanctions are potentially devastating.
However, other social groups with alternative social and economic ties groups can avoid
these sanctions. A highly educated and wealthy businessman commented, "previously if
someone came to me for a contribution there was no voluntary element.. .you just pay an
amount calculated from your income. Otherwise, you will be outcast. They would send
people and go through processes and then nobody will come to your house if somebody
dies. Then social life was very important, so people paid. Even for urban people, this was
an important sanction but not anymore. People are not so concerned. The link is weaker.
They have social arrangements and organisations that are independent of the Gurages.
Someone in an urban area has an urban Idir for burial. I do not care much at all about
where 1 belong with the Gurages. I am not sanctioned by their traditions because
associatively I have been de-linked." GPSDO officials and activists seem to have tacitly
accepted the futility of attempting to force people with few connections to the Gurage
community to contribute to development. A GPSDO official commented, "The Yeka
committee rarely visits the houses of such people (those with fewer linkages to the
community]. Their participation in development is very low, so the Yeka committee does
not expect much from them. I have never come across the Yeka going to their house."
In the rural areas the sanctions are still powerful. However, their effectiveness, in the
urban areas, as a means to secure co-operation with the activities of the association is
limited to people with strong affiliations to the Gurage communities, particularly those with
most to lose from losing status or being ostracised. Thus it seems to have less impact on
established residents of Addis particularly civil servants, whereas sanctions have a more
powerful potential impact on regular migrants and businessmen who are dependent on
their connections with other Gurages. In addition to the application of sanctions being
based on the expectation of their effectiveness, on occasion they have been applied with
greater vigour on those who are expected to take a lead in communal affairs. Gurage
elders and other respected figures are expected to behave in an exemplary manner. An
official Gurage history outlines how, during the 1960s one particular Azmatch (hereditary
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clan head) refused to contribute to road construction and was persecuted by the GRCO
executive (Mariam 1972). This persecution was seen to be justified because of other
activities where he did riot behave in an exemplary manner and thus, an example was
made of him.
3.2 Voluntarism and leadership
All leadership in GPSDO and the sub-committees is provided on a voluntary basis. The
changing perceptions of the appropriate attributes of leadership of Gurage development
associations are also linked to the idea that contributions to development are willingly
accepted but nevertheless a burden. In Gurage notions of citizenship, leadership is
treated as another resource, which is harnessed by institutions and backed by similar
sanctions to those for other forms of participation. Leaders see their participation as a
sacrifice, which takes up much of their free time, and for businessmen work time.
Positions on the house sub-committees and GPSDO executive are unpaid and when the
committee is active, they are very time-consuming.
In the 1990s powerful figures in the Gurage elite decided that the attributes necessary for
successful leadership, particularly of the sub-committees, had changed. This reflects
changes in nature of the activities undertaken and the skills necessary to achieve them. In
the past the leadership of GRCO was dominated by prominent civil servants and military
officers, reflecting the importance of government contacts and organisational capacity.
However, in the sub-committees the ability to mobilise resources was crucial and the
leadership was dominated by people active in other forms of associational life, particularly
Idirs and successful businessmen who could use their contacts in trade networks. This is
related to the nature of project implementation, which during the road construction phase
was mainly done by government departments. Thus, the main role of the leadership was
to mobilise resources and secure the co-operation of government. However, with the
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changing focus of development activities new skills were needed by the leadership. In
particular, organisational and technical skills became more important due to the increasing
complexity of proposed projects and the need to improve planning and reporting
mechanisms. In line with their ethos of self-help, there was a conscious attempt on the
part of the powerful sectors to professionalise and build the capacity of the sub-
committees by encouraging more skilled people to accept leadership roles. A leader of the
Akilil committee and prominent civil servant stated, "The previous committee realised that
poorly educated people could not lead these development activities. So they presented
the problem to the people of Moher and Akilil [general assembly], saying that they were
incapable of doing the job and that they had to be replaced by intellectuals, as it is beyond
their capacity to produce projects. Then the people started nominating people who were
appropriate." Thus, whilst attempting to change the activities of the development
associations and the role of the leadership, the elite legitimised this process by using a
discourse that stressed continuity in forms of leadership.
However, some people were unwilling to accept positions of leadership when requested
by the association and ldir leaders. In some of these cases, the Yeka committee was used
to recruit potential leaders who had declined to volunteer their services. The informant
continued, "This included people who did not volunteer to become active, so they were
forced. The general assembly obligated others to become active. Pressure included
people going to their offices and homes saying that 'if you live with us and you are our
brothers, so you have to contribute', so people have no choice but to participate and share
their time. When elders come to your office in Gurage culture and law you cannot refuse.
If you refuse it breaks the law and the Yeka committee will come to your home. Yeka is
traditional law. If they come to your home, you have to invite them in and provide them
with food and drink. It could be many people and they won't leave your home unless you
accept. It is very strong pressure and if you refuse you may be outcast and expelled from
the Idir." He then illustrated how he had been recruited to his present position, "Elders
came to my office and I tried to explain that I had no time and have a sensitive job. So
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they came again. One was the person who built my elementary school and said 'you are
my product, you have studied because we built the school and now you are in a position
to serve the people in your area', so I had to accept and become an executive committee
member".
This perception of leadership as a burden is also apparent in other aspects of Gurage
associational life. An urban Idir leader commented, "I did not want to be the leader but the
general assembly and clan members requested me. The usual trend is that people do not
want to use up their time especially their business activities. It is not about gaining status.
A committee who proposed some people to be leaders conducted the election [and] the
general assembly then voted on these people. We have no choice, I do not want to be the
leader as it takes up my time but the general assembly obliged me to do so. It is a free
service so nobody wants to do this. So who wants to assume this positionT
I indicated above that the enforcement mechanisms are applied to general contributions
on the basis of their effectiveness. The obligations on leaders follow a similar pattern. The
leader who had been obliged to join the executive committee compared his experience
with another urban Akilil to illustrate how Yeka had only limited effectiveness as a means
of enforcing participation. "One Akilil man was born, studied and is working in Addis and
was nominated to be a member [of the executive committee] but he rejected saying he is
often out of Addis, so his job prevents him. They wrote to him asking him to change his
mind or to participate whenever he is in Addis. He refused but the Yeka committee did not
take any measures. Sometimes the Yeka committee bases its' activities on their
expectations of the individual, such as their earlier participation."
If participation can be enforced, there are greater obligations for those with greatest
abilities. Gurage citizenship is about contributing everything within one's capacity to the
community. In some ways, the attributes of the altruistic elder act as a point of reference
for leadership. In the discussion of the attributes of leadership above I mentioned that
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informants constantly stressed how these attributes were innate to the individual and
given by god. This may well imply that those who have been given the greatest attributes
also have the greatest responsibility to serve the community. The obligated nature of
leadership, particularly within the sub-committees, grounds leadership's understanding of
the nature of community participation in development. It also affects the nature of
accountability and in particular limits the scope for more formal mechanisms of
accountability, as I shall go on to argue in the next section.
4	 Accountability
The processes of accountability in GPSDO can only be understood in the context of
perceptions of participation in development, and other communal affairs, as sacrifices
which are an element of the obligations that constitute the dominant Gurage notions of
civic virtue. GPSDO has two interrelated sets of mechanisms of accountability: formal
procedures for decision-making and reporting and a web of informal pressures and
expectations imposed on office holders. Formal accountability does little to fetter the
autonomy of the leadership of the sub-committees, as the official sanctions are not
enforceable on leaders, who are 'obliged' to participate. Informal accountability is thus
more important in the sub-committees. Within GPSDO headquarters formal accountability
is potentially more important. However the people who hold the leaders to account are
selected by the sub-committees (albeit with negotiation with urban and rural figures). In
GPSDO, there seemed to be little evidence of informal pressures and, as I discuss below,
when major problems related to accountability occurred, the contestants chose remedies
in the formal sector and in legal recourse. However, it is difficult for an outsider to
comprehend and assess the impact of informal pressures on the leadership, which are
inherently hidden and may operate subconsciously. Indeed even the participants
themselves may not be aware of these processes; I now look in detail at these formal and
informal processes.
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4.1	 Formal mechanisms of accountability
As a registered legal entity the accounts of GPSDO are audited annually by the Auditor
General's office which leads to a perception that there are no financial irregularities. In
theory decision-making about the overall strategies of GPSDO and the sub-committees
are the responsibility of their respective General Assemblies and annual reports by
GPSDO and sub-committees are submitted to their respective general assembly.
However, some inactive sub-committees do not hold regular meetings.
The general assembly of the sub-committees is made up of 55 'permanent members', 50
urban residents and 5 prominent rural elders selected by the sub-committee. However,
every Gurage is considered a member of GPSDO and has a right to attend meetings. The
sub-committees select the permanent members based on past actMsm and financial
contributions to development. The GPSDO general assembly is made up of the 55
permanent members from each of the seven houses. A GPSDO officer explained how the
sub-committees appoint the urban representatives. "Generally anybody who is Gurage
and is a member of a house is by default a member of the sub-committee. He has Idir
here [Addis], two or three Idirs in the area. In some areas, there are 50 or so Idirs and
they are members of the sub-committees. Members of the ldir and the sub-committee
elect members. They have no card or membership fee. They know each other because
they were born together and they live together, they know each other's shops and working
place. They go and select members. The committee selects these people. Usually it is the
most active contributors, as when there is development these people are the ones who
give money and ideas and they are the active members." Thus, the sub-committee
members in negotiation with prominent urban figures, such as ldir leaders selects the
urban people who will hold the committee to account.
The sub-committees also select the five rural representatives, who are the most prominent
elders of the house and represent the house at the Sebat Bet Shango. A sub-committee
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leader commented, "we know who the influential people are.. .there are groups of men on
whom the people have great cult". This was supported by an Enamor farmer who linked
the elders' leadership role in other communal affairs to their role in development. "In
Gurage culture, if someone commits crime, that house will get together. It is already
formulated [for development] so there is no need to change people every time. By culture,
people know that area and they select tribe [house] chiefs and people with better
leadership."
The main purpose of accountability to the general assembly is to ensure that the
leadership does not benefit personally from their position and to ensure equality between
the houses. An elder who participated at the general assemblies commented. "During
elections there is voting, otherwise the committee formulates points and there is
consensus between the committee members, elders and others. It is most important to
reach consensus with the elders"
The effectiveness of potential formal sanctions, such as de-selection from the committee,
is constrained by the obligated nature of leadership. One committee member commented.
"Individual leaders are accountable to the committee. Sometimes the general assembly
will criticise the leaders, for example for poor performance or favouring their own area. But
there is no such official accountability as the leadership is voluntary." Informants
suggested that there was much more competition for places on the GPSDO executive
committee which involves status for the individual concerned and for their community.
Equal representation on the executive committee has long been a point of contention
between the houses and is central to the current leadership's legitimacy, these issues will
be explored in more detail in Chapter 8. The purpose of the GPSDO general assembly is
to decide the overall strategy of GPSDO and to ensure equality between the houses. A
sub-committee member commented. "We were appointed by the general assembly for 2
years, although usually people stay for longer depending on their commitment and the
political situation. Although it is always possible for someone to challenge an incumbent.
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Usually the challenge is between the sub-regional committees for a place on the GPSDO
executive." Again, there is little formal sanction on the GPSDO executive. One informant
stated, "If executive members are not doing well they will be asked to leave. However,
these mechanisms are not as strong as civil servants or shareholders enterprise. A
person is elected in the belief that they will work for their community, so its not common
for a person to be removed for negative reasons usually it is for other reasons, such as
leaving Addis or sickness".
Although this process of accountability appears to be open to abuse, it must be analysed
in the context of the voluntary nature of positions in GPSDO and the sub-committees.
Furthermore, the inter-linked formal and informal processes of accountability should be
analysed as a whole. In the next section I look in more detail at the informal pressures on
the leadership. In Chapter 8, I examine the ways in which criticisms of GPSDO structures
have been articulated.
4.2	 Informal processes of accountability
The informal processes of accountability are by their nature difficult for an outsider, or
indeed an insider, to investigate and interpret. There appear to be two inter-linked
processes at work in the informal mechanisms of accountability: pressures placed on the
leadership by prominent elders and urban dwellers, and the cultural constraints of
appropriate behaviour by which the leadership abide. Informal consultation with prominent
figures is constrained by the voluntary nature of the post. One sub-committee member
commented. "There is no pressure from the elders once you accept your responsibilities
to become a committee member. You become aware of the problems and work to realise
the objectives. Once in position the elders talk to me informally and discuss things. They
consult us, as the elders play a great role in mobilising the people. If there are certain
problems, we will also consult them. This is done informally." The salient aspects of this
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statement are that according to the informant the main pressure is to accept their
obligation to serve and that informal consultation involves less overt pressure. A member
of the Moher sub-committee explained the nature of informal accountability in detail. "It is
natural that I have to be accountable to the traditional institutions, as I am a member of
that community. Since I am Moher I am accountable to the Moher judges [elders at the
Shango] there [Gurageland], the general assembly there [Moher Shango] and also the
Yeka committee here [Addis]. If I do something wrong I will be asked by the Yeka
committee. Informal accountability to traditional institutions is much stronger than the
formal accountability to the sub-committee and GPSDO, as formal accountability has not
yet been practical. The traditional organisations are strong and we are behind traditional
law and traditional judgement so we know what will happen to us if we do something
wrong to the community or if we do not do what is expected of us". This suggests that
informal accountability is related to ensuring that the leadership adhere to the general
values embedded in Gurage citizenship rather than the elders intervening in specific
issues and projects.
An ex-leader of GPSDO stated that elders never overtly attempted to exert pressure on
him over issues, such as the allocation of resources. However, he was aware of the threat
of indigenous sanctions if he did not conform to the appropriate notions of leadership. "In
order to be truly accountable to the community you serve, you must have the confidence
of the people in the first place. It is more dangerous for the individual if we use the
traditional ways, because if he makes a mistake or is not being honest in his dealings or
does not perform what he is supposed to do, then that person is destroyed. But, if it is in
the formal system in the first place it must be accepted and it has to have meaning to you.
In the informal system maybe they do not know the word 'accountability' or 'participation'
but they do participate and they are accountable, because if you use community property
and misaHocate what has been given to you then they are destroyed if they do not
function property". He also acknowledged the power of social expectations of appropriate
leadership in constraining the activities of the leaders. "Those processes that require the
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indMdual to perfomi his tasks may not be minuted or recorded but it is recorded in the
minds of the people that the individual was assigned, even we do not fully understand how
it operates. But, there is definitely accountability there. It may not reflect our wishes or the
way we would like to see it but there is definitely transparency because we have to explain
what we do to the community."
The impact of social expectations, on the activity of the leadership, is difficult for an
outsider to assess. Perceptions of appropriate leadership are framed with reference to the
past, such as previous leaders and the role of rural elders. A moral framework of
obligations and conceptions of justice and equality is embedded within contemporary
constructions of Gurage civic virtue. These constructions include definitions of appropriate
leadership, which act as a point of reference in negotiations between leaders of the
development associations and elders. These constructions are part of defining who the
Gurage are and are thus, embedded within the consciousness. Thus, these perceptions of
appropriate leadership act to self-discipline the leadership.
Whilst indigenous methods are used to recruit office holders, they have a more limited role
in regulating the activities of leaders, who are granted a great deal of autonomy once they
accept office, due to an appreciation of the personal sacrifices made by them. However
there are regular informal discussions between the urban elders and the leadership and it
is acknowledged that if they do not act in the interests of the community they will be liable
to sanctions. The leadership emphasises that these informal mechanisms ensure
accountability to the community through informal discussions with the elders and that this
is more powerful than the formal structures of accountability. The activities of the
leadership are thus constrained by the need for legitimacy with the community,
represented by the elders.
Although these processes are deemed effective at ensuring that the organisations
represent the interests of the community, there are occasions, particulatly for GPSDO,
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where these processes have broken down. In these cases, the informal processes are not
always applied or have not been successful. One of the founders of GRCO stated in
relation to the use of formal legal procedure's rather than the Gurage customary law to
resolve the controversy over holding regular elections. in the constitution [of GPSDO] we
have provisions that are governed by the law of the country and we are also governed by
the culture of Gurages. The cultural measures are very strong steps, they are not easily
done. All other possibilities have to be exhausted. We have been trying to persuade them
[the previous leadership] to understand the risk they were facing but until lately they
always ignored us.. .there are two ways, we abide by the law and culturally. There are
provisions in the civil law for non-profit making organisations to deal with wrongs done to
us. Cultural steps, the sanctions of ostracising them, but to have leadership change it is
more appropriate to use the law as this is where the organisation is registered."
5	 Personalised leadership and effectiveness
I now examine how the legitimacy of indigenous Gurage development agents is based on
the personalised nature of leadership within the development associations and the
effectiveness of the interventions. I argue that structures of accountability and participation
and the legitimacy of the development associations is enhanced by personalised
leadership, while ultimately the legitimacy of the development association is dependent on
its effectiveness. The relationship between personalised leadership and the effectiveness
of the organisation is based on the belief that known personnel will adhere to Gurage
values.
5.1	 Personalised leadership
As I have shown above, the development associations tend to be associated with groups
of prominent urban and rural people in whom much trust is vested. The urban leadership
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and key activists are prominent businessmen and civil servants, who are active in urban
associational life particularly the Idirs. In Gurageland, prominent elders who have much
authority, act as intermediaries between the community and the development
associations. The personalised form of leadership harnesses the informal structures of
accountability discussed above. The sub-committees of GPSDO tend to be identified with
their leaders. The urban-based leaders are highly respected and well known in
Gurageland and within the urban communities. Their participation as leaders of the
development associations is an extension of the wider obligations to the wider community.
Thus, they are regarded as exemplars of Gurage civic virtue and therefore have much
authority based on their activism. Their 'localness' is central to their authority, as the
attributes of leadership are demonstrated by their local actMsm. Thus, they are trusted by
the urban and rural communities to conform to the dominant notions of Gurage
citizenship. An ex leader of MDA stated, "members of the committee in Addis are part of
the rural area, they grew up there and only came to Addis for business. They know the
problems of the area and the proximity of Addis facilitates regular rural visits during which
time they meet rural people and discuss their problems and find solutions." In Moher, most
rural informants were able to identify with key activists in the sub-committee due to their
regular visits and history of activism. A farmer stated, "the Addis Development Committee
is closest to the people, they are people from this area so they understand the problems
and we take our problems to these people." Trust in the leadership is based on their rural
origins and linkages with Guragefand, which demonstrates that they share the values of
the local people. Furthermore, by accepting the obligations of leadership and providing
rural development, they exemplify Gurage civic virtue. An elder stated "they are part of the
community. In the past they went through the same problems as us, then they became
rich in other areas. But they understand this area and help us most of the time." Thus,
leadership in development is seen as fulfilling the social obligations expected of
successful members of the community. A Moher student stated "the Addis Development
Committee is closer to the people [than other organisations] as they were born here and
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take responsibility for the people. This responsibility is to the Moher people in general
rather than to a specific area."
5.2	 Effectiveness of the organisation
The other key factor that contributes to the legitimacy of the leadership and the
relationship of trusteeship between the communities and GPSDO and its sub-committees
is effectiveness in development, outlined in Chapter 5 as tangible public goods, distributed
on the basis of equality between and within houses. The other elements of trusteeship,
such as accountability and participation, usually only become salient in determining the
legitimacy the development associations when they impact on the effectiveness of the
organisations. Thus, it is only when the process of development fails to deliver public
goods equally that dissatisfaction with GPSDO or the sub-committees is articulated.
All non-government informants stressed the services that GPSDO and the sub-
committees had provided to the Gurage communities. A typical example of their views
came from a migrant, 'GPSDO is close to the people because its services are well known.
Before road construction, it took many long hours to walk or ride. Now we can go to the
country and back in one day." These views were repeated by informants of all ages and
occupations in Gurageland and Addis.
It appears that the perception of equal distribution of the benefits of development is more
important than the level of these benefits in determining the legitimacy of development
agencies in Gurageland. In Enamor, even though the committee has barely functioned
since the mid 1990s, the main criticism currently levelled against it is related to the
location of a project implemented in partnership with Save the Children rather than its lack
of other developmental activity. The uneven distribution of benefits was the main criticism
of all government and non-government development agencies operating in Gurageland.
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Informants frequently complained that certain houses and areas within the houses had
been forgotten by these development agencies. Conflict within GPSDO has tended to take
the form of competition for the distribution of resources between houses. In Chapter 8, I
relate this to constructions of Gurage identity. The mechanisms of accountability
discussed above relate primarily to ensuring equality between areas.
In Moher, the Moher Development Association was seen as 'the eyes of the community'
(see Chapter 5) due to its personalised leadership and history of providing benefits to the
area. However, most informants drew a strong distinction between the Moher sub-
committee and GPSDO. This was due to a widespread belief that GPSDO operated in
favour of certain areas at the expense of others, whereas, in Cheza and its environs, there
was a perception the MDA distributed benefits more equally. This was also the basis for
their complaints about the lack of accountability and democracy in GPSDO. One elder
who was a representative at GPSDO General Assembly stated TMAlthough we [Moher]
have representatives on the committee [GPSDO executive] they have no rights as the
chairman decides everything. In the past it was impossible to hold leaders to account, as
from its inception the organisation has operated in favour of Cheha, Enamor, Geta and
Gomer. As things have been done earlier in these areas by the organisation, whenever
the chair wants to do something in their own area they activate their relationship with the
dominant groups against other areas. It is impossible to prevent this." Similar criticisms
were repeated by a wide range of rural informants including a student who stated that,
UGPSDO leaders are not from this area so we are ignored. It has done nothing in Moher.
The only problem is the leaders. Our fathers told us that this area had many chances for
development but the leaders diverted it to other areas." These views express the
interrelationship between the two central aspects of the trusteeship constructed between
GPSDO, its affiliates and the beneficiary communities: 'localness' and equal distribution of
benefits. A leadership staffed by local people, who embody the notions of equality and
fairness embedded in Gurage civic virtue, will ensure that the leaders of other groups
maintain their commitment to these notions.
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GPSDO officials strongly countered criticisms of uneven allocation of resources and
stated GPSDO's only role in implementing development projects was to construct roads
and the order of road construction was based on the level of contributions made by each
area. Most other development work was the responsibility of the sub-committees. Uneven
development was explained by the varying levels of capacity of the leaders of the sub-
committees and the financial capacity of their urban community. An ex-leader stated,
"There was no distribution of funds to the sub-committees under GPSDO. Money is not
distributed. The money collected is used for implementing the programme of GPSDO. The
major funds went for road construction. Roads were built to the different sub regions, now
with the exception of Indegagn all the other houses have their share of road construction.
But money was not distributed to each group." The Moher Development Association
leadership seemed to accept this, a previous leader of the association commented, "The
Moher contributed the least [towards road construction] and got the last road." However
unjustified, there is a perception that benefits are not equally distributed between areas
and this has severely reduced the legitimacy of GPSDO in some areas.
To conclude this section, I have argued that personalised leadership and a perception of
equal distribution of resources are the key factors in the legitimacy of Gurage
development associations and that this can be evidenced from the differing perceptions of
the legitimacy of GPSDO and its sub-committees. However, it should be noted that
special circumstances in the two rural locations might also influence perceptions of the
legitimacy of GPSDO. As discussed in Chapter 7, in Enamor and particularly around
Gunchire there was a great deal of agitation against GPSDO during the I 990s, largely for
political purposes. Although there appeared to have been less political agitation against
GPSDO in Moher, perceptions there may be influenced by antagonisms between some of
the Moher elders and GRCO during the 1 960s. At the beginning of the road construction
phase, the Moher elders attempted to persuade GRCO to change the route of the first
road so that it would pass through Moher. The GRCO executive, on the grounds of cost
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rejected this. Problems between GRCO and rural Moher were further exacerbated when
Moher experienced great difficulties in meeting its financial pledges to GRCO. This was
caused by a contradiction between the organisational structure in Addis, which reflected
house affiliations, with Moher being grouped with Akilil, whereas, in Gurageland the
organisation reflected government administrative districts with Moher being linked with the
Wolenie Gurages, a non Sebat Bet group. Under pressure to match the pledges of other
areas the Moher elders pledged 100, 000 Birr towards road construction, however, it was
not possible to produce this money as Akilil contributed to another area and the Wolenie
refused to contribute. According to GRCO minutes because of this controversy, the Moher
rural elders were rebuked by GRCO and reproached by other Sebat Bet elders (Manam
1972). In the light of this context, the hostility shown towards GPSDO in rural Moher and
Enamor may not be evident in other areas of Gurageland.
6	 GPSDO and NGOs
This chapter has focused on one dimension of the legitimacy of development
organisations, the relationship between the organisation and the community it seeks to
serve. The relationships between GPSDO and its other stakeholders, such as the state,
donors and partner organisations have not been the primary focus of the chapter.
However, I include a brief comment here. Until recently, GPSDO and its affiliates have
drawn almost all of their resources from the Gurage communities and the state. However,
since the removal of its main sources of income, GPSDO and some of its affiliates have
sought support from partners in the international NGO sector, including PACT, OXFAM
and Save the Children. According to its main partner PACT, GPSDO has been an
exemplary partner as it excels in three essential criteria for partnership with community
based organisations. A PACT project officer commented:
They have deep roots in the community: They are controlled by the community.
All the power comes from below, this is a major strength. It has been able to
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survive for 35 years through its strength in a turbulent society and changing politics
and economics."
They have a clear reporting structure: "They have good documentation. They try to
document things, I believe that they spend more time in documentation than in
actually doing things. [Their] culture of documentation is good... [And it] helps
[them] to remain legal."
They are able to match funds: " We use their people to train others in fundraising.
People are very committed to the organisation. Starting from below, they are
committed at all levels. They have the capacity to raise resources locally, which is
not the case with other indigenous organisations. It has the capacity and is doing
so. It raised a lot of money to build schools. However poor the community is they
are very eager to contribute. That is their greatest heritage and capacity."
It seems that with the removal of GPSDO's main source of income, and a perception that
the urban Gurage community has less financial capacity than in the past the sub-
committees and particularly GPSDO will have to rely more on outside support. Increased
interactions with mainstream development associations may well lead them to re-orientate
their approach to participation and accountability. However, the statement of the PACT
project officer above suggests that, at present their partners are supportive of the form of
trusteeship constructed between GPSDO and the Sebat Bet Gurage communities.
7	 Conclusions
Community participation in development contributes to the legitimacy of the development
agencies and the intervention primarily by increasing the effectiveness of the project. This
reflects the perception, outlined in Chapter 5, that development is a set of tangible
outcomes rather than a process. Although consultation of the rural community secures
acceptance of projects, the most salient outcome of consultation is that it legitimises a
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range of processes which facilitate resource mobilisation. For urban contributors, rural
participation in development is crucial as it demonstrates the worthiness of the rural
community to receive their assistance and assures urban stakeholders that the rural
people will sustain the project. Community participation in development reflects urban
rural relationships within the Gurage communities, particularly the obligations on migrants.
Hence, it entails rural dependence, passivity and deference to the skills and knowledge of
the urban sectors of the community. The dominant development discourses are
underpinned by an assumption that community participation in development is an
essential aspect of the process of development. However, whilst the dominant
development discourses view this participation as being part of a process of
empowerment, Gurages see participation as a burden that is a willingly accepted aspect
of their wider communal obligations. Contrary to the development discourses, the nature
of community participation in the organisation has little direct bearing on communal
support for the organisations. The most important aspects of the process of development,
in secunng legitimacy, are the ways that they impact on the outcomes of development -
tangible public goods distributed on the basis of equality.
Through personalised leadership, which embodies an idealised form of Gurage
citizenship, the development associations are seen as being of the community and
representing the community. Thus, participation in decision-making is largely the
responsibility of the leaders of the development association. Accountability is based on a
complex interrelationship of formal mechanisms and informal pressures, which are
underpinned by expectations of appropriate leadership embedded in Gurage notions of
civic virtue. The central argument of the chapter can be summed up by the words of a
merchant and farmer in Cheza Sefa.
"The Addis Development Committee have done many things in this area and
compared to the others [GPSDO, GZDA and the government] this group are the
closest to the people. Rural people do not have the economic capacity, but the
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people from Addis do. The Addis Development Committee understands the
problems of the people because they meet with the rural people. They are close to
the community because they help people."
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Chapter 7
The relationships between Guracie development organisations and the state
Introduction
In this chapter, I provide some historical background to the evolution of GPSDO and in
particular its relationship to the state. This provides the historical and political contexts for
contemporary constructions of Gurage identities and the relationship between GPSDO
and the Sebat Bet Gurage community. While this chapter is a break in the discussion of
Gurage constructions of development and their relationship to ethnic identities, it is
important to understand the historical forms of accommodation that GRCO/GPSDO have
had with the Ethiopian state and the issues that these accommodations now present to
the role of ethnically-based organisations. I thus trace the evolution of the relationship
between GRCOIGPSDO and the Imperial and Derg regimes from the establishment of the
organisation in 1961 to the assumption of power by EPRDF in 1991. The histories
presented here are based on current narratives provided by Gurage elites and
intellectuals and historical insider accounts based on GRCO I GPSDO documentation
produced by Gurage intellectuals linked to GPSDO, such as (Bereka 1986; Mariam 1972;
Neri undated). The chapter outlines how they have interpreted the historical position of
GRCO I GPSDO, and its accommodations with the Ethiopian state, and how they make
sense of contemporary events. I then outline how the accommodations with the state
established during the imperial and Derg regimes broke down during EPRDF rule, and
relate this to ideological differences between the competing models of development of
GPSDO and the government. I focus particularly on the contradiction between the
government vision of self-sufficient rural development and the urban rural relationships
inherent in Gurage survival strategies and exemplified by GPSDO. I also argue that the
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conflict is related to the government's perception of the practical processes needed to
implement its vision of development in Gurageland.
2	 Historical constructions
2.1	 Accommodations with the imperial regime
According to Gurage oral traditions, the Gurages have a long history of rural self-help
initiatives. This has included clan and village based institutions, group labour in
agricultural production and village level projects such as Jafforo (the village street)
clearance and bridge building. Indeed, Pankhurst and Endrias (1958) suggested that the
two most significant Ethiopian non-government institutions, Ikube and Idir have Gurage
origins.
The history of formal Sebat Bet Gurage development organisations began soon after the
end of the Italian occupation when rural Gurage elders attempted to establish a road
construction organisation. This initiative failed because the governor of the Sebat Bet
Awraja (Imperial administrative unit) thought that the proposed organisation was politically
motivated. In addition, the Gurage elders were constrained by their limited links with
educated urban dwellers, which resulted in a lack of organisatiorial capacity, skilled
personnel, limited political influence, and a relatively weak financial base.
With the increase in Gurage migration, their financial base and supporting networks
improved, including their forms of accommodation with the state. During the Imperial and
Derg regimes, the survival and effectiveness of GRCO/GPSDO was largely due to
accommodations made by the Gurage urban and rural elites with the two regimes. The
official Gurage development discourse suggests that the key element was that the
organisation officially distanced itself from political activity. However, in practice
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GRCO/GPSDO was promoted by patrons who were strategically placed within the state.
Its activities were broadly in line with government policy, which allowed it to serve the
interests of different sections of government, and it engaged with rural power structures,
which were deemed legitimate by the regimes. I look at these elements in turn.
According to the official and semi-official histories of GPSDO / GRCO, such as (Bereka
1986; Mariam 1972; Neri undated), by the early I 960s the rural elders had gained the
support of a more sympathetic governor, and together they contacted prominent Gurage
figures in the military and civil service, suggesting that without assistance from their 'Sons
in Addis' it would be impossible to establish a road construction organisation to serve the
rural areas. These senior figures included: General Wolde Sellasie Bereka, the first
president of GRCO, Seifu Dibabie, a senior civil servant and deputy minister of transport,
and Fitawirari Habte Mariam, a provincial governor, who was close to both the royal family
and the prime minister. This alliance, which occurred in the aftermath of the attempted
coup of 1960, linked the rural power structure of prominent elders and administrators with
prominent urban Gurages. Moreover, the imperial regime attempted to tie these groups to
the state by giving them a personal and communal stake in government. This process
seems to have opened political space and facilitated an expansion of associational life.
Several prominent military officers were rewarded for their loyalty and were permitted to
become leaders of ethnically-based development organisations, including in Gurageland,
GRCO and AWRCA. The latter organisation was analysed in depth by Gedamu (1972).
The channels used by these individuals to promote GRCO took two forms: access to
powerful circles in the court, and access to ministries. They enabled Gurages to allay
fears of politicisation and to ensure that government ministries acted in accordance with
the emperor's directives to support the organisation.
During this period, the central government promoted what it called modemisation,
however, there were no government-backed agencies with the capacity to carry it out.
200
However, by the early 1960s, it became clear that the government did not have the
capacity to satisfy developmental needs, which created some public dissatisfaction. "The
government conceded that it could not accomplish all that was required.. .by doing so, it
avoided pressure and criticism and put the onus of development on the people" (Gedamu
1972 p189). The government therefore encouraged civil servants and military officers to
initiate and lead development associations. The activities of GRCO were thus not
autonomous from the state. It worked in partnership with government agencies,
particularly the imperial highway authority. The primary role of GRCO was to mobilise
resources and to select the starting and finish point of the roads. The road construction
authority controlled other aspects of decision-making such as, the route of the roads and
implementation. Therefore, the interests of the ministry of transport were served by
supporting an organisation, which provided it with a great deal of paid work and reduced
its costs. The localised successes of GRCO also reflected well on the government
administrators.
The ability of GRCO to overcome obstacles to its aim of road construction was also
dependent on the relationships established between the urban Gurage elite, the state and
the rural power structure of Balebbats and elders. In Gurageland, the organisation was
structured into four rural sub-committees, mirroring the rural administration, rather than
seven sub-committees, reflecting Gurage house affiliations. The key personnel in the rural
areas were the Balebbats and, to a lesser extent, clan heads who regularly met with the
Addis-based committees and collected money. Their role in mobilising resources for
GRCO reflected their position within the rural government structures, where their primary
functions were as tax collectors and agents of social control. Thus, the structures of
GRCO reflected rural power relations, and both reinforced their legitimacy in the eyes of
the community through providing benefits, and facilitated new linkages between them and
the urban elite.
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In the urban areas, GRCO also engaged with urban sectors deemed legitimate by the
government. The clan and house-based Idirs were the key access point used to harness
urban resources. During this period, Idirs were used by the government as agents of
urban development, social control and to provide linkages between residentially-based
communities and local government structures (Ottaway, 1976).
The main fear of the imperial government was of political opposition. While GRCO
avoided becoming involved in anti-government activities, an Oromo organisation, the
Macha Tulama association, by contrast embarked on a programme of politicisation of the
Oromo population, which culminated in an attempted coup in 1968 (Hassen 1998).
Although these events seem to have had little bearing on the relationship between GRCO
and the government, there is a more theoretical issue of whether raising ethnic
consciousness can be considered as political activity or not. For example, Gedamu (1972)
broadens a definition of political activity to include increasing ethnic consciousness or
ethnic divisiveness. However, the term 'raising ethnic consciousness' is ambiguous.
Promoting the ethnic group's self image was a key motivation for GRCO's activities,
particularly to challenge some of the negative stereotypes often assigned to Gurages,
which are discussed in Chapter 4. Contemporary Gurages distinguish this from generating
politically motivated ethnic sentiment
2.2 GRCOIGPSDO and the Derg
During the Derg, much independent organisational life was suppressed. However, GRCO
managed to survive and eventually prosper by adhering to the principles outlined above.
This is largely due to the political astuteness and commitment to development of the
Gurage elite. Superficially, it seems surprising that an organisation largely dependent on
its personalised linkages with the imperial state developed an accommodation with a
radically different regime. However, this demonstrates that the organisation had managed
202
to maintain a degree of autonomy from the state. Although the organisation used the
networks of pivotal individuals, co-operated with government departments and used the
imperial rural power structures, it was not directly associated with the government. Gurage
intellectuals have constructed a particular history of the transition from imperial to Derg
rule, which acts as a point of reference and informed the organisation's approach to the
new EPRDF government in the early 1990s.
At the time of the revolution, the organisation was wealthy because of its access to rural
and urban resources and its own income-generating schemes, such as a monopoly of
public transport on the roads it constructed and charging tolls for private use. It also had
access to influential networks and had strong linkages with the rural areas. Gurages
believed that the Derg regarded GRCO as a potential threat. For example, someone who
had been a Worreda administrator during the Derg period commented, "in the beginning it
[the Derg] opposed the organisation, as it was suspicious of what their real objectives
were. The organisation united the Gurages and collected much money so the government
was suspicious. But due to wise people they were able to continue."
These strengths also made it a prime target for take-over by other politicised sectors in
order to use the structure of the organisation as a political vehicle. There was a great deal
of hostility to the old guard of GRCO leaders, who were labelled as reactionary and
corrupt by politicised students. According to official Gurage histories, an alliance of elders,
prominent civil servants and some students were able to resist these attempts at
politicisation (Mariam 1972; Bereka 1986). Although the organisation was largely inactive
in the aftermath of the revolution, this resistance to politicisation and support from the
Gurage elite enabled it to survive the red terror, a period of backlash against politicised
organisations.
Official Gurage histories relate the survival of GRCO and the termination of AWRCA by
the Derg, to their differing legal statuses. According to these discourses, two Gurage road
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construction organisations were established because the other Gurages proposed to
establish a share company rather than a non-profit organisation. This led AWRCA to be
nationalised by the Derg, whereas GRCO as a genuine community development
organisation was allowed to continue. However, the role of the old Gurage elite in the
post-revolutionary period is an extremely sensitive subject, and few informants were
willing to discuss this period in any detail. Some Gurage intellectuals attribute the differing
fates of GRCO and AWRCA to the differing autonomy of their respective leaders from the
imperial regimes. According to Gedamu, General Yilma, the leader of AWRCA and
executed by the Derg, was head of the imperial security apparatus, whereas General
Bereka, leader of GRCO was an "honest soldier" (personal communication Nov 2000).
During the Derg period, a new Gurage state-based elite developed. This group maintained
connections with the old elite and promoted GRCO in a similar way using their
personalised linkages with the Derg leadership and within the ministries. The leader of
GRCO from 1980-89 explained his role in the organisation. "At first we (Gurages with
political connections] supported the organisation and kept it free from political activity. The
leaders were getting my legal advice on an unofficial basis. Later when things were
getting worse, i.e. the red terror, we wanted to save the organisation. By then, I was a
Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, perhaps I was one of the senior officers of the
government. So I was asked to be chairman rather than informal advisor. I accepted and
took the chairmanship. This was through elections at a General Assembly. From the early
history, the organisation's success was dependent on the closeness of people like the
General to the emperor. Always you need powerful backing from the government side,
otherwise you are nowhere. People were thinking that since I was a Supreme Court judge
and knew many people, like the Chief Justice and Ato Emanuel Michael, one of the chief
advisors of the Derg, this meant that the organisation had many friends."
In addition to the leader, many sub-committees used their links with well placed civil
servant to promote the organisation. For example, an Enamor Gurage, Lemar Argau, was
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Auditor General in both the Derg and EPRDF periods, and has acted as an unofficial
intermediary between GPSDO and the state for 20 years. Although he has never held
office in GPSDO, he has used informal channels to lobby for both GPSDO, over taxation
issues and the Enamor committee, over high school construction, and the electrification of
Gunchire. Similar processes were apparent in other sub-committees, for example, the
Moher committee used a prominent Moher civil servant to lobby the provincial governor
and education ministry to support the construction of a high school in Moher during the
Derg period. Prominent urban Gurages and the leaders invested much time and effort in
demonstrating the development orientation of the organisation to civil servant and
government figures by taking them on tours of development sites. The elite used their
contacts in the cabinet and ministries to maintain the concessions granted to GRCO by
the imperial regime, such as tax exemption for the transport operation, a 35% subsidy on
road construction and legal recognition. According to contemporary accounts, the leaders
continued to avoid political activity. However, between 1989 and 1998 the executive
committee included members of the Worker's Party of Ethiopia (WPE), the political party
established by the Derg. This may partially account for the current regime's suspicion of
GPSDO, which I return to below.
Even though GRCO attempted to maintain political neutrality, during the initial stages of
the Derg, the previous agents of GRCO in the rural areas, the Balebbats, and some of the
clan heads, were labelled as reactionary and dispossessed of their lands so many fled the
countryside. Critically, the Gurage elite constructed a new accommodation with the state,
which took a similar form to that with the imperial regime. GRCO sought new partners in
the rural areas and engaged with the new legitimate structures, the PAs and the Worreda
development sub-committees. The members of the Worreda development sub-
committees became ex-officio members of GRCO and 'permanent members' (see
Chapter 6) of the general assemblies of the sub-committees. GRCO and the sub-
committees used the PAs and elders, approved by the government, to mobilise rural
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resources. This process reinforced the linkages between the indigenous and state
sectors, legitimised the PAs and enhanced the status of the government-approved elders.
The personal motivations of the Worreda officials seemed to be a crucial determinant of
the success of GRCO during this period. The Worreda leaders directed all local agencies
to co-operate and mobilised rural resources. Many informants, who were active in GRCO
during this period, suggested that the relationship between a district administrator in
Enamor and the Enamor sub-committee of GRCO exemplified the positive outcomes of a
long-term interaction between a committed sub-committee and supportive government
officials. This Worreda administrator is still remembered with affection by the rural
community in Enamor.
"I was district administrator in Enamor from 1971-75 [1978-83 AD]. When I arrived
there were no roads. The roads were constructed [by GRCO] according to which
house contributed the most. So the Worreda development committee, EDC
members and I went to GRCO to lobby for construction of a road. The Worreda
development committee had some money and we handed it over to GRCO
headquarters and mobilised the people in Enamor to pay more. We also contacted
various GRCO committees, such as the executive in Addis to lobby for our road.
The Worreda development committee and EDC went to Addis and presented the
case to the Enamor General Assembly and discussed how much money had been
handed over and what to do. When they saw that they were entitled to have a road
constructed, they contacted the executive committee. The EDC in the countryside
and Worreda development committee submitted the money and joined with the
Addis EDC to persuade the executive that it was their turn. The executive went to
the highway authority and they brought equipment to the region and built the road.0
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In addition, there was lobbying by prominent individuals of government departments and
Worreda offices for individual development projects, as well as to persuade them that the
organisation was not politically motivated. In addition, Worreda leaders lobbied GRCO
and engaged with the organisation on its own terms, while sub-committees and the
executive of GRCO often invited the Worreda leaders to Addis to discuss development,
and the sub-committees would ask permission of the Worreda and PA leaders before
holding meetings in the rural areas.
Another example comes from one of my fieldwork sites, Moher, where a close relationship
developed between the PAs and the urban and rural committees of GRCO during the late
Derg period. The Moher rural development committee was made up of PA leaders and
prominent elders. At the fall of the Derg, when the future of the PAs was uncertain, the PA
leaders signed over the assets of the PAs to the rural development committee for safe
keeping.
However, like the imperial regime, the Derg claimed to be promoting modernisation in
Ethiopia yet lacked the financial capacity to do so. As GRCO was the only autonomous
community development organisation, it was in the interests of the government to support
the organisation, as it helped to project the government's image as a facilitator of rural
development. GRCO's projects were shown to representatives of international financial
institutions and other donors when they visited Ethiopia. This relationship gave GRCO
some negotiating strength with the government. A GPSDO leader during the 1 980s
commented, "the Derg wanted to get international money from the IMF, World Bank and
UN Development Fund. These institutions were encouraging rural development, so
whenever the foreign officials came to Ethiopia, the Derg took them to Gurageland to
show how they encouraged public development. That was the main reason why the Derg
was supporting GRCO. In fact, we were exploiting this situation. Whenever problems
arose we would say, 'this is the only organisation run by the public, helping the
government do its job in providing rural infrastructure'". Many urban Gurages suggested
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that the organisation received the personal support of Mengistu, as it was an example of
community development initiatives and rural socialism, therefore Mengistu directed
ministries to assist the organisation. Moreover, the Gurage elite adopted the pseudo-
socialist discourses of the Derg, portraying the activities of GRCO as co-operation
(Bereka 1986).
The interests of local as well as national government were also served by supporting
GRCO. Worreda leaders could increase their prestige in the eyes of the community and
government by ensuring that development projects were sited in their area. Derg cadres,
who were drawn from the peasantry and rural teachers, were generally supportive of
GRCO, as they desired access to ORCO services for personal reasons and prestige.
GRCO's planning process also provided incentives for the local government to co-
operate. The rural and urban communities had already contributed to GRCO's first road,
from Welkite to Endibire, on the basis that these contributions and their ongoing tolls
would be used to construct roads in other Sebat Bet areas. Thus, there was much
pressure on local state representatives to assist GRCO in order to receive the benefits of
activities they had already contributed to.
2.3	 Contestation, continuity and change during the Imperial and Derg regimes
This account is intended to illuminate contemporary understandings of the history of
GPSDO, not to provide an accurate reflection of events that happened 20-30 years ago.
The central aspect is that all informants presented these discourses as facts that could be
detected as points of reference when informants discussed contemporary events.
During the imperial regime, the major fear of the government was that the organisation
would become a focus point for anti-government activity. The GRCO leadership
suggested that the government was particularly suspicious of organisations that used
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mass rallies and there were fears that the resources collected in the rural and urban areas
could be used to obtain weapons. Current Gurage discourses suggest that some
bureaucrats in the rural areas feared that road construction would lead to a circumvention
of their authority and that increased travel would destabilise the rural areas. Conversely,
these rural officials feared that easing communication would also fetter their autonomy
from central government. According to these discourses, most of the problems
encountered by GRCO seemed to be at local government level. However, they were
overcome by the connections that the prominent leaders had with contacts at the political
centre and within the ministries. These two issues, the ability to circumvent rural political
authority if problems arose and the relationship between the Gurage elite and the state
being stronger at the political centre than at the periphery, are ways of using the past to
construct an understanding of contemporary events.
The urban elite was thus able to use its position to facilitate the foundation of the
organisation during a period of associational expansion. The elite was able to ensure that
GRCO evolved into an organisation form deemed appropriate by both regimes. This
imperial period of associational expansion was, however, also characterised by high
levels of government suspicion and was tightly controlled. This pattern of civil society
exhibits many similarities to the relationship between other African governments and
associational life (Woods 1994). In the process of road construction, GRCO became a
vehicle for binding the central government, rural power structure, and the urban elite. This
involved both vertical and horizontal integration of ethnic groups into the state. The civil
service and particularly military elites were integrated horizontally with other members of
the elite and regime through a system managed by court controlled patronage. These
ethnic elites were vertically integrated with their respective ethnic or sub-ethnic
constituencies through these associations and thus tied the group to the state. The
organisation can be seen as institutionalising linkages across spatial divisions between
urban and rural Gurages and class cleavages between the elite and the wider population.
The organisation also facilitated the development of new linkages between the Sebat Bet
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elites from differing clans and houses. Gedamu (1972) implies a similar process with
respect to the role of the Kistane Gurage elite in AWRCA. He suggests that, AWRCA
provided a structure for the elites to increase their prestige in the eyes of both the court
and the Kistane Gurage community. However, due o political considerations he was not
explicit. More recently, he has suggested that, uGeneral Yilma enhanced his position
through the organisation. Whilst he was building loyalty for the emperor, he was
feudalising the area through distributing titles etc. In my thesis, I did not stress this, as at
the time support for the feudal regime was dwindling and other groups like the forerunner
of OLF were moving for secession. The Gurage organisations were exemplary, using the
emperor as patron and building loyalty for him and his regime" (personal communication,
Nov 2000).
3	 Contemporary governmental relationships
One would expect that an ethnically-based development association, which had survived
two repressive, authoritarian dictatorships, would flourish under ethnically-based
pluralism. However, this has been far from the case for a variety of reasons related to
government strategies of domination, and contradictions between Gurage migratory
survival strategies and EPRDF ideology. By the late 1990s, the organisation was in crisis.
The relationship between GPSDO and the government during the EPRDF era deviated
significantly from the patterns of accommodation discussed above. This has severely
impaired the ability of GPSDO to operate effectively. The salient issues are:
1. GPSDO became associated with an opposition political party.
2. The government established a competing development association, based on a
different model of development. Thus, the interests of the government are no longer
served by promoting GPSDO.
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3. The government opposes the urban rural relationships embedded within the structure
and orientation of GPSDO.
4. The house and Sebat Bet affiliations that form the basis of association of GPSDO are
regarded by the government as parochial and sub-ethnic and thus inappropriate.
5. The networks of influence previously used by urban Gurages to promote GPSDO are
less effective under the new federal structure.
3.1	 Gurage Political representation
At the time of the EPRDF military victory in 1991, Gurages unlike other ethnic groups
were not represented by any formal political organisations, leaving GPSDO as the only
Gurage mass organisation. At this time, EPRDF invited all ethnic groups to form political
parties to represent them in the transitional assembly. Prominent members of GPSDO
had been involved in an Addis-based study group of Gurage intellectuals, which had been
meeting regularly at GPSDO headquarters. This group formed the basis of the new
political party, the Gurage Peoples Democratic Front (GPDF). The first programme of the
GPDF included several policies based on the perceived interests of Gurages, which were
contrary to core principles of EPRDF. These policies included opposition to ethnically-
based federalism and Eritrean independence and support for the introduction of the
private ownership of land.
The party received mass support and funding from urban Gurages and became the
cornerstone of an alliance of parties from southern Ethiopia, which quickly became the
second largest political grouping in the transitional assembly.
Although the leaders claimed to make a clear distinction between their roles in GPSDO
and GPDF, the party initially used GPSDO headquarters for meetings and its facilities for
printing. Furthermore, the networks of sub-committees and Idirs were used for mobilising
the urban population and penetrating the rural areas. There was also some suspicion that
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GPSDO resources were channelled to the party, although the leadership vehemently deny
this and point out that the organisation's accounts were audited by the Auditor General's
office.
In addition to the connections between the GPSDO leadership and GPDF, certain
prominent members of some of the sub-committees were also active in GPDF. These
groups campaigned in the rural areas and attempted to reinforce the legitimacy of the
party in Gurageland by emphasising the contributions GPSDO had made to the rural
areas. This should be distinguished from using GPSDO as a political vehicle, as these
groups used the status gained through their years of sacrifice for the rural community to
promote their political ambitions. In some areas, political activists used GPSDO's
networks, such as the links with prominent elders and clan heads that had been GPSDO's
rural representatives, to mobilise rural support.
Prior to its military victory, the TPLF had created 'sister' organisations amongst many non-
Tigrayan ethnic groups, however, they had no structure in Gurageland and their Gurage
representatives were relatively unknown and thus lacked legitimacy. Following their
established pattern, the EPRDF created a parallel organisation, the Gurage People's
Revolutionary Democratic Movement (from 1998 the Gurage Zone Nationalities
Democratic Movement (GZNDM)), in order to contest power in Gurageland. According to
urban Gurages, initially GPDF was popular, however GZNDM had access to greater
resources in the rural areas. For political purposes, it became necessary to de-legitimise
GPSDO in order to undermine GPDF. Therefore, in the context of a widespread
perception that the internal workings of GPSDO were not transparent, GZNDM cadres
were able to mobilise rural suspicions about alleged corruption and a lack of accountability
within GPSDO. Although the competition between the two parties did not degenerate into
violence, there are allegations of a great deal of intimidation of GPDF and GPSDO
supporters. When they attempted to hold meetings about development issues in
Gurageland, the leaders of GPSDO and General Wolde Sellasie Bereka, possibly the
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most respected Sebat Bet Gurage, were arrested at gunpoint, imprisoned and only
released after the personal intervention of the vice-president of Ethiopia.
3.2 Government sanctions
As a result of the conflict with the government, GPSDO and some of the sub-committees
have been prevented from holding rural meetings in Gurageland. This has constrained its
ability to consult the rural communities and secure legitimacy for development
interventions. In some areas, meetings to ratify the changes to Ya Kitcha were also
prohibited by the government. As discussed in Chapter 5, this led to tensions within urban
and rural Sebat Bet Gurage communities and within GPSDO. After undermining GPSDO's
rural base by cutting its linkages with the rural areas and achieving a decisive electoral
victory in Gurageland, it seems that the EPRDF government then sought to eliminate
GPSDO's financial base. In 1998, GPSDO was prevented from charging tolls for using
roads in Sebat Bet Gurageland and the monopoly of public transport in the area held by
GPSDO's bus company was also lifted. This occurred at the culmination of a period of
intense internal conflict within GPSDO and it is possible that the government assumed
that the organisation would cease to exist.
This move by government seems to have received widespread support in the rural areas.
Rural informants suggested that it has increased competition, which is perceived to have
reduced transportation costs for people and goods. However, it took place after a great
deal of agitation against GPSDO related to alleged corruption, inefficiency, lack of
transparency and accountability to the rural people. The government also justified its
actions on the grounds that it has taken responsibility for road maintenance and that due
to the alleged corruption and lack of accountability, GPSDO no longer provided significant
benefits in return for the revenue it generated.
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While this effectively destroyed GPSDO's financial base, the sub-committees have other
independent sources of income. Furthermore, through ending the revenue generated by
tolls, the long term mismanagement and corruption within the bus company and toll
collection agency was exposed. The bus company seems to have been given
unfavourable access to transport routes, as until late 1999 only two of GPSDO's fleet of
20 buses were operating at any one time, although this could also be related to a tack of
adequate repairs. The organisation has been made liable for a tax backlog of 2 million Birr
(approximately £185,000), a figure greater than its assets. The leadership of GPSDO
suggests that if these tax obligations are enforced the organisation will be bankrupt. Some
well-placed patrons are discretely attempting to lobby for the tax exemption to be upheld.
GPSDO is not the only development organisation to have experienced difficulties in its
relationship with the Gurageland administration. The Catholic Secretariat, which had
provided a range of development projects, such as micro finance and natural resource
conservation, was expelled from Gurageland in 1998. This action was supported by elders
from Cheha, their main base, although there are suggestions of some intimidation. The
zone authorities claim that the organisation fostered dependency through its use of food
for work programmes, which have been prohibited. However, these methods are still
widely used in many other areas of Ethiopia.
With the exception of partnerships with Save the Children and Oxfam, GPSDO is no
longer allowed to undertake development activities in Gurageland. However, this
prohibition seems to have been interpreted in different ways across Gurageland. There is
a great deal of variation between Worredas in the relationship between the sub-
committees and the state authorities. The relationships between the sub-committees and
the state now vary between outright prohibition on any form of rural activity and active
partnerships with the Worreda authorities. Certain sub-committees, notably Eza and
Gomer, are involved in large-scale development projects in partnership with their
respective Worredas. For example, the Eza sub-committee is involved in constructing a
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technical school on land owned by the Worreda. As noted previously, the Moher rural sub-
committee is composed of prominent elders and PA leaders.
There seems to be a tendency for government to differentiate between GPSDO and its
sub-committees, which it regards as 'tribal associations'. Thus, many of the sub-
committees are still active, and there seems to be a degree of confusion at the Worreda
level over the relationship between GPSDO and the sub-committees. For example, when
discussing the relationship between the Eza Development Association and the Worreda
authorities in Eza, the Worreda leaders appeared unaware that this organisation is a sub-
committee of GPSDO or that its leader is currently the president of GPSDO. This could be
due to a lack of knowledge of the structure of GPSDO particularly at the Worreda level as
many informants at this level were unable to determine which of the plethora of house,
clan, village and kinship-based development associations operating in Gurageland were
affiliated to GPSDO.
However, the crucial issue is probably the differential perceptions of the legitimacy of
GPSDO and its affiliates in the eyes of the rural communities. The sub-committees,
composed of known local men in regular contact with the rural population using
personalised leadership and providing benefits are seen as more legitimate than GPSDO.
Furthermore in some areas, GPSDO is unpopular due to transport problems, rumours of
corruption and internal disputes that either reflect or harness inter-house competition. In
the rural areas, criticisms were usually directed towards GPSDO rather than the sub-
committees.
In section 2, I argued that GRCO's legitimacy was enhanced by making accommodations
with state-backed rural institutions during the Derg and imperial eras. The differing
relationships between the various sub-committees and the government is reflected in their
differing relationships with the GZNDM-dominated PAs. In Moher, the Development
Committee has been much more successful during the EPRDF regime than in previous
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periods. This contrasts dramatically with the situation in Enamor. In Moher, the
development committee (MDC) continued with its relationships established under the
Derg. It maintained its direct engagement with the PA leaders who in conjunction with
MDC established a rural sub-committee of known elders and PA leaders, which conferred
with the MDC and co-ordinated the PAs efforts in the high school construction. The
telephone project was also based on a partnership of the PAs, the MDC and rural Idirs.
MDC has also been involved in lobbying the Worreda and zone officials over the siting of
water and health facilities. Some committee members claim that the Worreda uses MDC
networks to mobilise the rural population in government-sponsored projects. There is a
significant difference between Moher and the area around Gunchire in the relationship
between state and indigenous institutions. In Moher, the government uses Idirs and the
rural sub-committee to mobilise the population in government-initiated development
interventions. The PAs also use Idirs and Shango sanctions for development and other
purposes.
The relationship between the Enamor Development Committee (EDC) and the Enamor
Worreda is much more challenging and, with the exception of partnerships with
international NGOs, it does not seem to have been active during the EPRDF period.
According to pro-government sources, prominent members of the committee attempted to
mobilise the rural community in support of GPDF and faced a great deal of hostility from
the rural population. Few actMsts in the EDC were prepared to discuss their relationship
with the government other than saying that it was a sensitive issue but was improving.
One activist who was sentenced to death by the Derg stated, "we went there [Enamor] to
work during the Derg period as if going through fire, without being afraid of being burned.
We were called many names, such as reactionaries. We were sometimes put in prison,
but we went there. Now we do not have any work, as the government has killed all our
initiatives." The leadership claim that the organisation has the capacity and motivation to
implement wide-ranging development but have been prevented from doing this by the
government. However, due to internal factors such as the death and illness of prominent
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activists, the Addis-based committee for Enamor meets rarely and their first urban
General Assembly for several years attracted only 20 participants.
3.3 Competing models of development
An additional dimension to this contested arena is that a new Gurage organisation, the
Gurage Development Association, was formed in 1992, becoming the Gurage Zone
Development Association (GZDA) in 1998. The organisation was formed by GZNDM.
GZDA has had a significant impact on relationships between GPSDO and the state. For
the first time, there was direct competition with another 'indigenous' development
association operating in Gurageland. The following comments are based on the views of
the informants I spoke to about this development. It is not the place of this thesis to pass
judgement on GZDA's activities.
The activities of GZDA reflect the government's perception of the needs of the rural
Gurage community, particularly the government's focus on increasing the productive
capacity of the rural population to limit migration ) especially of children, and to reduce
dependence on urban kin. Therefore, government and GZDA development endeavours
tend to focus on natural resource conservation and improving agricultural techniques in
order to achieve rural self-sufficiency. I argued in Chapter 5 that indigenous perceptions of
the purpose of development reflect Gurage migratory survival strategies and that the
nature of development for Gurages was to facilitate or modernise their survival strategies.
However, the government's perception of the needs of rural Gurages contradicts the
urban-rural relationships that underpin their survival strategies, as it focuses on increasing
the productive capacity of Gurageland.
The different conceptions of appropriate urban rural relationships are also apparent in the
organisational structures of GZDA and GPSDO. GZDA claims to have established
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permanent rural structures in order to build the capacity of the rural population to identify
local needs and produce solutions. However, currently GZDA is focusing on establishing
its rural organisational structure and undertaking natural resource conservation under the
direction of government extension workers rather than building the capacity of the grass
roots of the organisation.
The essence of the government critique of GPSDO can be summarised in the statement
of a GZDA activist who suggested that it should be renamed 'the Sebat Bet Gurages living
in Addis Ababa development organisation'. This links two of the overarching criticisms of
GPSDO: that its basis of association is inappropriate as it only represents the interests of
Sebat Bet Gurages, and secondly that it is dominated by urban dwellers. I briefly outline
the substance of these critiques and then look at the GPSDO response in relation to
Sebat Bet Gurage identities and discourses around ethnicity and development.
As GPSDO is based on house and Sebat Bet identities, it is perceived by the government
as not representing the interests of all Gurages. GPSDO is seen as reflecting and possibly
exacerbating divisions within the ethnic group, such as those between Sebat Bet and
other Gurages and between the Sebat Bet houses. Internal competition within GPSDO
can take the form of house-based conflict, however as I discuss in Chapter 8, this is
related to the ways in which grievances are articulated by relating them to historical
issues. This is linked to government perceptions, that house, clan and other associations
are essentially parochial and competitive. Government and party officials stressed that the
lack of co-ordination between different indigenous development associations had led to
the replication of services, such as roads and schools. However whilst government
officials and others provide a long list of projects where services have been replicated and
resources allegedly wasted, few if any of these involved GPSDO or its affiliates.
In the government discourse, the uneven development of Gurageland is seen as a
consequence of the activities of GPSDO, as certain areas are portrayed as benefiting at
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the expense of others. However uneven development seems a logical consequence of
self-help, as those areas who are able to help themselves can become involved in
virtuous circles of development, whilst the less developed areas become marginalised.
Differential rates of development in Sebat Bet Gurageland can be explained by the
historically advantageous access to education in Cheha and the wealth of certain clans.
The government discourse harnesses the way that discontent with GPSDO over the
allocation of resources has been articulated as competition between houses (see Chapter
8), and then juxtaposes it with the pan-Gurage ideology of GZDA. The government
discourse is rooted in an interrelation between ideological distrust of 'parochial' affiliations
as the basis of political and social organisation, and practical preferences for territorially-
based organisations, where the scope of organisations' activities matches government
administrative units. The government desires a pan-Gurage development organisation
that is structured according to Worredas rather than house affiliations. This would facilitate
control by the government and party, which would accommodate the government's
territorially based planning process.
A PA leader in Enamor commented, "once they [the Enamor Development Committee]
came here and they were told, 'development doesn't start from the towns but from here'".
This reflects the second major criticism of GPSDO, that it is dominated by urban Gurages.
This criticism reflects EPRDF emphasis on rural self-sufficiency and the government
perception of the appropriate urban-rural relationships, which, as discussed above,
contradicts Gurage survival strategies. According to the government, in addition to having
little accountability to the rural community and no internal democracy, GPSDO lacks
accountability to the government. The government has appropriated elements of the
dominant development discourses to criticise the internal structures of GPSDO and its
relationship with the rural community. The government presents GPSDO as an elitist, top-
down, urban-based organisation with little legitimacy in the rural areas. This is juxtaposed
with GZDA as a participatory organisation, which is accountable to the rural community,
albeit through GZNDM, as the elected representatives of the people. In the context of its
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overwhelming victory when it won all the Gurage seats in the federal and regional
assemblies, GZNDM perceives itself to be the sole source of legitimacy in Gurageland'5.
Rural informants openly discussed the relationship between GZDA and the GZNDM and
suggested that GZDA acts as a vehicle for increasing the legitimacy of the GZNDM.
Whilst accusing prominent members of the EDA of attempting to use that association as a
political vehicle, an Enamor PA leader made a telling comment about the relationship
between GZDA and GZNDM. "In the end, the people here refused to accept them twell-
known urban GPSDO activists] as their representatives, because they were trying to
establish their structures here as EPRDF has done with GZDA".
Critics of the government suggest that its suspicion of GPSDO's urban bias reflect
government strategies of domination, which includes control of development and all other
activities within the zone. In particular they believed that attacks on GPSDO reflect the
government's aim to eliminate all non-GZNDM intermediaries between itself and the rural
community. GPSDO is the most obvious example of Gurage urban-rural networks, which
cut across the government's relationship with the rural community. This issue is
particularly salient as urban Gurages and especially the elite appear to be hostile to the
current government. I explain the reasons for this below. This hostility was manifested in
the rebuttal of attempts by GZDA to use Kebeles to mobilise urban resources. GZDA is
seen by much of the Gurage urban elite as an unnecessary imposition by the government.
It is seen as transplanting an alien Tigrayan model of development to an area with a long-
established, successful and genuinely indigenous development organisation. An urban
intellectual, who was often critical of GPSDOI commented, "the way that the party
[EPRDF] responded to this particular challenge is very typical of the way it responds to
similar issues. When there are independent organisations, both politically speaking.. .and
even development associations, that do not take their orders from the government or party
cadres, instinctively what they do is to create another organisation. Rather than co-opting
15 In the 2000 General Election GZNDM lost 2 of its 14 seats in the Federal Parliament.
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the existing organisation, which may require some kind of compromise, they create
another and weaken the other. This is a typical example. The unfortunate part of this
[case] is that they ended up weakening everyone. They have undermined GPSDO,
without having benefiting from it. So essentially community based activities have been
stopped." The criticisms of GZDA by urban dwellers focused mainly on its political
linkages, which for them implicated the organisation in the undermining of GPSDO.
Much of GPSDO's success during the imperial and Derg periods has been attributed to
the pivotal role played by well-placed patrons in the civil service and military. There now
seem to be fewer Gurage high-ranking civil servants prepared to promote GPSDO openly.
According to Gedamu, during the imperial period the urban elite were offered honorary
titles, land and promotion as an incentive to work for development associations (Gedamu
1972). In the Derg period, provincial officials could also benefit from supporting GRCO.
Currently, there is little incentive for government employees to promote GPSDO openly,
and it is possible that open support for GPSDO would harm their careers. All government
employees are expected to become active members of their respective development
associations such as GZDA.
Due to decentralisation, the sectors of the Gurage elite who previously promoted GPSDO
are geographically marginalised from influential networks. In the past, under more
centralised political systems, prominent urban Gurages were able to circumvent rural
opposition by using their personal contacts or status to persuade decision-makers at the
centre. Theoretically, power is now decentralised with more autonomy located at the
Zonal and Worreda level. Therefore, it is likely that urban Gurage activists have less
influence on rural decision-making than previously, as their contacts and access to key
decision-makers are in Addis. However, if one examines the flows of accountability in the
rural areas, the exclusion of GPSDO and its supporters from the key decision-making
processes is even more apparent. Here the flows of accountability are upwards and within
GZNDM at the zone level, then to the Southern Peoples Democratic Front at the regional
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level, and ultimately to the EPRDF. Few if any of GPSDO's activists, even those working
as civil servants, appear to have any influence over these parties. Linked to this is the
desire for GZNDM to control all activities in the zone. The activities of GPSDO were one
of the few things not under the direct control of the party. This is reflected in part of the
GZNDM discourse, which urges GPSDO to relocate its headquarters to Welkite, the zone
capital.
4	 Conclusions
I conclude by examining how the Gurage elite and intellectuals have conceptualised the
current relationship with the government by relating it to the constructions of their
accommodations with previous regimes, outlined above. The overarching discourse is
that, once the true nature of GPSDO as a non-political development organisation is
presented to the government, the conflict will end as it did under the previous regimes.
Hence, GPSDO officials and documentation refer to their conflict with the government as
a 'misunderstanding', which implies that it can be resolved through the government
understanding the true nature of the organisation. This conception could also be linked to
traditions of arbitration of disputes by elders reaching a consensus. However, using the
term 'misunderstanding' could also be a means of presenting disputes to outsiders in a
non-confrontational manner.
GPSDO projects an image of a non-political people's organisation, which stands above
politics and is permanent, when compared to the various regimes. Gurage intellectuals
articulate a perception that an organisation too closely associated with a regime will share
its fate when the regime eventually falls. This discourse was applied to GZDA by almost
all urban informants who were aware of its existence. The following statement by an urban
Gurage not active in GPSDO typifies this attitude. TMThey are like any other party-based
development association, it has very little legitimacy outside the political process. The
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minute the political change comes, they will disappear. Their existence is dependent on
the party and its political structures." Gurage intellectuals usually juxtaposed this with the
constructed history of GPSDO independence outlined above. Ironically, the official
government discourse seems to share this view. A leader of GZNDM stated of AWRCA, it
"was created by General Yilma who was killed by the Derg and the organisation died a
natural death after him."
There are however broad similarities between the GPSDO and government discourses.
Both appropriate elements of the dominant development discourses to legitimise their
current activities, to explain the past and to differentiate and comment on each other.
Thus, the GPSDO discourse, which presents the organisation as a people's organisation,
has adopted aspects of the participation discourse to explain the nature of its linkages
with the urban and rural communities. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the nature of
this participation is radically different from the participation as empowerment paradigms.
In this chapter, I have outlined the dominant Gurage development discourse, which
stresses that the main reason for the success of GPSDO is that it has avoided politics.
Throughout most of its history, the Gurage elite astutely projected an image of the
organisation as non-political in the sense that the organisation was not openly critical of
the government. Whilst engaging with government structures on their own terms, GPSDO
managed to maintain a high degree of autonomy from them. However, this implies a
rather narrow definition of political activity, which is limited to competitive politics. One can
suggest that the organisation has been apolitical, as it has maintained a balance between
avoiding mobilising Gurage resources against the government or indeed being openly
critical of the government, whilst also enjoying a degree of autonomy from government
structures. However, if one uses a broader conception of politics which encompasses
activities that impact on wider socio-economic power relationships, it can be seen that the
organisation has had a political role because it has rarely been involved in challenging the
status quo. On the contrary, through its flexible accommodations with a range of rural
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actors and political structures it can be seen to have legitimised and possibly reinforced
those power structures favoured by the government. Furthermore, many of its activities,
such as increasing the ease of communication and education, have the potential to cause
political side effects. As discussed in Chapter 5, more recently GPSDO and its allies have
become involved in challenging and modernising the legal underpinning of rural power
relationships through its role as facilitator in the Va Kitcha process. This process is likely
to directly affect power relationships, particularly gender relationships within households.
Thus, according to Gurage discourses, the survival of GPSDO up to the EPRDF
assumption of power was largely due to the organisation avoiding politics. Paradoxically,
the perception that GPSDO and Gurages in general, had avoided engaging in anti-Derg
activities led to them being viewed with suspicion by the EPRDF. It seems logical to
suggest that a government, which regards an essentialist form of ethnicity as the only
legitimate form of political and social organisation also conceptualises social action in the
same essentialist terms, with ethnic groups acting as homogenous units. Many urban
Gurages regard themselves as a targeted group, as they believe that the EPRDF regards
the Gurages as collaborators with the Derg who benefited materially from the regime, in
contrast to the suffering of other ethnic groups, particularly the Tigrayans. These
suspicions would also have been heightened by the fact that the GPSDO president
between 1989 and 1998 was a member of WPE, the party established by the Derg in the
I 980s, in addition to being a leader of GPDF, a party that opposed EPRDF in the I 990s.
There is a fundamental conflict between the material interests of Gurages and the
'ethnicisation' of territory that underpins ethno-federalism. The government's focus on
rural self-sufficiency is at odds with Gurage survival strategies based on cyclical migration.
Although the government is focusing on natural resource conservation and improving
agricultural techniques to increase the productive capacity of the rural areas, it is actively
discouraging chat production in Gurageland and has prohibited its trade in other regions,
due to the social, economic and medical harm allegedly caused by its consumption.
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However, chat is the second largest source of the rural income, after migrants'
remittances, and is the main source of government revenue in the Gurage zone (Gurage
Zone Planning Department 1999).
Many urban Gurages claim that ethno-federalism has limited their opportunities for trade
and employment in areas outside Gurageland and Addis. Gurage citizenship is defined by
their migration patterns and all the informants I spoke to believed that, if migration is
prohibited, the rural economy will not be sustainable. Furthermore, as I have argued,
Gurage survival strategies are closely linked to their notions of citizenship and civic virtue,
and enable them to take advantage of and adapt to changes In the political and economic
environment. However, at present there are fundamental contradictions between the
dominant Gurage notions of citizenship and the model of citizenship constructed by
EPRDF.
Even so, it is important to avoid suggesting that these contradictions are set in stone and
that there is no re-negotiation of the relationships between these different layers of
organisation and the state. For example, an examination of the activities and structures of
GPSDO and GZDA suggests that they are in many ways complementary. GPSDO and its
sub-committees focus on large-scale, capital-intensive infrastructure, whereas GZDA
emphasises localised, labour-intensive, natural resource conservation. At the Worreda
level, GZDA does not have the capacity to finance large-scale capital-intensive projects,
whereas GPSDO in most areas does not have the rural structures to monitor regular
labour-intensive activities demanded by natural resource conservation.
The new GPSDO leadership and the zone and Worreda authorities are currently
renegotiating their relationships. Meetings have taken place between the GPSDO
transport sector and zone officials and there has been a recent increase in the frequency
of its operations. Most significantly, GPSDO and GZDA are collaborating on a
development project, alongside a range of other development actors, including the state
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and organisations representing Siltes and Kistanes. This compensatory education project
is funded by American Gurages (BOLD - Outage Houses Development Association) and
is chaired by the ex-leader of GPSDO. All parties seem to have established a good
working relationship.
Officially, GPSDO is now welcome to return to rural development, provided that it avoids
becoming involved in politics and accepts the authority of the zone as embodied in the
recently-established Gurage Zone Development Forum. The new leadership of GPSDO is
aware that seeking a new accommodation with the state is critical to the organisation's
survival.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions: the role of identity in Gurage development associations
Introduction
The growing body of research into African indigenous development associations, such as
Hometown Associations, ethnic unions and migrants' associations, has analysed in some
detail both their contributions to their communities and their role in civil society. However,
the bulk of this research has overlooked the relationship between identity and communal
action. This oversight has led identities to be treated as largely unproblematic and has
implied, therefore, that identities, particularly ethnicity, are primordial and fixed. Some of
the research on Hometown Associations has detected an instrumental use of identity
within these associations related to their role in civil society (Woods 1994). When
researchers have analysed the role of identity within these associations, they have tended
to focus on how these associations have been involved in competitive politics and have
thus presented identity as primarily instrumentally mobilised ethnicity. However, there has
been little examination of the nature of the identity-based affiliations, which underpin these
associations. Instead, identities are regarded as pre-existing resources to be harnessed
for developmental purposes.
The dominant approaches to the study of ethnicity focus principally on the construction
and maintenance of ethnic boundaries. Until recently, following this logic, research has
tended to focus on a group's interactions with other groups. The constructivist
approaches, and particularly the contributions from Lonsdale (Lonsdale 1992), have
significantly altered the focus of research into ethnicity. This form of constructivism is
concerned with the moral aspects of culture that are used to define the group's position in
the world in relation to an imagined past. Central to this process are debates within the
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group about the nature of 'cMc virtue ', the moral framework of rights and obligations, and
conceptions of justice and equality. This approach significantly broadens previous
definitions of ethnicity and allows an analysis of the relationship between ethnicity and
development to go beyond regarding ethnicity as merely a resource mobilised by elites for
their own purposes.
In previous chapters of this thesis, I have argued that the dominant Gurage conception of
civic virtue is based on the rights and obligations embedded in their migratory survival
strategies and that adherence to these notions is crucial to be regarded as members of
the group. Furthermore, the dominant Gurage notion of civic virtue has been extended to
include participation in development, and the meanings that Gurages attach to
development are related to civic virtue. Thus, development has become a central element
in the creation and maintenance of Gurage identities. This chapter will now show how
identities have been harnessed for development purposes and will reflect on how these
processes have led participation in development to become a social obligation for
Gurages and thus embedded within Gurage identities.
Although I acknowledge that interactions with other groups have shaped Gurage
identities, the task of this thesis is to explain how Sebat Bet Gurage identities have both
changed and interacted with their perceptions of and involvement in development
processes, particularly through GPSDO. In section 2 of this chapter, I begin by outlining
the main currents of thought on the construction of Gurage identities. I then examine the
salience of the various layers of affiliation that go to make up the Sebat Bet Gurage
identity. It should be underlined that the identities discussed in the chapter are those of
male Gurages, as they constitute the activists and main participants in the indigenous
models of Gurage development. Women's identities are beyond the scope of this thesis
for the reasons outlined in Chapter 3. In section 3, I examine the role that identities have
played in GPSDO, arguing that a range of Gurage ethnically-based identities have been
harnessed for development and that identities are used to articulate grievances within
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GPSDO and interpret contemporary internal problems. In section 4.1, I draw together
analysis from previous chapters to illustrate how development has become a central
aspect of the construction and maintenance of Gurage identities. Section 4.2 discusses
how socio-economic and demographic changes have created tensions between new
urban Gurage identities and the previous model of the developmental Gurage identity. In
the final section, I conclude the thesis by looking at the relationship between development
and Gurage notions of civic virtue.
2	 Constructions of Gurage identities
2.1	 The history of Gurage identity
Contemporary Gurage discourses outlined by elders suggest that in pre-imperial times the
relationships between the various houses and clans was characterised by fluid alliances
and enmities, although Sebat Bet Gurages had co-operated in fighting external foes. In
particular, the period before incorporation into the Ethiopian State was characterised by
intense feuding between the Sebat Bet houses. Elders do not talk of pre-imperial times as
a golden age but rather focus on the insecurity and destruction caused by the feuding.
Elders refer to it as a time when a strong man could take a weaker man's son and sell him
into slavery. All indigenous and foreign research into Gurages suggests that, before
incorporation into the imperial state, they were segmentary societies with no history of
unitary political authority. Much of the early work into Gurage social organisation such as
Shack (1966) and Gedamu (1972) is synthesised by Markakis (1998) in a constructivist
account of the creation of Gurage identities. According to Markakis, Gurages came to be
perceived by others as a distinct ethnic group in the early 20th century in a process "not
different in essence from what happened elsewhere in Africa at the same timer
 (Markakis
1998 p131). Thus, it was conquest, and the need of the conquerors for clear and
expedient principles to guide their administration, that were the impetus for the creation of
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a Gurage ethnic identity. "The congregation of most Gurage into a single administrative
unit was the first stroke of fashioning a single Gurage ethnic identity" (Markakis 1998
p132).
Critically for the construction of new identities, colonialism led the Gurage to be
incorporated into the Gabbar system (a Feudal system imposing land appropriation by the
Shoan Amhara elite and incorporating a system of tithes payable by serfs) which alienated
them from their lands and imposed taxation that could only be paid through migration. In
line with anthropological work in other parts of Africa, much emphasis is placed, by all
researchers, on the role of urban migration in the creation of ethnic identities. Markakis
emphasises migrants' use of ethnic networks for mutual social and economic aid in the
creation of identities (Markakis 1998). However, Gedamu emphasised the importance of
house-based ties with each house focusing on a specific economic niche (Gedamu 1972).
My research suggests that contemporary Gurage networks are closer to the position of
Gedamu than Markakis, as the networks most important to their economic and social
advancement are based on sub-ethnic attachments of family, village, clan and house
rather than ethnic networks. However, it should be noted that Markakis states that the late
Derg and transitional periods created a social, economic and cultural environment where
Gurages placed greater emphasis on sub-ethnic affiliations. By contrast, the data on
which this chapter is based were collected in an environment where Gurages reflected on
their own history in the light of contemporary political and cultural factors.
Markakis suggests that the work of Shack (1966), which presented the Gurages as an
ethnic group with a shared culture and unified social organisation, "put a scientific gloss
on outsiders' perceptions of Gurages as a solid ethnic entity", and that it suited the
interests of Gurage migrants to accept this as it broadened their social network (Markakis
1998) p132). This perception of a unified Gurage ethnic identity suited the interests of the
elite as they could legitimise their activities by claiming to be acting on behalf of all
Gurages. Markakis acknowledges that the work of Shack caused much controversy,
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however, he focuses primarily on dissent from sources other than the Sebat Bet,
particularly Gedamu (1972) who at the time proposed that the Kistane (Sodo) Gurages
had a distinct ethnic identity16 However, Markakis overlooks Sebat Bet criticisms of Shack,
outlined in Chapter 3, which have also played a part in shaping Gurage identities and
relationships between the houses. It should also be noted that Markakis is at the
instrumental end of constructivism, and his analysis, whilst appreciating the importance of
indigenous actors in the construction of their identities, focuses primarily on how Gurages
construct their identities to further their material interests. As I argued in Chapters 3 and 6,
the dominant Sebat Bet Gurage understandings of their identities are constructed in a
complex process which includes responding to emerging material opportunities by
reference to 'traditions', and involves status building for individuals and groups. Thus, as I
outlined in Chapter 3, Sebat Bet Gurage collective identities were redefined in a process
that involved the interpretation of Shack's early research by the Sebat Bet Gurage
intellectual strata.
2.2	 Internal constructions of Gurage identities
Gurage identity is multi-dimensional, contextual and composed of a hierarchy of inter
related identities extending from the level of the family to the clan, the house, Sebat Bet
and Gurage. These affiliations are intersected by religious and territorial identities, such as
village, and are subsumed within an overarching Ethiopian identity. These various
identities become salient according to the environmental circumstances in order to give
meaning to the specific interaction. Throughout the thesis, I have stressed that rights and
obligations are embedded within Gurage identities.
16 Although in his thesis Gedamu suggested that Kistane Gurages were a distinct ethnic group, he
has subsequently revised this view. I would revise my thesis in the sense that there is a common
Gurage culture but different languages. ..l spent 3 years defending the Gurageness of the Kistane."
(personal communication Nov 2000)
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The dominant Gurage discourse outlined by elders and outlined by the Gurage zone
culture department in its publication 'Gogot: the history of the Gurage' suggests that the
creation of the Garage ethnic group involved the synthesis and assimilation of a variety of
groups (Alemu 1999). This is widely accepted by Sebat Bet Gurage elders as the most
accurate portrayal of Gurage histories. However, according to this discourse it is currently
impossible for a non-Gurage to become Gurage 17. This shows congruence with Turton's
proposition that ethnic identities are meaningless unless they are perceived to be
primordial by the participants (Turton 1998). Throughout the fieldwork, informants
stressed that Gurage identities are fixed according to the sub-ethnic affiliations of clan and
then house, which make up Sebat Bet Gurage ethnic identity. Therefore, for Sebat Bet
Garages their ethnic boundaries are presented as fixed. Furthermore the relationships
between the various Sebat Bet Gurage seem to differ significantly from Andersonian
'imagined communities' (Anderson 1991). Due to the importance of sub-ethnic
attachments in defining membership of the Sebat Bet, it is possible for rural and urban
intellectuals, who serve as gatekeepers, to locate all male Sebat Bet Garages in terms of
their sub-clan and clan affiliations. Thus, for Sebat Bet Gurages their community is
tangible rather than imagined. This supports Shack's view that Garages need to be able to
locate themselves socially in relation to other clans and houses (Shack 1966).
Although the ethnic boundary for Sebat Bet Gurages appears to be fixed at present, the
nature of what happens within the group is not. I now look at these internal processes.
Family is the basic unit of loyalty, and obligations are particularly powerful on children to
provide financial assistance to their parents. There are also strong obligations to assist
siblings and their sons in migration. Shack (1966) suggested that Garages have no
obligations to their mothers' relatives, however informants suggested that, at least at the
level of the first two generations, the rights and obligations were shared equally between
17 must also be noted that this perception contrasts strongly with Gedamu's research, which
suggests that Kistane (Sodo) Garages have assimilated other ethnic groups, principally Oromos.
However, according to Gedamu the Kistane seem to have stronger territorial attachments than clan
attachments.
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the mother's and father's relatives. Within the family, obligations are unavoidable and are
seen as the building block of Gurage society. These obligations are backed by powerful
sanctions such as curses and ostracism.
Affiliations to the home village cut across clan and house-based ties. Although some
areas are seen as dominated by particular clans, this does not exclude outsiders from
residence or participation in village level associational life. There is much co-operation
within the village in communal affairs, which was the basis of Gurage mutual aid and self
help. The main form of agricultural production is village or sub-village level Debos. In the
past and currently much communal development work is focused on improving the
physical infrastructure of the village, such as Jafforo clearance and bridge building. The
village is also the basis for one type of Idir and Ikubes. This co-operation by villagers is
adapted by migrants in urban areas, particularly amongst young migrants. In Chapter 4, I
argued that, outside the family, it is villagers who give the most assistance to new
migrants and form the original basis of the new migrant's social world. In addition to
assisting migrants, there are many village level Idirs that serve to maintain links to the
home village. These Idirs are also instrumental in development work in the rural area and
provide a point of access to the urban community.
Shack characterises the Gurage clan as "a system of exogamous lineages within which
genealogical relationships are not traced, although the clan is usually believed to have a
single founding ancestor" (Shack 1966 p101). This is supported by the Moher and Enamor
elders and Gogot (Alemu 1999), which all traced linkages between the various Gurage
clans and sub-clans. Shack suggests that clan, as a jural community, is the widest
grouping within which there are moral obligations and a means for peaceful dispute
settlement. Ideally, there should be no feuding within clans as elders and clan heads
mediate disputes (Shack 1966). My informants suggested that clan identity is important to
male heads of household in urban and rural areas for dispute settlement and protection.
However, it should also be noted that Shack's work probably focused primarily on rural
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relationships. Although the moral obligations within the clan are stronger and more
enforceable than those outside the clan, there are also moral obligations to the house,
which have been harnessed and transformed by the activities of the development
associations, as I illustrated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Clan obligations have become the basis for much of Gurage associational life, particularly
Idirs. As discussed in section 4.1, these obligations and rights are not automatic and are
dependent on individuals demonstrating their commitment to the clan through participation
in Idirs and assisting fellow clansmen in times of need. Thus, membership of the clan may
not automatically lead to assistance from the clan unless it is reinforced by participation in
clan affairs, such as Idirs and other forms of affiliation.
According to Shack the system of lineages on which the clan is built is highly dynamic,
breaking away and merging at various times and various places" (Shack 1966 p100).
However, this fluidity was due to the impact of warfare and contrasts strongly with the
perception of contemporary Sebat Bet Gurages that clan identities are currently fixed.
House is a group of related clans who share a common territory. They were constructed
as alliances for military co-operation in response to threats from other houses and non-
Gurages. These histories of conflicts and alliances between the houses have produced a
perception of traditional enmities, which have shaped their contemporary orientations to
others. According to Shack (1966 p102), house is based on clan, is the largest unit of
common values and has a strong sense of tribal loyalty. Shack emphasises that houses
are not based on genealogical principles or myths of common descent, but on a
continuous territory. The importance of house is supported by Markakis, who also
suggests that house is generally the most important identity to Sebat Bet Gurages,
although his terminology is somewhat confusing. "Amongst the western Gurage the clan
(bet) provides the main basis of identity" (Markakis 1998 p1 30). Thus, Markakis neatly
side steps the problematic issue of analysing the nature of house by treating it as clan.
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This approach is distinctly at odds with Sebat Bet Gurage perceptions of their own
identities.
For Sebat Bet Gurages, to be a member of a house, the father must be a member of a
given clan, which is perceived to have originated from that house. They suggest that, as it
is impossible to change clan, it is also impossible to be assimilated into another house.
One quote from an urban intellectual sums up all the approaches. "To be a Cheha you
must be born into an indigenous clan in Cheha. Gurages do not forget their original clan,
where they came from, what their clan is. He may come for better land or as a reward for
a warrior [but] he does not forget his clan even if he may live in another place. You can
move but you can not change clan. You are still called a Cheha even if you live in another
part of the Gurage. You remain in the Cheha tribe."
For Shack (1966), house was the largest unit of political significance, however, this view
underplays the political and legal significance of the Sebat Bet Shango, which he labelled
Ya Joka, the place where the Shango convened at the time of his fieldwork. The
significance of Ya Joka as the highest level of the Sebat Bet legal system reflects the
importance of the Sebat Bet identity. However, in the 40 years since Shack carried out his
fieldwork in Ethiopia, Gurageland and the Gurages have experienced dramatic political,
economic and social changes, including the activities of development associations, which
have affected the nature and salience of the various layers of Gurage identity.
With respect to these different forms of Gurage identity, ethno-federalism seems to have
had a contradictory impact. On one hand, the official definitions of ethnicity are based on
language (although language could well be a code for more Stalinist conceptions such as
'national psyche'). Thus, Gurages, with their variety of languages, would be seen as
distinct ethnic groups. Some urban Gurage intellectuals also suggest a more
Machiavellian motive for dMding the Gurage into different groups. They suggest that, as
their size at the fall of the Derg was roughly the same as the Tigrayans, they should be
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entitled to an equal access to political power. However, the Zonal administration has its
own interests in maintaining the integrity of the Gurage zone. They have actively tried to
create a pan-Gurage identity through commissioning indigenous anthropological research
in order to emphasis the shared histories, traditions and cultures of the various Gurage
houses. Indeed, much of the activities of the Gurage zone administration and
organisations linked to it, such as GZDA, are legitimised by a pan-Gurage ideology that is
seen as superior to more parochial sub-ethnic attachments embedded within GPSDO and
other actors in the indigenous models of Gurage development.
During the course of the research, it became apparent that Sebat Bet Gurages use the
terms Sebat Bet and Gurage interchangeably. For example, many informants used the
term 'the Gurage people' when talking about the Sebat Bet and similarly called the Sebat
Bet Shango the 'Gurage Shango or the Gurage appointment'. Indeed, GRCO was named
the Gurage Road Construction Organisation and later the Gurage People's Self-help and
Development Organisation rather than using the term Sebat Bet When discussing their
relationship with non-Sebat Bet Gurages, informants would stress that they viewed them
as fellow Gurages, saw themselves as closer in cultural terms and would have some
unspecified, loose obligations to them. This could certainly be an Andersonian imagined
community. However, informants tended to present Sebat Bet Gurages as 'more Gurage'
than the northern and eastern Gurages.
I thus suggest that there is now a complex relationship between membership of the
imagined community, the Gurage, which is based on membership of the tangible
communities of house and clan. All these interrelated identities have ethnic characteristics
as they gain meaning through interaction.
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3	 The salience of ethnic identities in GPSDO
On commencement of the fieldwork, it was anticipated that the focus of the thesis would
centre on the role of ethnicity in Gurage development associations. As outlined in section
2, Gurage ethnic identity is composed of a range of sub-ethnic affiliations that become
salient in different situations. Although house is the central organising principle in GPSDO,
I argue that the development associations have harnessed the range of affiliations that
together make up Gurage ethnic identities. I then go on to examine how identities are
used to articulate grievances about the allocation of resources by GPSDO and the sub-
committees, and how they are used by factions within the leadership as a means of
mobilising support and constructing alliances in competition for power within GPSDO.
3.1	 House as the organising principle
Although 'Gurage' is used in the name of GPSDO, the organisation has never claimed to
represent all Gurages. Instead, it has focused on development in the Sebat Bet areas of
Gurageland. GRCO was founded at the instigation of the rural elders and rural and urban
institutions. In Addis it took the form of a loose coalition of house-based committees
reflecting existing affiliations based on house. An ex-leader of GPSDO explained, "GRCO
was based on house in order to get the proper support and co-operation of all the
community. The people in the seven sub-regions were already organised into smaller
groups and it was easier to approach the organised groups instead of trying to contact
individual personalities. They worked as a unit, each with its own representatives. Before
GRCO, the sub-committees were already formed [as] they had their own smaller units
dealing with local affairs. Each group came together as a unit at the Sebat Bet Shango in
order to deal with community conflicts and social life as a whole. It was easier to deal with
existing [institutions] to form a development organisation, to make use of the existing
facilities ... for development. It made it easier as these were people who were accepted
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and had credentials within the community." Thus, the development associations were
based on pre-existing ethnic institutions, particularly the house Shango and by extension
the Sebat Bet Shango. These institutions were led by people with much authority within
their communities and, as shown in Chapter 7, were linked to imperial administrative
structures. These institutions also had a long histor' of co-operation and, most
importantly, it was the leaders of these institutions who instigated the process of founding
of GRCO.
Previous chapters have illustrated the central role of identity-based institutions in GPSDO
such as Idirs. These institutions have become the principle means of consulting the
community, securing legitimacy and most importantly mobilising resources. These
identity-based institutions reflect the wider forms of social organisation, such as the
house-based Shangos, which have shaped the organisational structure of GPSDO,
particularly in the urban selling where the sub-committees mirror house affiliations. The
organisational structure of GPSDO thus reflects, both Sebat Bet Gurage identities and
affiliations, and an element of accommodation with government structures. For example,
from its inception, the urban branches used house identity whilst the rural branches
followed government administrative units in the Derg and imperial regimes.
Under the current structure of GPSDO, the house-based committees have high levels of
operational autonomy and each has its own independent sources of funding. In this
context, all development projects, even those facilitated by GPSDO headquarters, are the
responsibility of the individual houses. Thus, the sub-committees rarely co-operate on
projects or share experiences and skills. Activists often describe the relationship between
the sub-committees as friendly competition. Usually the sub-committees only have
superficial knowledge of each other's activities, organisational structures, or their
relationships with the urban and rural communities. The implication of this is that the
organisational structure of GPSDO reflects house affiliations which, when taken with the
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autonomy of the sub-committees, leads to the mobilisation of communal resources and
competition for resources within GPSDO taking on a house form.
In line with the organisational structure of GPSDO, the most important identity used to
harness resources is house. The autonomy granted to the seven sub-committees in
resource mobilisation and implementation of projects means that with the exception of
road construction al projects are focused on a particular house. indeed, in projects
designed by GPSDO rather than the sub-committees, great care is taken to ensure that all
projects have seven locations, one for each house. Even during the road construction
phase, each road was designed primarily to benefit a particular house. Urban resources
are mobilised directly through clan and house based institutions, such as Idir or by using
them as a means of accessing the community.
Although clan institutions are regularly used to mobilise resources and enforce sanctions,
it seems that there is little mobilisation on the basis of clan by GPSDO or the sub-
committees other than informal competition between the clans in order to raise their
prestige by mobilising the greatest amount of resources. An urban informant commented,
"in development, it comes to house. Gurages do not think of their clan, they think of the
house. Within that house, different clans may be elected and run their development [but]
they contribute money expecting that their house will get a share of Gurage development."
However, as outlined in section 3.2, clan has been used to articulate criticisms of the
location of specific projects.
The scope of beneficiaries of development interventions also constrains the role of
identities in the Gurage model, particularly in relation to resource mobilisation. This is
related to Gurage notions of public goods and the importance of providing benefits for
legitimacy. The scope of the benefits is geographically limited and will rarely benefit all
Gurages. Most interventions have a geographically defined set of beneficiaries and no
239
projects could have benefited the whole Gurage ethnic group. Even within the smaller
Sebat Bet community, projects could not have benefited all, or at least not equally.
3.2	 The articulation of grievances and legitimisation of project location
One of the most significant uses of house identity by the sub-committees is in legitimising
its choice of location of projects to overcome objections based on residence. In the
relatively small area served by the Moher committee, all projects must benefit the whole
house. House identity is used, by the leadership, to overcome objections based on village
and, to a lesser extent, clan affiliations. Thus, the Moher committee claims to be acting on
behalf of the whole of Moher and will not directly assist projects that benefit a smaller
area, although its resource mobilising networks may be used, It is the associational
leaders, in conjunction with rural elders, who determine whether a proposed project
benefits the whole community. This seems somewhat elastic as previous projects, such
as the telephone and high school and lobbying for water projects, have focused on the
Cheza area, because it is the main market centre. There have been some complaints
from Mohers in outlying areas who claim that their areas have been forgotten.
Enamor is a far larger area than Moher and the committee also promotes projects that
benefit the whole area. There seems to have been more complaints about the leadership
benefiting their home areas at the expense of others, and this was expressed in clan
terms by some critics. The long-standing leader of the EDC is a clan head from a rather
remote area and thus criticisms over the allocation of resources could well harness long-
standing competition between certain clans. Thus, clan affiliations are used to explain and
articulate grievances over the allocation of resources. However, it should be noted that, on
a short visit, the area predominantly settled by this clan appeared to have far less physical
infrastructure than the area around Gunchire. The criticisms thus appeared to be related
to one specific project and could be linked to political agitation. For an outsider it was
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impossible to verify whether clan affiliations do indeed affect the choices of location for
projects.
As noted in Chapter 7, the most common criticism of all agents of development, including
GPSDO, the sub-committees and the government at the Worreda and Zone level, was
that they tended to favour their home areas at the expense of others. These criticisms
tended to be articulated using identity and territorial affiliations. Thus GPSDO was
criticised for favouring certain houses, and the sub-committees were occasionally
criticised for favouring certain areas or clans at the expense of others. Similar criticisms
were levelled at the various tiers of local government, with the Worreda authorities being
criticised in Moher for favouring the other houses sharing their Worreda or favouring their
home areas, whilst the Zone authorities were criticised for favouring the eastern Gurages
over the Sebat Bet. I suggest that, in all these cases, disputes and perceptions over the
unfair allocation of resources were expressed in either identity of territorial-based claims
depending on which made the most sense to the informants. As previously stated,
competition for access to resources often referred back to 'traditional' rivalries and
alliances between clans and houses. However, these constructions of contemporary
disputes contradict other statements made by these informants, as when they were
pressed over the nature of these rivalries they always referred back to at least the 1 940s
and stated that relationships between the houses were now cordial. Much of the
competition between and within house-based sub-committees appears to take the form of
being caused by identity, however, identities are used to analyse contemporary events
and disputes affecting GPSDO by referring them to the past.
Thus, although much of the competition within GPSDO takes the form of inter-house
rivalries, house antagonisms are not the primary cause of these disputes. There are
disputes between personalities of the elite and competition for resources between and
within the sub-committees. However, they appear to take the form of inter-house conflict
due to the organisational structure of GPSDO. In addition, this is the way that the
241
intellectual strata, particularly rural elders, make sense of these disputes by relating these
contemporary disputes back to historical antagonisms and alliances between the houses.
Thus, these disputes and competition for resources are rendered meaningful to the
constituencies, and particularly participants at the general assemblies and the Shangos,
by reference to house identities. These house identities, and the 'traditional rivalries' that
shape them, are further used to mobitise support for various factions and to construct
alliances across houses. The rural informants who were critical of GPSDO tended to
express their understanding of the weaknesses of GPSDO by relating them to long-term
tensions and historical alliances between houses. Thus, although competition between the
houses is explained by reference to inter-house antagonisms, they are not in themselves
the direct causes.
3.3 Competition within GPSDO
Within GPSDO, house identities become particularly salient during competition for places
on the GPSDO executive committee and for resources from GPSDO. These contests are
structured as contests between houses, which vote as blocks for their preferred
candidates. For example, in Chapter 6, I outlined how Moher elders had constructed an
understanding of contemporary issues within GPSDO by referring them to antagonisms
dating back to the I 960s. There is much criticism of dominance by certain houses at the
expense of others, and certain individuals appear to be more astute at forging alliances
across house lines in order to gain control of GPSDO and to implement particular policies.
For example, the previous leadership suggests that, from its inception to 1989, Cheha and
other houses dominated the leadership of GPSDO. This seems to be borne out by Gurage
historical accounts. The leaders from 1989-98 attempted to legitimise their leadership on
the basis that they represented the small and remote houses that previously had been
excluded from equal representation on GRCO executive.
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Gurage intellectuals explain the dominance of leadership of GRCO / GPSDO by certain
areas on the basis of variations in access to education. This was outlined by an ex-leader
of GPSDO who suggested that access to education facilitated consciousness of the
importance of development and the skills and access to decision-makers needed to
transform it into developmental action. "[GRCOI was established by people who had
access to education, those closer to the cities. In Sebat Bet Gurage, Cheha is closer to
the towns, then Eza. Moher, Enor, Gomare, and Geta are detached and do not have
access to education and development concepts. The Cheha had access to education very
long ago, through the missionaries. The leaders and others who established the
organisation and led it for a long time were from these groups. The others were remote
they had no educated people to bring into the picture and they were not conscious about
what was going on." This led to the leadership of the organisation being dominated by
Cheha. According to an official history of GRCO in the imperial period all the executive
were from Cheha and Eza (Mariam 1972).
During a period of crisis in the mid-i 990s, the concerns over the representation of the
houses on the GPSDO executive committee became particularly salient. According to the
then leader, "to stop the rumours, when the issue of elections and other conflicts came
into the picture, I drew up a general report on the evolution of the organisation.
Percentage-wise, [the] assumption of leadership by the remote corners was 1%. The
others were: over 50% from Cheha, 40% from Eza, then Gomare, fourth was Moher and
Akilil, then the others Enor, Geta, and the least Indegagn. The people who had historically
held responsibilities assumed that they were the exclusive owners of the organisation.
They excluded people from the remote corners. They never thought that such strong
people would come up from these corners." The concerns about the historical dominance
of Cheha were articulated only at a time of intense conflict within the Gurage urban elite
and attacks on GPSDO from the state. These differences in access to the leadership were
used to legitimise the monopoly of power during the 1 990s of a leadership who assumed
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office in 1989 and according to the GPSDO constitution were supposed to seek re-
election in 1991.
It should be noted that after the removal of the group discussed above, the GPSDO
General Assembly decided that henceforth positions on the GPSDO executive would be
equally distributed between the houses. However, whilst this has been accepted by most
informants as a positive advance there were continuing criticisms of the election process
particularly the formation of alliances between the more astute representatives of certain
houses.
GPSDO has used a range of identities to construct a unified interest between urban and
rural Gurages and within the urban Gurage community. Currently house is the principal
identity used in this process, although during the road construction phase Sebat Bet
identity was harnessed. These tangible identities are part of a construction of Gurage
identity in which the notions of civic v,rtue emphasise both equality and commitment to the
wider community. Due to its organisational structure, there has been no attempt to redress
the imbalance in development between the houses. According to GPSDO discourses, the
uneven development within Sebat Bet Gurageland is a consequence of differences in the
organisational capacity of the leadership of the sub-committees and the financial base of
the urban populations. However, dissent within GPSDO over the distribution of power and
allocation of resources has been articulated with reference to identities based on house
and clan. This section has focused on the ways in which identities have been used to
mobilise resources and articulate and mange grievances. In the next section, I examine
the impact of these processes on Sebat Bet Gurage identities.
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4	 Doing development and being Gurage
4.1	 The embeddedness of development in Gurage identities
In section 3, the central role of identity-based institutions in consulting the community and
mobilising resources was outlined. However, orientations to and participation in these
institutions also define the scope of the community.
The primordialist explanations of the relationship between identity and communal action
imply that people behave in a certain way because of pre-existing identities. Thus,
ethnicity and other forms of identity are seen as the driving force of communal action.
Some instrumentalist approaches imply that identities are merely inventions created by
elites for specific purposes. Thus, identities, such as ethnicity, are created by ethnic
entrepreneurs for particular purposes by generalising sectional interests as ethnic
interests. Although the development associations continue to harness identities for
development, analysis of the complexities of this historical process require a greater
sophistication than instrumentalism can provide. A constructivist analysis of the evidence
presented in previous chapters shows how participation in development has become a
central element in the creation of Gurage identities and is now part of the social
obligations that must be fulfilled to be seen as a member of Gurage communities. I
suggest that the development associations initially harnessed Gurage identities for
instrumental purposes but that, over time, this process led to development becoming an
embedded element of Gurage identities. My argument is as follows.
First, the urban elite and prominent elders constructed a new form of Gurage citizenship
from pre-existing cultural raw materials, such as identity based Idirs, Shango and
particularly the rights and obligations embedded in Gurage migration. In this process, they
were responding to changing circumstances, such as the increased financial and
organisational capacity of urban Gurages and an expansion of political space. Identities
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were used to legitimise and co-ordinate a range of interests that were served by road
construction, such as the material interests of migrants and the rural community. Road
construction also enhanced elders' prestige and reinforced the legitimacy of the elite in
their relationship with government. These shared interests are unified and legitimised by
Sebat Bet and house identities.
Second, this process involved input from the urban and rural intellectual strata who, rather
than inventing traditions and identities from nothing to serve current interests, harnessed
elements of the complex web of Gurage cultures, networks, institutions, obligations and
histories of co-operation and public action. This process was dependent on the Gurage
elite making accommodations with government structures and policies, to take advantage
of the opportunities afforded by the access of members of the urban elite to government
decision-making structures. Thus, development became part of the obligations of being a
Gurage.
Third, an alliance of sections of the urban and rural elites and the rural elders acting
through the development associations used Gurage identities to mobilise resources.
People participated in development because development activity had become part of
belonging to Gurage communities and because they had little choice. The alliance of the
urban and rural elites together with the rural intellectual strata successfully rooted formal
development endeavour within Gurage institutions. In the process of constructing the
Gurage model of development, histories of co-operative labour, mutual assistance and
migratory obligations became the points of reference when constructing new notions of
Gurage citizenship in relation to development. This initiated a process whereby
participation in development became an element of the obligations that go to make up
Gurage identities. In this process participation in development became embedded within
the web of obligations on community members. Thus, in the golden age used by the
dominant Gurage discourse as a point of reference to analyse contemporary events,
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people are Gurage because they fulfil their obligations to the rest of the community
including participation in development.
In the postscript to Chapter 6, I noted that the dominant Sebat Bet Gurage development
discourse is contested from within the Sebat Bet Gurage communities. This counter
discourse challenged the effectiveness of indigenous Gurage development endeavour
and questioned its relevance to young Gurages born in Addis Ababa. However, it did not
question the centrality of development to the identities of the older generation of Gurages
and contemporary migrants.
According to Gedamu (1972) and other contemporary Gurage accounts, the foundation of
Gurage development associations had the secondary aim of raising the image and status
of urban Gurages. With its long-term success, the Gurage model of development has
become one of the key points that Gurages use to differentiate themselves from other
ethnic groups. In Lonsdale's (1992) terms, development has become part of the internal
morality of ethnic identity, which the group uses to distinguish itself from others.
Development is thus symbolic of other aspects of Gurage civic virtue such as hard work,
self-sufficiency and the role of social institutions. Many urban Gurages contrast the
indigenously generated development in Gurageland with the cyclical famines in other
parts of Ethiopia. They contrast the hard-working migratory Gurage peasant with the
northern Ethiopian peasantry who are dependent on external aid. Their model of
development has provided concrete evidence of the strengths and uniqueness of their
culture and forms of social organisation.
Thus, to summarise:
1. The meanings of development are rooted in Gurage notions of citizenship, and in
tangible public goods to the rural areas, which are distributed equally.
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2. Participation in development has become an essential means of demonstrating
commitment to Gurage civic virtue and therefore membership of the Gurage
community.
3. Development is the clearest evidence of Gurage civic virtue as it demonstrates the
distinctiveness of Gurage civic virtue and shows who the Gurages are.
4.2	 Tensions in contemporary Gurage identities
The picture painted in section 4.1 reflects the dominant Gurage development discourse
which pulls together several related discourses relating to the golden age of Gurage
development and an idealisation of Gurage citizenship as personified by successful
migrants who accept their obligations to other Gurages. From the responses of the vast
majority of informants, developmental obligations continue to be embedded within Gurage
identities. However, significant changes have taken place in the nature of Gurage
migration which have called into question the accuracy of the idealised Gurage migrant
discourse, outlined in Chapter 4. In addition to the changes to the political environment
facilitated by ethno-federalism, discussed in section 2.1 and Chapter 7, significant socio-
economic changes and demographic trends have helped to bring about changes in urban
survival strategies and the de-linking of sections of the urban Gurage community. Thus,
the political and socio-economic context under which Gurage identities are constructed
has altered, which has led to fractures appearing in Gurage identity. One challenge is to
what extent adherence to Gurage civic virtue continues to produce benefits. For example,
some sections of the Gurage community question the utility of the orientations to other
Gurages and Gurageland that are embedded in Gurage notions of citizenship. Thus,
although the model of the developmental Gurage was widely presented by urban and rural
informants, this may well represent a discourse relating to a past golden age of Gurage
development rather than a reflection of current realities.
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Another challenge is the awareness amongst the Gurage intellectual strata that significant
changes are taking place in Gurage identities, which are affecting the Gurage model of
development. This has led to an attempt by the urban elite and elders to refine the nature
of migratory survival strategies by increasing focus on the importance of education, as
discussed in Chapter 5.
A further challenge is the relationship between de-linked, urban Gurages and the Gurages
for whom development is an integral part of their identities. In Chapter 4, I outlined a
process of de-linking by the urban elite and Gurages born in Addis. I suggested that this
group was developing alternative non-ethnic affiliations, as membership of the Gurage
community was becoming less relevant to them. Furthermore, for new migrants the
context of migration is changing. In Chapter 5, I suggested that the Gurage elite was
aware of the reduced and changing opportunities for urban income generation. The
traditional model of Gurage migration, based on the migrant progressing from a Listro to a
trader is now far more difficult. These changes have led to a reassessment of the role of
identity-based institutions, as Ikube, Idir, and trade networks are likely to become less
important for social and economic survival.
This de-linking process has had several impacts on the Gurage development activity:
First, the Gurage community has shrunk or has become less visible. In this thesis, I have
argued that in the dominant construction Gurage notions of community are limited to those
who either institutionalise their linkages with the community, maintain connections with the
rural area or can be contacted thorough informal trade networks. If these connections are
of less importance to both new migrants and established residents of Addis, the ability of
the development associations to access and mobilise the community will be
compromised.
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Second, the effectiveness of the social pressures and sanctions that had previously been
used to mobilise urban resources are now less powerful. With de-linking from the Gurage
community and the development of alternative non-ethnic ties, the sanctions have less
relevance in social and economic terms. The urban community has fewer connections
with the rural areas, they have less information about the social and economic conditions
in Gurageland, and thus they are less likely to contribute to development. Furthermore,
the loosening of ties to Gurageland means that rural kin can exert less pressure on them
to contribute. There is also less incentive for urban people to contribute to development in
order to increase their status in both the urban and rural sectors of the community.
Third, the response by GPSDO has varied. Some sub-committees are almost non-active,
while others seek support from international NGOs. The sub-committees are aware of the
impact of these socio-economic changes, as their activists tended to be older. However, it
is difficult to disentangle these demographic and socio-economic problems from the wider
political environment, as the inactivity of some committees could be due to political
prohibitions and conflicts within GPSDO. Nevertheless, there is still much activity in the
wider indigenous model of Gurage development and there are many contacts between
localised development actors and the urban community. Many of the sub-committees are
still highly active. In addition, the increased political space in Addis has led to a
resurgence of identity-based ldirs there.
Finally, one of the major problems facing GPSDO and the sub-committees is the ageing of
much of the activists. The leadership of many sub-committees were extremely worried
about the lack of participation by young urban Gurages, particularly professionals. Some
rural informants were highly critical of young professionals suggesting that they were
selfish and had ignored the community that had provided them with education and social
support. According to this group, the lack of interest in development from young
professionals reflected a wider lack of willingness to fulfil their obligations to the rest of the
community. However, the majority of informants were more sympathetic and suggested
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that the urban community had a massive amount of obligations and lack of time and that
they were forced to focus on providing for their immediate families. In particular, much
sympathy was expressed for civil servants whose incomes and job security had been
undermined.
5	 Conclusions
I have argued that essentialist explanations of communal action are basically descriptive
as they treat ethnicity as a main driver for activities such as deve'opment. The ultimate
logic of this approach is that Gurages behave in a certain way because they are Gurage.
However, this approach to the relationship between identity and communal action also
underpins the official GPSDO discourse, as according to this discourse all Gurages
participate in development because they are Gurage. My characterisation of these
discourses is outlined in Figure 8.1. The GPSDO discourse has a more complex meaning
related to its purpose, which is to encourage resource mobilisation on the basis of identity.
Thus, the discourse and the perception of Gurageness that underpins it facilitates the
Gurage model of development. Although GPSDO has not attempted to mobilise Gurages
on the basis of a pan-Gurage ethnic identity, ethnicity as civic virtue plays a central role in
Gurage development. The Gurage model of development is built on Gurage notions of
civic virtue and has also become a central aspect in their construction.
The evidence presented in previous chapters suggests that the proposition that ethnic or
other identities drive developmental activities should be reversed. People are Gurage
because they conform to the behaviour expected of Gurages. Being a Gurage entitles one
to a web of rights such as assistance in welfare and access to networks that facilitate
trade. However, being a Gurage also entails responsibilities and obligations. In Chapter 4,
I highlighted the importance of individuals institutionalising their relationships with other
members of the clan or house in order to gain access to communal assistance. This
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perception also underpinned the definitions of community outlined in Chapter 6, which
limited membership of the community to those who maintain relationships with rural kin
and participate in associational life, such as contributing to development.
Figure 8.1
Models of the relationship between ethnicity and collective action
Relationship between
	 Relationship between ethnicity
ethnicity and collective and the Gurage approaches to
action	 development
Essentialist	 Ethnic identity causes	 People participate in development
collective action.	 because they are Gurage.
Instrumentalist	 Ethnicity is created to
	 Gurageness is created for the
legitimise collective	 purpose of development.
action.
Constructivist	 Collective action is built People are Gurage because they
on, reconstructs and	 participate in development.
affirms ethnic identity.
Although Gurage identity is based on meeting certain criteria such as clan, and therefore
house membership, these identities are meaningless unless they are activated by
participation in institutions or some other means of fulfilling obligations such as visiting
rural areas and helping kin. Thus, at present, although being a Gurage is automatic by
virtue of birth, an individual must also accept the responsibilities that go with group
membership. One is born a Gurage but to be Gurage in a meaningful sense one must
behave like a Gurage by fulfilling the obligations related to being a Gurage.
As outlined in Chapter 6, participating in development through providing resources and
leadership has become an integral aspect of being a Sebat Bet Gurage. However,
currently, it seems impossible for a person without the appropriate sub-ethnic affiliations of
clan and house to become a Gurage. As I outlined in section 2, being Gurage, whilst
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entailing membership of an imagined community, is based on membership of tangible
communities, such as house and clan. The criteria used by Gurages to define their
identities have both apparently fixed and active elements. At present, the apparently fixed
elements are membership of the appropriate clan and house. Although house and clan
identities are fixed, they are not seen as primordial by Gurage elders and other
intellectuals who can date their origins. However, for the fixed criteria to become activated
and form the basis of identities, they must be reinforced by the more active elements,
such as participation in Gurage associational life as a means of discharging ones
obligations to the community.
This case study has illustrated the complexities of the relationships between Gurages,
their survival strategies, their social networks, and their notions of citizenship and
perceptions of communal action. This thesis has analysed a specific set of social
relationships, which are unique to Gurages. However, this approach, analysing
development as a form of civic virtue, has implications for the study of other indigenous
development associations.
The dominant development discourses stress the importance of indigenous agency in
development, through indigenous organisations and beneficiary participation. My
approach can contribute towards a better understanding of the ways that development
associations and their beneficiaries construct a relationship of trusteeship based on forms
of social organisation and the values embedded within them. This approach is also
applicable to analysing how beneficiaries conceptualise their relationship with non-
indigenous agencies of development. My analysis of how the values constructed around
development interact with notions of social responsibility and citizenship can inform
methodological debates within development studies, as it contributes toward developing
conceptual approaches that centre on beneficiaries' understanding of the process of
development.
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The approach used in the thesis also has implications for the study of ethnicity in Africa. It
demonstrates that constructivist analysis can be applied to situations where politicised
forms of ethnicity are not apparent and therefore widens the scope for the analysis of
ethnicity. It also contributes towards a better understanding of the relationship between
processes within ethnic groups and the construction of relationships with other groups.
This thesis illustrates that the relationship between ethnicity and development is a
complex process, which can become self-sustaining. It demonstrates that an
instrumentalist analysis of ethnicity can only reveal a partial picture of these processes at
work. Although ethnicity is harnessed as a resource to achieve specific ends by ethnically-
based development associations, it is also the medium through which the process of
development is experienced. Fundamentally, this thesis demonstrates that ethnicity does
not necessarily produce negative outcomes and is not always the result of political
manipulation. I provide evidence that ethnicity can be part of a complex process of
improving the soclo-economic conditions of ethnic groups.
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